



METRO

2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398
503/221-1646

Memorandum

REVISED DRAFT

Date: October 31, 1990

To: Urban Growth Management Plan Policy Advisory Committee

From: Transportation Policy Alternatives Committee (TPAC)
Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT)

Regarding: REGIONAL URBAN GROWTH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

We have reviewed your draft document proposing Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives and congratulate you on your considerable progress in defining an urban growth strategy for the Portland region. This document will provide a helpful framework for guiding and coordinating local and regional plans, and ~~The proposals in this document will have a significant effect on the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) and~~ We look forward to working with you to finalize and implement these recommendations. We feel it is particularly important to coordinate your work program development and follow-up studies with our regional transportation planning activities.

In general, we understand the document does not represent a plan; rather, it defines a set of principles. We offer our support to a process moving in the right direction, yet realize more work needs to be done. In particular, we support the intent of the goals and objectives to direct the region toward three major concepts involving "activity centers," "urban reserves," and "infill/redevelopment." This direction serves to implement the land use principles defined in the RTP regarding urban containment and concentrating land uses in a transit supportive pattern. These proposals need to be further defined and their potential impacts and interrelationships adequately evaluated as part of the follow-up process. Again, we look forward to working with you on these follow-up activities.

The following are comments on specific aspects of the proposed goals and objectives:

1. The goals and objectives define a policy framework for urban growth which must ultimately be implemented through a geographic concept plan delineating the urban growth pattern for the region. It is important that Metro, its growth management and transportation committees and interested jurisdictions, agencies and the public continue to participate in this urban growth management program, leading to more specific products in

the future. Based upon the Draft document, we see the importance of the following activities:

- a. evaluation of potential urban reserve areas outside the UGB;
- b. evaluation of the feasibility of and density for infill and redevelopment within the urban growth boundary;
- c. identification of planned economic activity centers and proposed development requirements inside and outside these centers, with an emphasis on examining the relationship between objectives for infill/redevelopment versus objectives for economic activity centers;
- d. identification of natural areas proposed for protection;
- e. evaluation of alternative land use scenarios in conjunction with alternative transportation system plans, should be achieved early in the process through the coordination of the Urban Growth Management and Transportation Planning work programs.

Based upon these studies, an urban growth concept plan should be developed and adopted.

JPACT, TPAC and the Metro Transportation Department look forward to assisting and actively participating in the aspects of these studies having transportation implications, particularly the evaluation of alternative land use/transportation scenarios. We will ensure that the next Regional Transportation Plan update is coordinated with your efforts.

2. A number of land use recommendations appear to be very good in terms of their potential benefits to transportation planning:
 - a. Establishment of a series of economic activity centers appears to be a very good concept in that it provides a basis for integrating development with major transit nodes and provides sufficient density to encourage pedestrian circulation and use of alternative access modes. The concept is consistent with RTP recommendations for regional high density sub-centers focused on regional transit trunk route stops and major transit centers. We would like to further evaluate the implication of this proposal

on the full transportation system, including highway access, parking, ridesharing, transit system design and internal circulation.

- b. There should be a stronger emphasis on restricting multi-family housing to economic activity centers and designated transit zones.
 - c. There should be a stronger emphasis on restricting Class A office and regional retail development to economic activity centers.
 - d. In general, infill and redevelopment results in more cost-effective infrastructure investments, depending upon the specific type and density of development.
 - e. Delineation of urban reserves outside the urban growth boundary will assist in planning the size of facilities near the fringe.
 - f. Consideration of a longer term planning horizon (such as 50 years) is helpful and should be pursued both inside and outside the boundary. This is particularly important for evaluating the long term viability of LRT and for defining requirements for right-of-way dedication.
3. The proposed objectives on urban design relating to a better land use relationship to transit, pedestrians and bikes is very important to successfully integrating land use and transportation. More attention is needed to develop good urban design techniques that are applicable in high density environments such as economic activity centers as well as lower density neighborhood environments.
 4. Transportation Policy 3.2 needs to be restructured. As proposed in the Draft document, it deals with directing new development first into areas already having needed transportation systems, second into other parts of the region that can meet mobility needs without new construction and last into areas requiring new or expanded transportation systems. This may be a desirable policy for controlling and directing growth but is misplaced as a transportation policy.

As an alternative, this policy could establish that the overall long range transportation plan should first seek to meet

mobility objectives without new construction before proposing new facilities be added to the RTP.

5. Objective 2, dealing with the provision of public facilities and services, should explicitly include transportation.
6. Objective 2 should establish the policy that public infrastructure investments be used to help implement the desired urban form expressed in these goals and objectives.
7. In order to better integrate land use plans with the Regional Transportation Plan, consideration should be given to coordinating the schedule for periodic reviews in the Portland region.
8. We encourage you to include ODOT and Tri-Met on your technical and policy committees.



METRO

Memorandum

2000 S.W. First Avenue
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Date: November 8, 1990

To: Urban Growth Management Plan Policy Advisory Committee

From: Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT)

Regarding: REGIONAL URBAN GROWTH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

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2000 S.W. First Avenue
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Memorandum

Date: October 29, 1990

To: JPACT

From: *M* Andrew C. Cotugno, Transportation Director

Re: Surface Transportation Act Reauthorization

FHWA and UMTA have released legislative proposals for their respective components of the Surface Transportation Act. These are in the process of review by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation and the Office of Management and Budget. A Draft bill is expected to be submitted to Congress in February, 1991.

Attached is an overview of the key elements of the FHWA and UMTA proposals (more details are available upon request), together with an evaluation of the implication of the proposal to urban areas and a recommendation for adopting a position.

ODOT has initiated an effort to establish a statewide position through the participation of statewide interest groups.

JPACT IS REQUESTED TO REVIEW THIS PROPOSED POSITION AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE STATEWIDE EFFORT. IN DECEMBER/JANUARY, AFTER THE ODOT EFFORT IS COMPLETED, A FORMAL POSITION WILL BE SUBMITTED TO JPACT FOR ADOPTION.

ACC:lmk

Attachment
CC: TPAC

FHWA Legislative Proposal Highlights

A. NHS Program

1. A National Highway System (NHS) category is proposed, representing a consolidation of the previous categories for "Interstate" and the "major" "Primary" routes (3.5 percent of the total public road miles). 50-70 percent of highway funding would be distributed through this program.

	<u>Current STA</u>	<u>Proposed STA</u>
Interstate	\$3.15 b.	\$0 b.
Interstate-4R.	2.815	0
Primary.	2.325	0
NHS.	<u>0</u>	<u>8.65</u>
	\$8.29 b.	\$8.65 b.

2. NHS funding will be distributed to the states. The states will select improvements on the NHS routes in cooperation with local officials through the MPO's.
3. Fund flexibility for alternatives to upgrading the NHS route will be limited to operational improvements to parallel arterials, HOV lanes on the NHS route, and park-and-ride lots.
4. Match ratio will be 90 percent for operational and rehabilitation-type improvements; 75 percent for other capital improvements; 60 percent for start-up costs of traffic management and control systems; 35 percent on toll facilities.

By comparison, the basic existing federal share is 90 percent for Interstate and 75 percent for Primary. Both the new and the old STA increase these federal shares if the state contains a large amount of federal lands. In Oregon, the revised shares are currently 92 percent and 88 percent, respectively, and would be higher than the basic rates under the new STA.

5. The Interstate system will be retained and signed for the motorist. NHS funds can be used to build or upgrade additional routes which can be signed as Interstate routes if they meet Interstate standards and connect with the Interstate system.
6. Use of NHS funds on beltways or bypasses in areas over 200,000 population will be for improvements designed to ultimately provide for multi-lane divided highways with separate lanes for through traffic and with access limited to interchanges with other NHS routes.

7. NHS funding would be used for high-speed, intercity rail studies, use of highway rights-of-way and highway design modifications.
8. Set-aside within the NHS category will be created for discretionary funding of high cost, large scale, access-controlled projects on the Interstate system or routes directly connected to the Interstate system. Funding will be paid back as a loan through future years appropriation.
9. Funds will be distributed 70 percent on the basis of fuel consumption and 30 percent total public road mileage. By comparison, current Interstate-4R funds are distributed on the basis of Interstate lane miles (55%) and Interstate vehicle miles traveled (45%); current Primary funds are distributed on the basis of rural population (22%), urban population (33%), rural area (22%) and rural mail delivery routes (22%).

The effect is to shift the distribution away from one which emphasizes the geographic size of the state to one which emphasizes the population size of the state (at Oregon's detriment).

B. Urban Program

1. An "Urban/Rural Program" is proposed representing a consolidation of the "minor" portion of the "Primary" system, the FAU system plus all other Collector routes not currently on the FAU system and, in the rural areas, the FAS system.
2. Funding for the Urban/Rural program would be more than double the existing FAU/FAS level.

	<u>Current</u> <u>STA</u>	<u>Proposed</u> <u>STA</u>
FAU	\$0.75 b.	\$0 b.
FAS	0.6	0
Urban/Rural	<u>0</u>	<u>3.3</u>
	\$1.35 b.	\$3.3 b.

3. Flexibility for use on transit allowed (although transit improvements on NHS routes not clear).
4. Federal project approvals and inspections would be replaced with overall program approval. EIS requirements would still apply.
5. 60/40 match ratio.

6. Funding distributed to each state based upon what they paid in; funds available until spent.

C. Bridge Program

1. Revised formula approach for funding distribution to states would remain with NHS, off-system and other (i.e., FAU system and FAS system) set-asides; set-aside shares not defined; formula basis unclear.
2. "Discretionary" Bridge program expanded to all facilities except off-system (i.e., allows FAU bridges).
3. Minimum threshold for Discretionary funding -- \$10 million for NHS and \$5 million for other routes.
4. Discretionary funding requires toll feasibility analysis; criteria not defined.
5. 75/25 match ratio.

D. Additional Requirements

1. Pavement Management System required for NHS system by the states.
2. Bridge Management System required for NHS and all other systems for which bridge funds will be used (i.e., all bridges).
3. Congestion Management Plan required in urban areas greater than 200,000 population by the states in cooperation with MPO's.
4. Safety Management System required for the NHS system by the states.

UMTA Program Highlights

1. Revised overall program funding level as follows:

	<u>Current STA</u>	<u>Proposed STA</u>
General Fund	\$2.3 b.	\$1.8-1.48 b.
Gas Tax.	<u>1.4</u>	<u>2.2-3.2</u>
	\$3.7 b.	\$4.0-4.68 b.

This increase is accomplished through a draw-down of the trust fund surplus rather than a gas tax increase.

2. Funding for discretionary versus formula programs is proposed to be reversed with discretionary funded from the General Fund rather than the gas tax (as provided by the current STA) and vice versa. This provides greater assurance for formula funds, responds to the objections of some rural states that they pay gas taxes but never receive discretionary funding and leaves New Starts exposed to future budget cuts because of the General Fund source of revenue.
3. Changes Rail Modernization program from current distribution to eight old rail cities to all rail cities.
4. Funding for New Starts = \$500 million per year without separate category for Washington, D.C. Metro (current = \$400 million plus \$100 million Washington, D.C. Metro).
5. Urban program equivalent to current urban Section 9 plus Rail Modernization; Rural program equivalent to current Section 9 (small city), Section 18 (rural) and Section 16(b)(2) (private, nonprofit). Section 16(b)(2) program in urban areas unclear.
6. Changes the federal share from 75 percent to 60 percent.
7. Eliminates use of Section 9 funding for operating assistance but allows an expanded definition of "Materials and Supplies" under the capital program.
8. Allows flexibility to use transit formula for highways.
9. Retains current recipients in areas over 200,000 population; distributes funds through states to areas under 200,000.

Evaluation of Legislative Proposals

According to the U.S. Department of Transportation report to Congress, "The Status of the National's Highways and Bridges: Conditions and Performance," 40 percent of the needs nationwide are for Modernization improvements in the metropolitan areas. In addition, 16 percent are for Interstate Rehabilitation, a portion of which are in the metropolitan areas. The FHWA/UMTA legislative proposals do not ensure these needs will be met nor that an equitable share of the funds will be targeted to the metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the proposals provide insufficient flexibility and will inherently bias funding decisions against projects that can most cost-effectively meet urban mobility objectives.

The FHWA/UMTA proposals continue the past trend of disinvesting in the urban areas, emphasizing intercity highway improvements and skewing funding that does flow to urban areas toward major highway improvements. Particular concerns are as follows:

A. Urban Mobility Not Adequately addressed:

1. The major funding categories to meet Urban Mobility objectives are either through NHS program or UMTA-New Starts program. The NHS program will receive 50-70 percent of all the FHWA funding (@ \$8+ billion) while the New Starts program will continue at a meager \$.5 billion.
 - a. NHS provides bias toward major highways without adequate flexibility for alternatives involving upgrading parallel arterials, bus service expansion, rail construction or demand management even if these will more cost-effectively meet NHS congestion objectives.
 - b. New Start funding inadequate to meet legitimate demand for New Start facilities. The overall funding level is increased \$100 million/year but will also include Washington, D.C. Metro. In addition, shifting the New Start program from the gas tax to the General Fund puts this funding level in jeopardy.
 - c. NHS funding to states for both urban and intercity improvements reinforce bias for intercity improvements at the expense of urban mobility improvements. Since the Rural NHS is intended to connect all urban areas of population greater than 10,000, urban vs. rural competition will be significant.

- d. Level of NHS funding intended for urban areas not necessarily targeted to urban areas. The level of funding is based upon the overall NHS needs (urban and rural) but the distribution is not targeted.
 - e. Match ratio bias in favor of NHS improvements (75/25) rather than urban arterials (60/40) or New Starts (60/40).
2. The Urban program (FHWA and UMTA) which is intended to meet the balance of the urban system needs is insufficient to meet urban needs. "Urban" funding would be spread across a larger system. FAU system would be expanded with more large scale facilities shifted from the FAP system and added smaller facilities (all Collector routes).
 3. Added requirements that urban areas implement Congestion Management Plans are not accompanied with resources and flexibility to meet requirements.
 4. The FHWA/UMTA programs should be restructured to ensure a balanced approach to meeting key national objectives affecting:
 - a. Urban/suburban growth and gridlock
 - b. Urban air quality
 - c. International economic competitiveness

B. Intercity Improvements Partially Satisfied

1. The philosophy of NHS for intercity connections appears acceptable (involving connecting all urban areas of 10,000 population or greater) but should not be the priority at the expense of urban mobility.
2. An artificial mileage cap (150,000 miles) could limit intended function of NHS, but all mileage levels under consideration (120,000 to 180,000) represent a significant increase over the Interstate system (44,000 miles).
3. Preservation of the Interstate system could be jeopardized by shifting funds to Preservation and Modernization on a much larger NHS system.

Recommendation

A. Principles

1. Urban areas should be assured funding through a formula approach to the greatest extent possible.

2. A federal Discretionary program for NHS and New Starts should be provided to supplement formula programs for large scale, high-cost projects.
3. Funding available to urban areas should be sufficiently flexible to meet objectives through the most cost-effective alternative available. Modal bias resulting from funding availability, match ratios or difference in administrative requirements should be eliminated.
4. Comprehensive Congestion Management requirements should be a joint responsibility of the state and urban area, including the state Department of Transportation, MPO, cities, counties and transit operators, and should be the primary basis for targeting funds to urban mobility needs. Congestion management requirements should apply to UMTA programs in addition to FHWA.

B. Proposed Changes to FHWA/UMTA Proposals

1. Designate NHS system in urban areas only for the purpose of defining a congestion management requirement for facilities of national significance (NHS routes into and through urban areas) rather than for targeting funds for NHS improvements.
2. Standardize match ratios at 75/25.
3. Increase funding for New Start program with reliable trust fund dollars.
4. Retain "New Starts" and NHS "Discretionary" programs for high-cost, large scale projects.
5. Maintain Bridge program.

C. Alternatives for Distributing Funds to Meet Urban Mobility Objectives

Alternative 1

- . Maintain "NHS" and "Urban" categories as currently proposed.
- . Suballocate urban portion of "NHS" funds to urban areas.
- . Allow use of the urban NHS allocation for preservation projects on the NHS system identified by the state.
- . Allow use of the urban NHS allocation for actions identified by the state and the region in the Congestion

Management Plan to meet level-of-service objectives on the NHS system. Allow sufficient flexibility to fund highway, transit, arterial or demand management improvements that most cost-effectively benefit the NHS route.

- . Suballocate FHWA "Urban" funds and UMTA "Urban" funds to each urban area to meet mobility objectives off the NHS system. Allow use of highway funds for transit; transit funds for highways.

Alternative 2

- . Maintain an Interstate-Preservation category to be administered by the state in both urban and rural areas.
- . Merge the funding intended for NHS "Urban" Modernization with the FHWA "Urban" program and the UMTA "Urban" program into a single category with suballocations to each urban area.
- . Allow first priority use of the consolidated "Urban" funding program for cost-effective actions identified by the state and the region in the Congestion Management Plan to meet level-of-service objectives on the NHS system.
- . Allow use of the consolidated "Urban" funding program on mobility improvements off the NHS system if reasonable progress on the NHS system can be demonstrated.

1991 SURFACE TRANSPORTATION ACT UPDATE PROGRAM OPTIONS

CURRENT S.T.A.

URBAN:	FAI/FAI-4R	FAP	FAU	HBR	UMTA Sec. 9	New Starts
RURAL:			FAS		Sec. 18	
MATCH RATIO	92/8	88/12	88/12	80/20	75/25	75/25

FHWA/UMTA PROPOSAL

URBAN:	NHS	FHWA-URBAN	HBR	UMTA-URBAN	New Starts
RURAL:		FHWA-RURAL		UMTA-RURAL	
MATCH RATIO	75/25	60/40	75/25	60/40	60/40

JPACT-ALTERNATIVE 1

URBAN:	NHS-URBAN	FHWA-URBAN	HBR	UMTA-URBAN	New Starts
RURAL:	NHS-RURAL	FHWA-RURAL		UMTA-RURAL	
MATCH RATIO	75/25	75/25	75/25	75/25	75/25

JPACT-ALTERNATIVE 2

URBAN:	FAI-3R	FHWA-URBAN	HBR	UMTA-URBAN	New Starts
RURAL:		FHWA-RURAL		UMTA-RURAL	
MATCH RATIO	75/25	75/25	75/25	75/25	75/25



METRO

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Fax 241-7417

October 8, 1990

Mr. Robert Royer
Planning Engineer
ODOT/Highway Division
Room 605, Executive House
325 13th NE
Salem, Oregon 97310

Dear Bob:

Enclosed please find Metro's detailed route list for the Portland region's urban area Highways of National Significance (HNS) system. As requested by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the route list has been entered on the enclosed diskette. For your reference, we have also included a hard copy of the route list and a map which details individual route segments. The routes remain unchanged from our initial submittal and reflect the basic and second level mileages allocated to the region. The list does not include any optional level facilities.

With this submission, the Portland region's responsibilities related to the initial development of an HNS system for "illustrative purposes" are complete. We appreciate the assistance you and your staff have provided us during this exercise and are extremely interested in its outcome. We anticipate, given the uncertainties surrounding the HNS and its development process, additional work will be required on the program prior to adoption of a new Surface Transportation Act (STA).

Specifically, the Portland region's HNS system was reviewed and approved for submission, with comments and concerns, by the region's Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT). Those comments are summarized in a September 13, 1990 letter to Bob Bothman from George Van Bergen, JPACT Chair. A copy of that letter is attached for inclusion as part of our submission. Also, after reviewing the preliminary statewide urban and rural networks as distributed September 25 by your office, we have identified two additional significant issues:

Executive Officer
Rena Cusma

Metro Council
Tanya Collier
Presiding Officer
District 9

Gary Hansen
Deputy Presiding
Officer
District 12

David Saucy
District 1

Lawrence Bauer
District 2

Jim Gardner
District 3

Richard Devlin
District 4

Tom DeJardin
District 5

George Van Bergen
District 6

Ruth McFarland
District 7

Judy Wyers
District 8

Roger Buchanan
District 10

David Knowles
District 11

Mr. Robert Royer
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1. Optional Level Facilities

The urban area systems for different parts of the state appear odd relative to their application of "optional mileage levels." While the Portland region has not identified any optional facilities, the other urban areas, to varying degrees, have. While we understand that the Portland region has been allocated the bulk of the "basic" and "second" level urban mileages, and while we understand the difficulties the other urban areas encountered in developing a coordinated, comprehensive system, we feel the optional mileages should be used judiciously and only as a means to create equitable systems between the urban areas. This does not currently appear to be the case. As it stands now, a number of relatively minor street segments have been designated for the optional level in the state's other urban areas. Consequently, the resulting system does not appear equitable based on any criteria or formula, whether lane-miles, population, fuel consumption or others.

Accordingly, we feel that the optional level street segments should at least be applied uniformly throughout the state and be consistent with FHWA HNS national significance criteria which are intended to:

- . Serve interstate and international commerce and travel;
- . Provide for national defense needs;
- . Enhance economic vitality and international competitiveness;
- . Provide service to all portions of the nation; or
- . Respond to changing population and travel patterns over time through an objective review process.

Also, for further clarification, we feel that ODOT should develop necessary statewide criteria for optional level facilities. Such criteria will enable the state to define a consistent, logical, and justifiable HNS system in the event the program

Mr. Robert Royer
October 8, 1990
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is ultimately adopted as part of the new STA. Such a system would also reduce the potential for future funding allocation discrepancies between the state's urban areas. Possible criteria could include functional classifications, current federal designation (Interstate, Primary, etc.), average daily traffic, land use, economic factors, and others.

In summary, the application of statewide HNS classification criteria should result in comparable systems between the state's urban areas. Individual urban facilities should be able to be reviewed for HNS inclusion whether they are in Portland, Eugene, Salem, or Medford.

2. U.S. 26 (Sunset Highway)

U.S. 26 (the Sunset Highway) should be included in the Basic Level System in its entirety from downtown Portland to U.S. 101. In addition to its importance as a key highway facility within the Portland metropolitan area, the Sunset Highway provides a major connection between the Portland area and the coast. This connection is vital from two major economic standpoints: commerce and tourism. With its connections to the Sunset Corridor and downtown Portland, we feel the Sunset Highway is consistent with the HNS significance criteria by "serving international commerce and travel," "enhancing economic vitality and international competitiveness," and "responding to changing population and travel patterns."


We felt the Sunset Highway's exclusion from the Access Oregon Highway program and as a Statewide route in the Oregon Highway Plan was a mistake and we do not want the same mistake repeated in the event the HNS program is implemented at the "Basic" mileage level. Further, if the state continues to recommend second level HNS status for the Sunset Highway, we would appreciate receiving from ODOT quantifiable justification for such a designation as compared to other routes that are included in the Basic system.

Again, we have appreciated working with you and your staff on the preliminary development of an HNS system.

Mr. Robert Royer
October 8, 1990
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We would appreciate hearing back from you on our above comments as soon as possible in order for these issues to be resolved in advance of the November 30, 1990 FHWA submittal deadline. If you have questions or would like to meet to discuss our comments or our proposed system for the Portland region, please feel free to call either Mike Hoglund at 221-1646 or me at 220-1152.

Sincerely,



Andrew C. Cotugno
Transportation Director

ACC:MH:lmk

Enclosures

CC: Bob Bothman
JPACT
TPAC

**PRELIMINARY HIGHWAYS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
URBANIZED AREA(S) ROUTE LIST TEMPLATE**

Items:																
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Description:																
S	R	F	A	N	R	S	R	H	LN	1989	1989	C	UBZD	M	BEG	END
T	/	C	T	I	T	N	I	N	IN	WEIGH	WEIGH	O	AREA	I	MILE	MILE
A	U	S	C	T	G	S	T	E	TENTH	TED	TED	N	FIPS	PT	PT	
T	Y	H	S	N	S	M	I	E	MILES		HEAVY	N	URBAN	L		
E	C	S	C	R	I	E	E	E	-ASSUM	AADT	TRUCK	PLACE	E	-ASSUMED		
D	T	U	G	D	G	X	E	D	ED		AADT	L	OR	V	DECIMAL	
C	C	L	N	ROUTE	/	DEC						K	SMALL	E	POINT	
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41	3			I205		05	6		46	104600					1	
41	3			"		05	7		24	119000					1	
41	3			"		05	8		21	95500					1	
41	3			"		05	9		10	83600					1	
41	3			"		05	10		19	77600					1	
41	3			I405		06	1		10	80600					1	
41	3			"		06	2		14	75400					1	
41	3			"		06	3		10	82500					1	
41	3			US30		08	1		31	21300					1	
41	3			"		08	2		27	25600					1	
41	3			"		08	3		21	28700					1	
41	3			"		08	4		3	32400					1	
41	3			"		08	5		4	54500					1	
41	3			99W		014	1		18	25100					1	
41	3			"		014	2		20	36300					1	
41	3			"		014	3		8	35900					1	
41	3			"		014	4		12	46300					1	
41	3			"		P1	1		13	17300					2	
41	3			"		P1	2		23	21200					2	
41	3			"		P1	3		9	13500					2	
41	3			"		P1	4		14	30800					2	
41	3			Hwy224		017	1		25	27300					1	
41	3			"		017	2		8	29000					1	
41	3			"		017	3		8	34900					1	
41	3			"		017	4		9	44400					1	
41	3			"		017	5		25	33000					1	
41	3			"		017	6		9	21600					1	

**PRELIMINARY HIGHWAYS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
URBANIZED AREA(S) ROUTE LIST TEMPLATE**

Items:																
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Description:																
S	R	F	A	N	R	S	R	H	LN	1989	1989	C	UBZD	M	BEG	END
T	/	C	T	I	T	N	I	N	IN	WEIGH	WEIGH	O	AREA	I	MILE	MILE
A	U	S	C	T	G	S	T	ENTH	TED	TED	N	FIPS		PT	PT	
T	Y	H	S	N	S	M	I	LES		HEAVY	N	URBAN	L			
E	C	S	C	R	I	E	E	-ASSUM	AADT	TRUCK	PLACE	E	-ASSUMED			
D	T	U	G	D	G	X	E	D		AADT	L	OR	V	DECIMAL		
C	C	L	N	ROUTE	/	DEC					K	SMALL	E	POINT		
D	D	L	G	#	#	F	POINT					URBAN	L			
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Length:																
2	1	2	1	2	1	5	3	1	5	6	5	1	5	1	5	5
41	3			US26		P2	1		33	33400					1	
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41	3			"		P2	4		16	97100					1	
41	3			"		P2	5		31	120600					1	
41	3			"		P2	6		7	25100					1	
41	3			Hwy217		P3	1		14	76600					1	
41	3			"		P3	2		16	89300					1	
41	3			"		P3	3		25	97800					1	
41	3			"		P3	4		3	73800					1	
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41	3			Marine Dr.		P4	1		53	5100					1	
41	3			"		P4	2		16	17400					1	
41	3			Lombard		P5	1		19	9500					1	
41	3			St. Johns Br.		P6	1		8	18400					1	
41	3			NE Portland Hwy		P7	1		9	24500					1	
41	3			"		P7	2		43	23100					1	
41	3			"		P7	3		8	27500					1	
41	3			Going		P8	1		10	27200					1	
41	3			Greeley		P9	1		12	7700					1	
41	3			Airport Way		P10	1		19	22000					1	
41	3			ORB		P11	1		68	26900					2	
41	3			"		P11	2		67	32900					1	
41	3			"		P11	3		20	39100					1	

PRELIMINARY HIGHWAYS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
 URBANIZED AREA(S) ROUTE LIST TEMPLATE

Items:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Description:

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 E C S C R I E E E -ASSUM AADT TRUCK PLACE E -ASSUMED
 D T U G D G X ED AADT L OR V DECIMAL
 C C L N ROUTE / DEC K SMALL E POINT
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 CODE

Length:

2 1 2 1 2 1 5 3 1 5 6 5 1 5 1 5 5

Tacoma	P33	1	11	27000	2
"	P33	2	4	9400	2
Murray	P34	1	27	15700	2
"	P34	2	9	28100	2
"	P34	3	24	24600	2
SW 185th	P35	1	33	18100	2
Harbor Dr.	P36	1	5	32200	1



METRO

2000 SW First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398
(503) 221-1646
Fax 241-7417

September 13, 1990

Mr. Robert Bothman, Director
Oregon Department of Transportation
Transportation Building, Room 135
Salem, Oregon 97310

Dear Bob:

In accordance with the directive from FHWA, we have submitted a preliminary "Highways of National Significance" system for the Portland metropolitan area (within the Federal-Aid Urban boundary). We are, however, concerned about designating such a system without fully understanding how the Surface Transportation Act will use such a system.

As currently proposed by FHWA, urban areas will not be properly equipped to deal with the growing problem of urban gridlock. This proposal puts the urban areas in the position of competing for funds statewide for improvements to their national highways even if alternative transit or arterial improvements are shown to be more cost-effective. Furthermore, there is no assurance that the state will choose to fund the requested national highway improvement or spend their funding elsewhere in the state.

Consideration should be given to other alternative approaches for the Surface Transportation Act. Urban mobility should be recognized as the primary objective in urban areas, not building national highways. In addition, urban areas should be given certainty as to the level of funding that will be provided to their area with sufficient flexibility to implement the transportation system most appropriate for their area.

More detailed comments, which have been approved by TPAC and JPACT, are attached. Also attached are comments received from Citizens for Better Transit. We look forward to your support in pursuing these issues with FHWA and Congress. We request that you transmit these comments to FHWA with the submittal of the Highways of National Significance. We have submitted the map and the detailed listing to Mr. Royer under separate cover.

Sincerely,

George Van Bergen, Chair
Joint Policy Advisory Committee
on Transportation

Attachment

Comments on FHWA Proposal
for a System of
"Highways of National Significance"

1. The national interest in the metropolitan areas throughout the country should be based upon a comprehensive approach to the area, taking into consideration the land use objectives of the area, a need to attain a certain level of urban mobility, and the already recognized interest in air quality. The national interest is not to build a highway system of national significance. Achieving a desired level of mobility in an urban setting requires a comprehensive mix of highway, arterial, transit, bike and pedestrian improvements in conjunction with the transportation demand management and effective land use planning.

The current FHWA proposal does not assure that the desired level of mobility will be accomplished. Rather, it assures that certain segments of "national highways" will be improved or added and it continues a funding bias in favor of these national highways at the expense of other modes, particularly in light of UMTA's proposal to reduce the federal share for transit funding to 60 percent.

2. The FHWA proposal for development of "Congestion Management Plans" in the urban areas is a good step in the right direction. It demonstrates that FHWA understands the importance of a comprehensive set of actions to meet a minimum level-of-service standard on the national highways. However, as proposed, the majority of funding to be provided through the Surface Transportation Act will be made available to the states to build and improve the Highways of National Significance while the localities are left with the requirement to implement the balance of the Congestion Management Plan with insufficient funding. Greater emphasis should be placed on providing funds to implement the full Congestion Management Plan rather than just the elements associated with improvements to the Highways of National Significance.
3. The preliminary map submitted for the Portland metropolitan area only reflects planned routes to the extent these routes are reflected in approved environmental documents. In particular, the following routes are reflected on the map:
 - a. Extension of Marine Drive west of N. Portland Road.
 - b. Connection of McLoughlin Boulevard to I-5 at the east end of the Marquam Bridge.
 - c. Connection of Bertha Boulevard to I-5.

If a program is established based upon a system of Highways of National Significance, provision should be made for adding

new routes to the system once the planning and project development process determines the need for these routes. The following new routes are under consideration in the Portland metropolitan area but are not reflected on the map:

- a. The Mt. Hood Parkway from I-84 to U.S. 26.
- b. The Sunrise Corridor from I-205 to Highway 224 in the vicinity of SE 135th Avenue.
- c. The Western Bypass between I-5 and the Sunset Highway.

If these are ultimately approved, it would be appropriate to add them to the system of Highways of National Significance.

4. The FHWA proposal for apportionment of funding to each state, based 70 percent on each state's share of total highway use of motor fuel, simply rewards those states that make the least effort to conserve energy. The more a state pursues an energy-efficient transportation system with greater emphasis on transit, bikes and walking, the more that state will be penalized in the apportionment formula.



METRO

2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398
503/221-1646

Memorandum

- D R A F T -

Date: November 7, 1990
To: The Metro/Tri-Met Merger Subcommittee
From: Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT)
Re: Metro/Tri-Met Merger Report

Attached for your consideration is JPACT's report on the transportation planning and transit service implications of a Metro/Tri-Met merger. While time did not permit an exhaustive study of this question, the attached report does represent the collective opinion of JPACT on the following related topics:

- Problem Definition
- Process/Timing
- Finance
- Service
- Planning
- Governance

Letters on these topics from individual JPACT members are included as well as documentation on the experience in other metropolitan areas.

JPACT strongly recommends approaching the question of transit governance based upon the region's objectives for transit service improvement. Upon defining the transit system improvements, the question of how to best implement the system, finance the system and govern the system would be appropriate. JPACT would be willing to participate in such an effort if a reasonable work program and schedule were established.

ACC:lmk

JPACT COMMITTEE REPORT
TRI-MET/METROPOLITAN SERVICE DISTRICT MERGER
NOVEMBER 8, 1990



CITY OF
PORTLAND, OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

Earl Blumenauer, Commissioner
1220 S.W. 5th Avenue, Room 407
Portland, Oregon 97204
(503) 248-5577

November 8, 1990

Dear JPACT Members:

Attached for review is your Committee's report on the proposed Metro/Tri-Met merger.

I can assure you that we took this charge seriously. We believe the focus of this discussion should be on better transit service for the region. As JPACT representatives, we are dealing with much more than simply highways and public transit. Our decisions effect the livability of our neighborhoods, how the region grows and how robust that growth will be.

When METRO asked JPACT to respond to the transportation planning and transit service implications, we had only a little over a month to accomplish that task (see attached Metro resolution). Given the short time frame and lack of staff availability, we accomplished what we could. Many important questions remain to be answered. Those are identified in the report.

While the Committee summarizes a number of findings in the report, I will not repeat them in this transmittal letter. The conclusions of the Committee are as follows:

1. The consideration of Tri-Met merger should be delayed until the fall of 1991 after the completion of negotiations for the Westside Light Rail full funding agreement.
2. The Metro merger committee should work with JPACT to develop a reasonable work plan for a merger study.
3. The work plan should include:
 - a. the identification of a problem;
 - b. the study process;
 - c. the identification of the region's goals for transit;
 - d. development of alternatives and review criteria;
 - e. involvement of public and affected jurisdictions;
 - f. the decision process; and
 - g. adequate timelines.

Page 2
November 8, 1990

JPACT should recognize the efforts of the members of the Committee. They include Jim Cowen, Bob Bothman, Clifford Clark, George Van Bergen, David Knowles, Bonnie Hays, Charlie Williamson and John Frewing. Their attention to this important issue is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Earl Blumensauer". The signature is written in dark ink and extends across the width of the page.

Earl Blumensauer, Chair
JPACT Committee on Tri-Met/Metro Merger

BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF THE
METROPOLITAN SERVICE DISTRICT

Certified A True Copy of the Original Thereof
[Signature]
Clerk of the Council

SUPPORTING THE MERGER OF TRI-MET)
WITH THE METROPOLITAN SERVICE)
DISTRICT AND ESTABLISHING A PROCESS)
TO PURSUE THE MERGER)

RESOLUTION NO. 90-1293A
Introduced by Rena Cusma,
Executive Officer and the
Intergovernmental Relations
Committee

WHEREAS, The Metropolitan Service District under Oregon Revised Statutes Chapter 268.370 is granted the authority to merge with the transit system of the mass transit district, which for the Portland Metropolitan region is the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (Tri-Met); and

WHEREAS, The District believes the merger of Tri-Met would benefit the citizens of the mass transit district by providing directly elected representation through the Council of the Metropolitan Service District and the Executive Officer, potential economies of scale and cost savings from consolidation, and greater public accountability; and

WHEREAS, In order to pursue a merger of Tri-Met with the District, a process must be established to develop comprehensive information on potential costs and benefits of a merger, to actively involve representatives of all interested parties, and to prepare specific actions to remove impediments to a merger; and,


WHEREAS, The Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT) has been established to provide recommendations to the District on transportation policy matters; now, therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED,

1. That the Council of the Metropolitan Service District supports the concept of a merger of the Tri-County Transportation District of Oregon with the Metropolitan Service District and establishes a subcommittee of the Council Intergovernmental Relations Committee with membership and charge as outlined in Exhibit A hereto to pursue the merger.

2. That the Council of the Metropolitan Service District requests that JPACT, as a forum of local elected officials and transportation operating agencies, conduct a study of the transportation planning and transit service implications of a merger and report to the Council Intergovernmental Relations Committee no later than October 31, 1990.

ADOPTED by the Council of the Metropolitan Service District
this 12th day of July, 1990.



Tanya Collier, Presiding Officer

jpmsix
b:\901293A.res

JPACT COMMITTEE REPORT

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JPACT COMMITTEE REPORT TRI-MET/METROPOLITAN SERVICE DISTRICT MERGER

NOVEMBER 8, 1990

INTRODUCTION

In July 1990, the Council of the Metropolitan Service District (MSD) adopted a resolution supporting the merger of Tri-Met with MSD and establishing a process to pursue the merger as part of that process.

The MSD Council requested the Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JPACT), as a forum of local elected officials and transportation operating agencies, conduct a study of the transportation planning and transit service implications of a merger and report to the Council Intergovernmental Relations Committee on October 31, 1990. That date has since been moved to November 13, 1990.

The JPACT Chair, George Van Bergen, subsequently asked Portland City Commissioner, Earl Blumenauer, to Chair a Committee to conduct the study. The following JPACT members agreed to serve on the Committee: Jim Cowen (Tri-Met), Bob Bothman (ODOT), Clifford Clark (Cities of Washington Co.), George Van Bergen (JPACT Chair), David Knowles (Metro Council), and Bonnie Hays (Washington Co.). The Chair also invited Charlie Williamson and John Frewing to serve on the Committee. Both individuals are former Metro Councilors and JPACT members.

The Committee met and identified issues to be addressed in the study effort. Those issues are the following: (1) Problem Definition, (2) Process/Timing, (3) Finance, (4) Service, (5) Planning, and (6) Governance. The content of this report is directed to those subject areas.

I. PROBLEM DEFINITION

The Committee is concerned that Metro is proposing a significant, disruptive change in the regional transportation service delivery system without identifying a "problem" necessitating the change.

The Metro Council adopted a resolution which states, "The District believes the merger of Tri-Met would benefit the citizens of the mass transit district by providing directly elected representation through the Council of the Metropolitan Service District and the Executive Officer, potential economies of scale and cost savings from consolidation, and greater accountability."

The Committee thinks Metro has drawn a premature conclusion that has not been tested or demonstrated.

"it ain't broke. We do not perceive Tri-Met or the region's transit service delivery as currently broken. While there is always room for improvement, Tri-Met was recently named the best large transit agency in North America. Tri-Met's popularity is currently high according to public opinion polls and the agency is currently working on the Westside LRT which is important to all of us in the region." (Source: Clackamas County)

"We believe that before substantial changes are made, there should be a compelling reason for change. That reason may exist, but we have yet to see the establishment of a case that change needs to be made in the method that mass transit is managed and governed in the metropolitan area." (Source: Bob Woodell, Port of Portland)

There are public policy questions which could form the basis for a significant analysis of regional transit service delivery. Is the public concerned about the current Tri-Met governance structure? Does the public think accountability would be improved by moving the governance of this service to Metro? At what price? What is the Oregon experience regarding the effectiveness of single purpose special districts? Are the regional objectives for transit service delivery being met by Tri-Met? Should Tri-Met expand its customer base to meet suburban demands? Is it easier to raise financing in a single purpose district versus multi-purpose district? Should mechanisms other than a Metro/Tri-Met merger be evaluated to improve local service delivery?

Those are only a few of the questions which should be addressed to the public and public jurisdictions before the Metro Council draws the conclusion that regional transit services would be improved by a transfer of responsibilities to Metro.

FINDINGS

This committee finds that the Metro Council has not identified a problem to be solved, nor demonstrated how a proposed merger would benefit the region, and the current review process does not provide an appropriate examination of the issues.

II. PROCESS/TIMING

Committee members have serious concerns about the process and timing of this review as conducted by the Metro Council. In attempting to secure a Westside Light Rail Funding Agreement with the Federal Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) prior to September 30, 1991, we must appreciate the fact that we are competing nationally with at least ten other communities for a portion of very limited dollars. Experience has taught us that we must singularly focus on our federal objective to succeed. UMTA demands clarity regarding institutional arrangements for funding and managing such projects. Such clarity cannot exist with ongoing discussions concerning a merger.

"With respect to the merger issue, we are vitally interested in any transportation related measures which would improve transit services and correspondingly result in air quality attainment status and also provide for future growth. However, I have serious concerns and questions regarding the subject study and the direction to move on this issue at this time." (Source: Fred Hansen, Department of Environmental Quality)

"The Metro Council has adopted timelines for its study and dictated timelines for the JPACT study that allow insufficient time for a systematic and unbiased analysis." (Source: Bonnie Hays and Clifford Clark, Washington County and Washington County Cities)

Note: Jurisdiction comments are quoted from material included in Attachment A.

"Between now and September 1991, gaining a full-funding agreement for the Westside Light Rail Transit project is the region's top transportation priority. Any other transportation topic will only cause confusion and direct damage to that goal."
(Source: Office of Transportation, City of Portland)

"Thus for the next year, the jurisdictions represented on JPACT must show unprecedented unity in our approach to the voters, and state and federal decisionmakers. The stakes are too high to do anything less. I therefore recommend we delay all further discussion of a merger for at least a year." (Source: Bob Bothman, ODOT)

FINDINGS

The committee finds that an analysis of a potential merger between Tri-met and Metro interferes with the region's top transportation priority for westside light rail and should wait until at least the end of year 1991.

III. FINANCING

In the near term, the Committee is concerned that a merger will cause additional costs to be borne by Tri-Met. Looking into the future, the Committee is concerned about the availability of adequate funding for transit services with the prospect of Metro as the governing body. Metro has contracted with the consulting firm Cogan, Sharpe, Cogan to examine these issues. That work will not be complete in time to be considered by this Committee.

"In considering whether 'better' transit service can be gained 'better' needs to be defined. If 'better' means 'more', then additional revenues are required. The current situation suggests that Metro would not be able to provide more cash, and service will not get better. If 'better' means a greater variety of services, this can only be achieved by gaining a more flexible union contract....If additional revenues are not available and there is no additional flexibility in work rules, then any significant changes would 'threaten existing services'." (Source: Office of Transportation, City of Portland)

"The primary source of operating revenue (payroll tax) is at its statutory limit. Federal resources are in a period of decline and greater reliance on state and regional resources will be required. State match for on-going capital replacement is no longer available." (Source: Richard Feeney, Tri-Met)

Tri-Met reports that increased pension costs resulting from a change in pension systems would range from \$3.1 million to \$6.2 million per year depending upon how employee costs are covered and accrued medical benefits are treated. This assumes that current Tri-Met employees transferring to PERS would include capped prior eligibility service but would not include prior benefit service.

FINDINGS

The committee finds that it is impossible to comment on the full effects on the Tri-Met/Metro merger until the full costs of the merger are identified, and a revenue source identified to pay the costs. However, the committee is most concerned that jurisdictions, the public, Metro and

Tri-Met have the opportunity to engage in a public dialogue regarding plans for financing transit into the next century.

IV. SERVICE

The attached report, "Regional Transportation Decision Making" (Attachment B), is Tri-Met's effort to review the development of transit service levels and patterns in the context of regional transportation policy. The report also describes major transportation and transit issues of the 1990's.

The report asks the question "What system of governance and inter-jurisdictional cooperation will be most effective in achieving the level of consensus, ownership and resolve that is necessary to address the next decade's transportation issues?"

1. Will the region be able to meet the travel demand generated by downtown Portland?
2. What level of off-peak service is necessary to meet downtown Portland growth projections?
3. What approaches are necessary to meet a target mode split of 35% of all downtown trips?
4. What level of service will be needed to serve the non-downtown travel market?
5. What will be the role of non-traditional fixed route service in the 1990's?
6. What will the level of Tri-Met's financial involvement be in the development of the regional rail network?
7. What will be the desirable level of special needs transportation service, given the American's with Disabilities Act and the eventual 100% accessibility of the fixed route system?
8. How will the transit industry, and Tri-Met in particular, deal with eroding productivity introduced by new federal law (i.e. Clean Air Act, Americans with Disabilities Act and possible mandatory drug testing)?
9. How will Tri-Met and its regional partners secure the necessary capital and operating funds for the envisioned system?

Also included for the Metro Council review is a report by the City of Portland, entitled "City Goals and Objectives for Transit." This report draws together transit policies from the City's Comprehensive Plan and the Arterial Streets Classification Policy adopted by City Council. It is a summary of the expectations of Portland residents and businesses as adopted in City policy, and clearly illustrates the interdependent nature of City policy implementation and the provision of transit service.

In addition, Washington County has provided a report entitled "Alternative Concepts for Providing Transit Services." The City of Portland report and the Washington County report are included in Attachment C.

FINDINGS

The committee finds that Metro adopted timelines for its study and dictated timelines for the JPACT study that prohibit thorough analysis. The committee recommends that the Metro council develop an inclusive, systematic process for examining the service implications to the region of the proposed merger. The process should include an analysis by each jurisdiction of current policy and future plans, as well as Tri-Met's plans to meet those expectations. The public should be encouraged to participate so that issues of mobility, community livability and growth would be clearly understood. Only after the completion of that process, would JPACT have sufficient information to evaluate the service implications of such a merger.

V. PLANNING

The Committee members have differing opinions regarding the federal MPO designation and the appropriateness of that designation in the event of a merger. Additional review would be necessary to form a common point of view.

"I think the MPO role is substantially compromised if the Metro Council was also the transit operating agency. Currently, the Metro staff plays an important watchdog role over both Tri-Met and local governments," (Source: Clackamas County)

"It's not clear whether the merger would have any impact on METRO's MPO designation. Are there other transit agencies which have the MPO designation?" (Source: Gussie McRobert, City of Gresham)

The federal regulations for MPO designation require the following:

- designation by the Governor with agreement of units of general purpose local governments;
- principal elected officials of general purpose local governments to be represented on the MPO; and
- the MPO can be redesignated by agreement of 75 percent of local governments (20 of 27) representing 90 percent of population (930,000 of 1,032,831) in cooperation with the Governor.

The intent of federal regulations is the following:

- to directly involve transportation service providers in a coordinated fashion in the transportation planning and decision-making process; and
- to ensure a comprehensive and objective evaluation of alternative modes.

FINDINGS

The committee finds that consolidation of Tri-Met and Metro would require careful attention to the way staff and decision-making is assigned to maintain the integrity of the MPO responsibility. The following appears necessary, if a merger is implemented:

- a) JPACT decisions on MPO functions should remain independent of responsibilities for transit operations, decisions on transit operations and budget should be assigned to a separate committee and the Metro council;
- b) JPACT bylaws currently provide for JPACT jurisdiction over MPO decisions, this should be retained and reinforced;
- c) Tri-Met's seat on JPACT would be vacated and a new mechanism would need to be created to assure that transit orientation is included in JPACT decision making;
- d) Staff support for transportation planning should be independent and objective to allow proper evaluation of transit/highway trade-offs;
- e) MPO designation must be assigned to an agency which fully covers the geographic area in question. Alternatives (if Metro is merged with Tri-Met) include Metro, Port of Portland, ODOT or a new agency.

VI. GOVERNANCE

Tri-Met has provided the Committee with considerable information regarding the national transit governance experience, Attachment D. The following points summarize that material:

- A) The research indicates that three transit boards in the country are elected-- Denver, San Francisco and Oakland. The experience of those three districts is discouraging.
- B) Organizational change has come in response to identified problems--financial crisis, disaffection of the suburbs, a crisis of confidence with the sitting board, or a lack of progress toward building a rail system. Tri-Met no longer fits the profile of an agency in trouble in need of shake-up organizational change.
- C) Transit systems managed by special authorities like Tri-Met are more efficient than transit systems managed under general governmental systems like Metro.
- D) There are no "models" for regional governance elsewhere which, from a transportation perspective, deserve emulation in this region. Governance structures in several regions which have enjoyed national recognition are in further transition or have been dramatically altered in recent years. Structures which work are patterned after unique regional needs and "ways of doing business" in those regions.
- E) The impact of major structural changes elsewhere, as it relates to transportation policy making and implementation of the regional agenda, has been to significantly stall progress while new working relationships are established.

FINDINGS

The committee finds that organization/governance is most effectively responsive to the community when designed to address specific work goals or particular work problems in the

organization. Structures which work must be designed to meet the specific needs of the region it serves.

Since Metro has not identified work goals or problems with Tri-Met, it is premature to talk about appropriate organization/governance.

CONCLUSIONS

From the previous material and findings, the Committee concludes the following:

1. The consideration of a Tri-Met merger should be delayed until the fall of 1991 after the completion of negotiations for the Westside Light Rail full funding agreement.
2. The Metro merger committee should work with JPACT to develop a reasonable work plan for a merger study.
3. The work plan should include:
 - a. the identification of a problem;
 - b. the study process;
 - c. the identification of the region's goals for transit;
 - d. development of alternatives and review criteria;
 - e. involvement of public and affected jurisdictions;
 - f. the decision process;
 - g. adequate timelines.

ATTACHMENT A
JURISDICTIONS AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS COMMENTS

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WASHINGTON
COUNTY,
OREGON

November 7, 1990

Metro
JPACT
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5298

RE: JPACT SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT ON THE TRI-MET/METRO MERGER

Following the November 1st JPACT subcommittee meeting, it was my understanding that the subcommittee report would be reviewed to eliminate some editorializing, and that it would then be submitted under a cover letter from Commissioner Blumenauer to the full JPACT committee. In addition, it was my understanding that a letter would be drafted by David Knowles for review by the JPACT subcommittee outlining to the Metro Council and to JPACT the concerns raised in our meeting regarding the essence of the report.

I do not believe the November 5th letter from David Knowles to Commissioner Blumenauer represents the conclusions nor the agreements reached by the JPACT subcommittee. I am pleased to report that the JPACT subcommittee agreed unanimously that a work plan to analyze the region's (and sub-regions') transit needs, how best those needs could be met, how they could be financed, and how they could best be administered and implemented (governance issue) was desirable and could easily be committed to by those members present. That becomes the reason for a time extension. In addition, item number 5 of Councilor Knowles' letter concerning JPACT's pledge on future legislative action was not discussed by the JPACT subcommittee in conjunction with the subcommittee report. While that specific recommendation may or may not have merit, it should be discussed in more detail to fully understand the action requested by Mr. Knowles.

I request that the subcommittee members be allowed an opportunity at JPACT to respond to Councilor Knowles' letter.

Sincerely,

Bonnie Hays
Chairman



METRO

2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398
503/221-1646

Casey Short

November 5, 1990

The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
Commissioner of Public Works
City of Portland
1220 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97204

David Knowles
Councilor, District 11
5 NE Merges
Portland, OR 97212
7288-2005

Dear Earl:

I have reviewed the Draft Report presented to the JPACT Subcommittee by your staff. I attended the meeting on November 1, 1990 and expressed my views. The Subcommittee decided to forward the report to JPACT with a recommendation that JPACT submit the report to the Metro Council.

I had hoped that your Committee would do the following:

1. Acknowledge that the form of governance is a legitimate issue within the broader discussion of how best to provide transit services to our region.
2. Identify, at least preliminarily, the positive and negative impacts of a merger on transit service and planning. (This was the specific request made by the Metro Council.)
3. Recommend that JPACT join with the Council in a more intensive analysis of the transit service needs of the region. The product of this analysis would be recommendations on actions required to meet those needs and the impact of a change in governance on transit service.
4. Recommend that JPACT request additional time to conduct this comprehensive analysis and establish a date certain for completion of the study.

The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
November 5, 1990
Page 2


5. Recommend that JPACT members pledge not to seek a change in Metro's statutory authority during the next legislative session and pending the completion of the study.

You will recall that at our first meeting, I strongly suggested that JPACT's members should play a constructive role in the process leading up to a merger decision. This report does just the opposite. The report fails to address in any substantive way the issues that the Metro Council asked JPACT to evaluate. The report consists largely of quotations from letters and other documents previously submitted to JPACT and distributed to the Council. For example, Section IV of the report, the section which purportedly deals with the transit service implications of a merger, is nothing more than a list of questions. Thus, the "Findings" contained in that and other sections are largely based upon opinion, not fact. Worse, the report begins with the conclusion that the proposed merger is a "disruptive" change yet fails to support that conclusion with any facts or analysis.

I believe your committee missed an opportunity to create a constructive dialogue with the Metro Council. Moreover, the Committee report lacks substance and provides no guidance whatever to the Council. Accordingly, I cannot join in your committee's recommendation.

I will be out of town on November 8. Therefore, I ask that you make my letter a part of the record when you present your report to JPACT.

Sincerely,


David Knowles

DK/mad

RECEIVED SEP 11 1990



Department of Environmental Quality

811 SW SIXTH AVENUE, PORTLAND, OREGON 97204-1390 PHONE (503) 229-5696

September 4, 1990

George Van Bergen
Chair, JPACT
2000 SW First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398

Dear George,

This is in response to your memorandum of July 31, 1990 in which you request comments on the Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study. As you know, emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons from transportation sources represent the most significant factor affecting our ability to meet air quality standards and accommodate regional growth.

Currently the Portland AQMA is a non-attainment area for both CO and ozone. With respect to the merger issue, we are vitally interested in any transportation related measures which would improve transit services and correspondingly result in air quality attainment status and also provide for future growth. However, I have serious concerns and questions regarding the subject study and the direction to move on this issue at this time. I am concerned that action now may have adverse impacts on the November 1990 bond issue and divert attention from the top regional priority of light rail expansion. Rather than JPACT trying to answer the questionnaire in such a short time frame, particularly for such a critical issue, I would propose the following:

- Conduct the evaluation after the Legislative session;
- In the interim, have Metro define the problem that necessitates the merger;
- Identify a reasonable forum (involve JPACT) for evaluating the issue or problem;
- Direct that forum to consider a range of options/solutions and their respective impacts.

Again, I would like to emphasize the significance of this issue as it relates to air quality and future growth in the region, and my

George Van Bergen
September 4, 1990
Page 2

belief that the proposed schedule for airing this issue is not appropriate. In my opinion, this schedule could pose serious problems for the November bond measure and threaten our region's highest transportation priority. I urge you to consider my above recommendations.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:
Fred Hansen

SEP 10 1990

Fred Hansen
Director

FH:TRB:ka

cc: Tom Bispham, Air Quality Division
Andrew Cotugno, Metro



CITY OF MILWAUKIE

****MEMORANDUM****

September 4, 1990

TO: Dan Bartlett, City Manager

FROM: Maggie Collins, Community Development Director

RE: Proposed METRO-TriMet Merger

Attachment B (August 30th Council Packet) pretty well outlines the major questions that should be answered if a merger were to take place. To help focus Council discussion, I picked three types of questions, as follows:

- FUNCTION:** Will a merger produce integration of public transit planning with both local land use plans and with regional transportation planning issues, systems and plans?
- OPERATIONAL:** Will a merger result in daily public transit services that are reliable, responsive to the public's needs, and cost-effective?
- POLITICAL:** Will a merger result in broad public representation and efficient decision-making?

Is an elected decision-making body appropriate to the most efficient functioning of a service delivery system?

None of the above questions implies poor performance by TriMet as it now exists. All of the above questions can be localized by adding, "To Milwaukie residents" at the end of each question.

Some of a merger's advantages now being discussed include:

- a strong mandate for elected decision-makers regarding coordinated public policy to assure public transit services to the region
- if well structured, possible reduction of duplicatory efforts
- closer integration of public transit operations with highway and light rail transit plans as articulated through the Regional Transportation Plan
- mandate for integration of public transit planning with land use planning at both the local plan level and the regional implementation level.

Memo to Dan Bartlett
September 4, 1990
Page 2

Some of a merger's disadvantages now being discussed include:

- possible politicization of public transit policy at the METRO Council level
- difficulty of running operations division with a vague regional perspective
- uncertainty of "better" representation through a JPACT-type board for public transit issues and needs.

MC:mc



WASHINGTON
COUNTY,
OREGON

September 12, 1990

Page 14
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George Van Bergen, Chair, JPACT
Jim Gardner, Chair, Metro/Tri-Met Merger Subcommittee
METRO
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5398

RE: PROPOSED METRO/TRI-MET MERGER

As the JPACT members representing Washington County and its cities, we have been asked to respond to a series of questions about the proposed Metro/Tri-Met merger. All of the questions are quite germane, but we choose not to submit prepared answers for the reasons outlined in this letter. We are opposed to the study and the corresponding work being done by the Metro/Tri-Met Subcommittee.

Our concerns and opposition to the study are described in the following areas.

Impact on Westside Light Rail Project

The timing of these studies and the controversy that is sure to accompany them threatens the region's number one transportation project in at least two ways.

First, immediately prior to the November 6, 1990 vote on the light rail bonds, JPACT is expected to forward its findings to the Metro/Tri-Met Subcommittee (MTS). According to their work plan, the MTS will then make a preliminary recommendation to the Metro Intergovernmental Relations Committee (IGR) on November 8, 1990. The debate that is sure to precede recommendations by either group will result in headlines that will lead to uncertainty about governance and future direction. This type of publicity is certain to undermine voter confidence and hurt the light rail bond request.

Secondly, the election in November is not the only date where controversy about the governance of Tri-Met could be damaging. Given their performance to date, the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) would seize any opportunity to stall committing to a full-funding agreement with the region prior to the September 30, 1991 deadline. Such controversy would also be viewed as an opportunity for representatives from other districts throughout the United States who will try to out-manuever Senator Hatfield and Representative AuCoin to fund their own projects.

Inadequate Research of Impact

The Metro Council has adopted timelines for its study and dictated timelines for the JPACT study that allow insufficient time for a systematic and unbiased analysis. Most of the JPACT work must occur over a four week period. This expectation seriously constrains the subcommittee's ability to seriously consider critical issues. In contrast, the MTS will have the benefit of a private consultant doing staff work and a longer period of time, though still inadequate, to develop recommendations. This point was affirmed by only one respondent to the request for proposals on this study. The one proposal was quoted at a significantly higher cost than estimated cost. This is clearly due to time constraints.

This work will draw staff and elected official's time from the information dissemination to help citizens vote on the bond issue with the facts in-hand. This is truly unacceptable. Thus, this proposed study will not get the time and effort it deserves, and it will severely restrict efforts to inform the public about the Light Rail Bond issue.

Intent of the Study


Given the work plan of the MTS, it is hard to see how the merger proposal is going to receive a fair and objective review. The work plan makes it abundantly clear that a recommendation for merger will be forthcoming. It specifically schedules two public hearings on the "merger ordinance" immediately following the November election.

As elected officials who have been asked to participate in the JPACT study, we find such assumptions offensive, biased and contrary to the public interest.

Summary

From the above comments, we prefer the following recommendations:

1. The work effort proposed by the Metro Council to study the merger of Tri-Met and Metro should be immediately stopped; and
2. The study sub-committee of JPACT should work to develop a reasonable plan-of-study for such a merger study after September 1991 when the full funding agreement for the Westside Light Rail is negotiated and approved; and
3. The plan-of-study should outline at minimum:
 - The problem (i.e., why is the study necessary? This has yet to be articulated)
 - The study process



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3. The plan-of-study should outline at minimum:
 - The problem (i.e., why is the study necessary? This has yet to be articulated)
 - The study process

George Van Bergen
Jim Gardner
Page 3
September 12, 1990

- Development of alternatives and review criteria (i.e., benefits and costs)
- Involvement of public and affected jurisdictions
- The decision process
- Realistic timelines


It may be that the merger of Tri-Met and Metro is in the best interests of the citizens of the Portland Metropolitan Area. However, until the problem is clearly identified and an objective study process is developed, we cannot support any further work on this topic -- including attempting to answer the questions as outlined by staff. We stand ready to assist and fully participate when these issues are addressed after September 30, 1991.

We are sending a copy of this letter to all Metro Council Members and hope that we can discuss our concerns at the JPACT meeting on September 13, 1990.

Sincerely,




Bonnie Hays
Chairman, Board of County Commissioners
JPACT Representative



Clifford Clark
Mayor, Forest Grove
JPACT Representative,
Washington County Cities

c: Metro Council
JPACT
Washington County City Councils
Washington County Mayors





Port of Portland

Box 3529 Portland, Oregon 97208
503 231-5000
TLX: 474-2039

August 31, 1990

Mr. George Van Bergen
Chair, JPACT
Metro
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398

Mr. Jim Gardner
Chair
Metro/Tri-Met Merger Subcommittee
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398

Dear George and Jim:

In response to your July 31, 1990, memorandum to JPACT members regarding "JPACT Involvement In Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study," we would like to make the following comments and observations.

First, because we are on the eve of a very important transit funding election, we have questions about the timing of this study. It is also likely that there will be requests to the Legislature for funding that will have substantial impact on mass transit in the metropolitan area. We feel this is not the appropriate time to add one more major issue onto the already long list of items that could significantly impact mass transit.

We believe that before substantial changes are made, there should be a compelling reason for change. That reason may exist, but we have yet to see the establishment of a case that change needs to be made in the method that mass transit is managed and governed in the metropolitan area.

Once the timing is appropriate and mass transit problems have been articulated, we believe JPACT should discuss the issues and form an opinion on what proper approach is in the public interest. JPACT then should develop the proper forum for the verification of the reality of the problems and where the discussion to find the solution should take place. The forum should not only allow for the discussion of solutions, but should assure that care is taken to articulate and address any ramifications or implications from the proposed solutions.

Page 2
August 31, 1990

I hope our thoughts have provided some help or insight into the issue that has surfaced about any proposed changes in how mass transit in the Portland metropolitan area is managed or governed.

Sincerely yours,



Robert L. Woodell
Executive Director

01X177



TRI-MET

4012 S.E. 17TH AVENUE
PORTLAND, OREGON 97202

August 20, 1990

Mr. Andy Cotugno
Director Transportation
Metro
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5398

Dear Mr. Cotugno:

In reference to your Metro merger memo listing eight questions this is to inform you that we will be directing our analysis of these issues to the JPACT committee chaired by Commissioner Earl Blumenauer and at that time a complete analysis of these issues will be provided.

To assist your further thoughts we have the following:

1. We have long felt there not to be any advantage for the transportation planning agency and the regional transit agency to be one in the same. Our view on this would change if that agency were also to be a regional road and highway agency.
2. Closer links between regional land use planning and the transit agency are beneficial.
3. There is no apparent promise of better transit service with a governance change. In the absence of planned improvements any governance changes could be threatening. We would be interested in hearing how governance changes could avoid or alleviate threats to transit service.
4. An increased local government stake in transit service delivery has always been favorably viewed by Tri-Met.
5. We believe if Metro and Tri-Met were merged the MPO designation should be reviewed.
6. The American Public Transit Association has a wealth of information available on organizational models for the planning and delivery of transit service. Testimony from individual transit experts should be sought for comparative subjective views of the relative success of different transit governance structures.

Page 2
Mr. Andy Cotugno

7. Yes conflicts would be created.
8. In the absence of any analysis or plan we have no way of knowing whether financing mechanisms would be more or less successful.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to respond to these questions.

Sincerely,

Richard E. Feeney/ds

Richard E. Feeney
Executive Director
Governmental Affairs

CC: J. Cowen
B. Harder
B. Post
F. Trader

ATTACHMENT B

Please provide comments to assist in defining the transportation planning and transit service implications of a Metro/Tri-Met merger. Your opinion on these matters, any documentation of these issues or identification of issues that require further investigation will be welcomed. The following is intended to provide additional guidance to assist in focusing your comments:

1. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the regional transportation planning agency also deliver regional transit services?
2. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the transit agency having a closer tie to regional land use planning?
3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under Metro's governance structure as compared to the existing Tri-Met governance structure? Is there a threat to existing transit service? Are there ways to modify the governance structure to alleviate these threats?
4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more closely involved in transit service delivery?
5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there be on Metro's federal MPO designation for transportation planning?
6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models affecting regional transportation planning and transit service delivery from elsewhere in the United States?
7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service provider and the road and highway jurisdictions or foster greater coordination?
8. Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council in developing new transit financing mechanisms provide a greater or lesser likelihood of success as compared to the indirect participation that now exists?

As you will note above, these questions focus on the potential impacts (pro and con) on coordination with regional transportation planning and transit service. JPACT's comments and conclusions will be incorporated into the work of the Metro/Tri-Met Merger Subcommittee which is also addressing other issues affecting personnel, bonds, legal impediments, boundary, etc.

PLEASE PROVIDE WRITTEN COMMENTS BY SEPTEMBER 1, 1990.

RESPONSE TO JPACT QUESTIONS RE: TRI-MET / METRO MERGER

City of Portland (August 31, 1990)

1. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the regional transportation planning agency also deliver regional transit services?

At the present time, Metro is the regional transportation planning agency. It is not the only transportation planning agency in the region, as each local government and several agencies do their own planning. Tri-Met currently delivers both local and regional mass transportation services. Just as with the street system, which needs local arterials as well as freeways, the transit system must have both components. The question implies that Metro will focus on the regional services. Since Tri-Met is currently underfunded, this approach would create conflict with the local governments and with the majority of the users, who would be hurt by any reduction of local service.

2. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the transit agency having a closer tie to regional land use planning?

Transit planning should be more closely tied to land use planning, both regional and local. This is so because both the arrangement or pattern of land uses, and the ease of access from the transit line to a building's front door, affect transit's attractiveness to potential patrons. Metro recently argued in court that they did not do regional land use planning. Within the last six months, that position has appeared to shift, and they are developing a regional land use planning program. When Metro has successfully established this program, this question can be considered. Until that time, it is not relevant to a Metro/Tri-Met merger.

3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under Metro's governance structure as compared to the existing Tri-Met governance structures? Is there a threat to existing transit service? Are there ways to modify the governance structure to alleviate these threats?

In comparing the two governance structures, one notes that:

- a. both have boards selected from a subdistrict (of relatively similar size) so this makes no difference.
- b. Metro is elected, Tri-Met appointed. The small number of elected transit boards in the U.S. suggests that it is not generally viewed as an effective governance structure.
- c. Metro is multi-purpose, Tri-Met single purpose.

- d. neither has a voter-approved tax base for its general functions.

In considering whether "better" transit service can be gained, "better" needs to be defined. If "better" means "more", then additional revenues are required. The current situation (see d. above) suggests that Metro would not be able to provide more cash, and service will not get better. If "better" means a greater variety of services, this can only be achieved by gaining a more flexible union contract. It is not likely that an elected board will be more able to achieve this flexibility than will an appointed board.

If additional revenues are not available and there is no additional flexibility in work rules, then any significant changes would "threaten existing services." In establishing service, the Tri-Met board first defined the mix of trip types they should serve: What share of service to devote to work trips as compared to all-day transportation for those without cars? Next, they distributed service based on the cost-effectiveness of each line (riders/service hours, etc.). The line ridership is determined by population density, concentrated employment centers, and transit supportive policies. They continually adjust this service distribution based on each line's effectiveness. Given the funding and flexibility limitations, it is hard to imagine an elected Board using a better planning process. An elected board, however, would be more inclined to distribute services on a population basis rather than use a planning process based on service need.

4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more closely involved in transit service delivery?

It would be advantageous to involve JPACT and its individual members. In the current proposals, Metro has not included any description of greater JPACT involvement on a regular basis. Tri-Met has asked for JPACT consensus with their major plans (TDP etc) and individual jurisdictions after participating in public hearings on service changes.

5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there be on Metro's federal MPO designation for transportation planning?

Merger would not necessarily impact the legal status of Metro as an MPO, since the region's MPO is selected by the Governor. However, Metro's ability to serve as the neutral meeting place, now possible since Metro has no transportation operating/construction responsibilities, would be greatly affected. At this time, Metro has no specific objectives except to see the region reach agreement and move forward. Our

congressional delegation and others have often said that this consensus approach is the source of our success. If Metro became the transit operator, it could not remain neutral and could not continue to serve as the MPO or neutral meeting place. Given that all other agencies in JPACT are also non-neutral, it is not clear who should be the MPO. However, since the state has the broadest responsibility, they probably could best provide the neutral meeting ground.

6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models affecting regional transportation planning and transit service delivery from elsewhere in the United States?

As mentioned above, we are not aware of many transit agencies governed directly by elected boards, nor of many instances where the MPO and the transit agency are one. Certainly both APTA and NARC could provide statistical information and perhaps evaluations of similar arrangements. They should also be likely to know other alternatives.

7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service provider and the road and highway jurisdictions, or foster greater coordination?

The merger would not create more points of conflict, nor would it cause fewer conflicts. Because of the loss of Metro's role as the neutral meeting place, the regional planning function would not be perceived as neutral, but as biased toward transit. The locals would, in reaction, be more road oriented. This would not foster, but hinder, cooperation.

8. Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council in developing new transit financing mechanisms provide a greater or lesser likelihood of success as compared to the indirect participation that now exists?

The current proposal does not specify any greater JPACT direct involvement in regional funding than currently occurs. JPACT has been a very active player in developing transit finance mechanisms, especially in the last three years. The Metro Council, through several members on JPACT, has been actively involved. It would seem that this active but not self-serving involvement would be the most effective in persuading the voters of the importance of transit financing.

As a final comment, it is important to mention the issue of timing in any discussion of a Metro/Tri-Met merger. Between now and September 1991, gaining a full-funding agreement for the Westside Light Rail

Transit project is the region's top transportation priority. Any other transportation topic will only cause confusion and direct damage to that goal. Voters confused about who will be building/operating the Westside project are less likely to be supportive of the ballot measure. The state legislature will similarly end up addressing peripheral issues of agency accountability, etc. when the focus must be on the project's justification from a state perspective. Perhaps most importantly, it will cause confusion in Washington D.C. Our congressional delegation has advised us to be clear, consistent and coordinated. UMTA, which is already looking for reasons to deny 75% federal funding, could use governance questions as reasons to delay carrying out a full-funding contract.

RECEIVED SEP 5 1990



Department of Transportation

TRANSPORTATION BUILDING, SALEM, OREGON 97310

In Reply Refer To
File No.:
PLA

August 31, 1990

Andy Cotugno
Transportation Director
Metropolitan Service District
2000 SW First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398

I'm replying to George Van Bergen's letter requesting comments on the Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study. Transit is an integral factor in the development of the Portland region, the region's ability to accommodate future growth, and Oregon's transportation system.

The timing of any potential merger is critical to Tri-Met's efforts to advance regional light rail. There are three very important aspects to the timing issue and they are sequential:

1. The region will vote on a \$125 million bond issue in November.
2. Between November 1990 and Summer 1991, there will be a change in the state administration and a new state legislature which will be asked for substantial matching funds for the Westside Project.
3. Throughout this period and culminating no later than September 30, 1991, a Full Funding Agreement must be signed with UMTA for the 75 percent federal share of the Westside Project (see enclosed letter from Senator Mark Hatfield and Congressman Les AuCoin).

Thus, for the next year, the jurisdictions represented on JPACT must show unprecedented unity in our approach to the voters, and state and federal decisionmakers. The stakes are too high to do anything less. I, therefore, recommend we delay all further discussion of a merger for at least a year.

Andy Cotugno
August 31, 1990
Page Two

Any future study should really focus, not upon the merger issue, but upon the definition of a problem, if one exists, in transit service in the region. Specifically, we feel that the problem statement should be clearly identified and be broken down into specific components.

Once the above has been accomplished, it would seem appropriate to address the question of the proper procedure and organization to deal with those problems. The Department of Transportation, is especially interested in the overall picture but, more specifically, all of the individual transportation components, such as highways and transit in meeting the regional planning objectives. All of the transportation-implementing agencies obviously have a strong stake in the implementation of transit as laid out in the Regional Transportation Plan in order that the components for which they are responsible are satisfactorily provided.

The final effort in the study should be to identify all of the alternatives to address the problem which has been identified and then to measure those various alternatives against the problem. Will they solve the problem? Are they doable? What are the impacts on the remainder of the transportation system and the development of the region?

I strongly recommend that JPACT consider replying to the Metropolitan Service District along the lines outlined in this response.



Robert N. Bothman
Director

RNB:fn

Enclosure

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC

August 22, 1990

Mr. Robert Bothman
Oregon Department of Transportation
516 Transportation Building
Salem, Oregon 97310

Dear Bob:

We are writing to review action taken by both the Senate and House Transportation Appropriations Subcommittees on the Westside Light Rail project.

As veterans of the fight for the Banfield MAX project, we knew the challenge that lay ahead in securing a federal commitment on the Banfield's Western expansion. But financing for the project, both locally and federally, has grown even more difficult, as was recently demonstrated in the defeat of the May ballot measure. When we started the Preliminary Engineering on the Westside, Portland stood virtually alone in seeking new light rail funds. Now ten new light rail lines around the country have qualified for Congressional appropriations this year. Clearly, our success on the Banfield has been an inspiration not only to those in Portland but also to many around the country.

Despite these competing national projects, we think you will agree that the progress that has been made on the federal level has put the Westside project in a relative position of strength. The amended terminus to Hillsboro, the issuance of a letter of intent, and a full funding contract have been secured in both the House and Senate Transportation Appropriation bills. These are the most significant steps yet in building this line to its western terminus in Hillsboro.

Funds to finish engineering studies and to acquire additional rights of way and some construction monies, are included in the report accompanying the Senate Transportation Appropriations bill. In the House report there is language to tie up some loose ends related to the Banfield project and to the costs of the overall system. We hope to have all these items included in the Committee's final Conference Report.

We feel especially pleased to have achieved this progress toward obtaining a federal commitment that is not exceeded by any light rail project in the country in spite of the lack of any secured local or state funding for this project. The likelihood of an increased local share requirement next year make the passage of the November light rail ballot initiative essential for any continued federal support.

Mr. Robert Bothman

In the coming months, we look forward to continuing our work with the region to secure a full funding contract that leverages the most federal money to match limited resources at the local level. In order to ensure that Westside Light Rail becomes a reality, we encourage you to work cooperatively and expeditiously to forge the necessary relationships with the federal regional officials who will play an integral role in the success of this project. We look forward to the day when we sign the contract that expands out to Hillsboro the nation's most successful light rail line.

Kind regards.

Sincerely,



Mark O. Hatfield
United States Senator



Les Aucoin
Member of Congress

MOH/sop

RECEIVED AUG 22 1990



**Washington State
Department of Transportation**

District 4
4200 Main Street S-15
PO Box 1709
Vancouver, Washington 98668-1709
(206) 696-6461

Duane Berentson
Secretary of Transportation

August 20, 1990

Mr. Andrew Cotugno
Transportation Director
2000 SW First Ave.
Portland, OR 97201-5398

Dear Mr. Cotugno:

Responding to your August 2, 1990 memorandum regarding the potential merger of Tri-Met and Metro, I have several thoughts.

1. The combining of two governmental entities can sometimes result in operating efficiencies and/or better service, especially if those two agencies are currently providing a duplication of services. I do not see an extensive, or even moderate, duplication that would be eliminated.
2. The concept that such a combination would result in reduced overhead and administrative expenses is seldom realized. The amount of work to be done remains constant or increases after a merger (unless significant duplication of services is eliminated) and, therefore, the staff needed to accomplish the work is not significantly reduced.
3. Some users of public transportation may be dissatisfied with current service, and may believe that a change in administration, especially moving from an appointed commission to an elected one, will result in service improvements. While there is much to be said for the responsiveness of elected officials as compared to those who are not, I submit that the current Metro commissioners were elected on the basis of their stance on Metropolitan Service District issues, not their expertise in operating a transit system, and wonder if the merger would ultimately result in redistricting within Metro and a whole new set of issues in upcoming elections. Perhaps a better way to achieve an elected board with broad representation is to have the transit board be composed of a variety of local elected officials.
4. Finally, while the desirability of combining planning and implementing agencies makes nice theory, something is usually lost in the process. My experience has been that the day-to-day crises associated with providing expected services soon overrides the importance associated with good planning efforts. The regional planning and other MSD responsibilities will diminish in priority when compared to keeping the system running, and I don't think the Portland metropolitan region really wants that to happen.

Mr. Andrew Cotugno
August 20, 1990
Page 2

These thoughts are based on my experience as a manager and reflect neither praise nor criticism of Tri-Met or Metro, nor are they in any way an official position of the Washington State Department of Transportation. I do hope they are beneficial.


Sincerely,



GARY F. DEMICH, P.E.
District Administrator

GFD:kd

cc: Dave Sturdevant
Scott Collier
Les White
Gil Mallery



CLACKAMAS COUNTY

Department of Transportation & Development

August 30, 1990

WINSTON KURTH
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

RICHARD DOPP
DIRECTOR
OPERATIONS & ADMINISTRATION

TOM VANDERZANDEN
DIRECTOR
PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT

Andy Cotugno
Transportation Director
Metro
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, OR 97201-5398

SUBJECT: Proposed Metro/Tri-Met Merger Study

I have attempted to answer, from the standpoint of what is in the best interest of the citizens of Clackamas County, each of the questions you asked regarding the transportation planning and transit service implications of a Metro/Tri-Met merger.

Generally, my position can be summed up by the old saying "If it ain't broke . . ." We do not perceive Tri-Met or the region's transit service delivery as currently broken. While there is always room for improvement, Tri-Met was recently named the best large transit agency in North America. Tri-Met's popularity is currently high according to public opinion polls and the agency is currently working on the Westside LRT which is important to all of us in the region.

Though I am often not happy with Tri-Met's lack of attention to this area of the region, I am not sure that a merger would help. More importantly, this is a very inappropriate time to be discussing such a sensitive issue, one needing long-term careful consideration. There is nothing about a merger that can't wait; yet continued pressure on this issue now could unnecessarily jeopardize the upcoming MAX bond measure!

- Q1. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the regional transportation planning agency also deliver regional transit services?**
- A.** I see no advantage and possibly a conflict of interest in having the MPO also responsible for delivering "regional" transit services currently provided by Tri-Met. Just as I see no advantage in Metro being responsible for delivering other regional transportation services such as new road construction and/or road maintenance as is currently provided by ODOT and local jurisdictions.
- Q2. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the transit agency having a closer tie to regional land use planning?**

- A. Clearly, a close tie between land use and transportation planning is desirable. Again, a Metro/Tri-Met merger could lead to a serious conflict of interest. The strength of the MPO role as a multi-modal planning agency simply is compromised when the same agency assumes operational responsibility.
- Q3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under Metro's governance structure as compared to the existing Tri-Met governance structure? Is there a threat to existing transit service? Are there ways to modify the governance structure to alleviate these threats?
- A. Although an "elected" Metro Council might at first seem appealing, a deeper look reveals some serious problems. It is true that the Tri-Met Board seems far removed from other regional transportation providers and the scrutiny of being elected. However, putting transit service management responsibility at Metro seems to distance it from the very public it should be closer to. Either local governments ought to be added to the Tri-Met Board or JPACT should be given much stronger responsibilities in the merger proposal. Either of these moves would strengthen the role of transportation providers by making them more responsible for a range of transportation solutions.
- Q4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more closely involved in transit service delivery?
- A. Having JPACT more closely involved in transit service delivery is perhaps the most hopeful possibility presented by a merger. At present JPACT, via its individual members, can both plan and deliver road projects. It does not have a similar capability with transit. Modern transportation systems should place more transit responsibility on those existing governments responsible for roads.
- Q5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there be on Metro's federal MPO designation for transportation planning?
- A. Again, I think the MPO role is substantially compromised if the Metro Council was also the transit operating agency. Currently, the Metro staff plays an important watchdog role over both Tri-Met and local governments.
- Q6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models affecting regional transportation planning and transit service delivery from elsewhere in the United States?
- A. Before looking for another organizational model from some other part of the country, we should first be clear in our own minds what we want a merger to accomplish? What's wrong with the existing situation? How will a merger

improve regional transportation planning and transit service delivery? Clark County's system, C-Tran, appears to be an attractive model. They operate an excellent system and have been enormously successful at generating both operating and capital revenue. They have accomplished this by providing local governments with a strong role on their board.

Q7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service provider and the road and highway jurisdictions or foster greater coordination?

A. I do not see that a Metro/Tri-Met merger would necessarily improve our current relationship with the regional transit service provider. Clackamas County currently has representation on both the Metro Council and the Tri-Met Board.

Q8. Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council in developing new transit financing mechanisms provide a greater or lesser likelihood of success as compared to the indirect participation that now exists?

A. The Metro Council is still in the process of building broad public support. The region has generally tried to distance itself from Metro on money measures even when Metro is the only acceptable vehicle . . . the Convention Center. JPACT has been and should continue taking the leadership role in regional transportation funding measures.

0827/tv/cot:tlo

cc: Ed Lindquist
George Van Bergen
Richard Devlin
Tom DeJardin
Wade Byers
Craig Lomnicki



City of Gresham

Mayor Gussie McRobert

1333 N.W. Eastman Parkway
 Gresham, Oregon 97030
 (503) 669-2306

August 30, 1990

Mr. Andy Cotugno
 Transportation Director
 METRO
 2000 SW 1st
 Portland, OR 97201

RE: COMMENTS ON PROPOSED METRO/TRI-MET MERGER

Dear Andy,

This letter summarizes some preliminary comments on the proposed METRO/ Tri-Met merger, for JPACT'S consideration. At this point, specifics of the merger are not clearly defined and it is difficult to comment conclusively on the merger issues.

In addition to the eight issues outlined in the July 31 Memo from George Van Bergen, JPACT should be aware of some fiscal concerns which could arise from a merger. The Tax Supervising and Conservation Commission gives Tri-Met high marks for its financial and budgeting procedures; would a merger assure sound fiscal management of transit services? Will the METRO excise tax be applied to Tri-Met revenues (farebox and payroll taxes), as METRO does with the Zoo? Will the excise tax reduce net revenues available for transit operations or create higher costs for riders? Would Tri-Met overhead charges and grant funds be effected by the excise tax? Would METRO charge Tri-Met rent on its buildings? Would METRO eliminate Tri-Met's finance department, perform this in-house and/or charge Tri-Met for these services?

Briefly, here are my comments on the eight issues:

1. With a merger METRO could lose some of its current advantages as an effective facilitator and objective regional transportation broker. How efficiently would a merged agency work, given the very different organizational missions and operating responsibilities of METRO and Tri-Met?
2. Closer ties of the transit agency to local and regional land use planning are desirable. METRO is developing regional land use goals, many of which support better coordination of transportation and land use. There are other means than the merger for the region to tie transit services to land use.
3. Most transit boards are governed by citizen appointees, like Tri-Met. Regional governments, where they have some control over transit services, rely upon separate independent transit boards. Direct control of transit services by a regional government appears to be an untried system with no clear promise of better transit service. Can the METRO board invest sufficient effort to effectively operate Tri-Met? Would the merger politicize transit service decisions? Let's examine transit organizations in other areas with regional governments.

Mr. Andy Cotugno
August 30, 1990
Page -2-


4. JPACT has a very ambitious regional transit program. To make this a reality, JPACT must form a regional/local partnership, involving coordinated policies, actions, funding, and promotion. JPACT does not need to be directly involved in "transit service delivery".
5. It's not clear whether the merger would have any impact on METRO's MPO designation. Are there other transit agencies which have the MPO responsibility?
6. Toronto has a high degree of regional land use and transportation coordination with an outstanding transit system. Let's look closely at the organization and effectiveness of their regional government and transit commission, before making a major change in ours.

Another region to examine is the Twin Cities area, which also has long experience with regional government and is in the process of planning a regional light rail system.

7. Tri-Met coordinates well with local governments (highway providers) currently. The merger places METRO in a new day-to-day role with local government, possibly leading to more METRO/local conflict in transportation issues.
8. In the past, Tri-Met has effectively developed transit funding mechanisms, which have gained regional, state, and federal support. METRO and JPACT need to be able to provide the regional leadership and public vision for new transit funding proposals, not necessarily invent the mechanisms.

I look forward to further dialogue on these issues at JPACT, as the merger proposal is clarified. I am pleased JPACT will be looking carefully at the implications of this proposal, so that our region in concert can continue to build an excellent transit system.

Sincerely Yours,


Gussie McRobert, Mayor
JPACT Alternate, Cities of Multnomah County

Attachment: Gresham Staff Comments on Merger Issues

cc: City Council
Richard Feeney, Tri-Met
Marge Schmunk, City of Troutdale
Bonnie Kraft
Debbie Sagen
John Andersen
Jeff Davis
Richard Ross



DATE: August 28, 1990
TO: Debbie Sagen, Director,
Community and Economic Development Department
FROM: Richard Ross, Transportation Planner

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED METRO/TRI-MET MERGER

The METRO Council has asked JPACT to conduct a study of the transportation planning and transit service implications of the proposed METRO merger with Tri-Met. The following staff comments respond to the eight issues outlined in the JPACT request for comments on the merger.

Sources of Information:

- Toronto Transit Commission, Brian Milsup, Asst. Gen. Secy.
- Metro Seattle, John Petrick, Public Affairs
- Metropolitan Council of Twin Cities, Minneapolis, Pat O'Connell, Public Information
- American Public Transit Assn., Public Information office
- The Practice of State and Regional Planning, APA, 1986
- "Urban Transit in Canada: Integration and Innovation at its Best", Robert Cervero, Transportation Quarterly, July 1986
- "Try Minnesota Idea: Tax-base Sharing Plan", J. Richard Forrester, Oregonian, June 13, 1990.

1. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the regional transportation planning agency also deliver regional transit services?

METRO is currently respected as an independent, objective agency which facilitates regional guidance and consensus through the JPACT and RTP process. Placing Tri-Met under direct METRO control could reduce METRO's effectiveness and credibility as a regional transportation broker. A merged organization could have advantages for transit planning, since a single entity would perform regional transit/transportation planning and transit services planning. On the transit services side, a merged agency could work less effectively, due to the difficulties of combining agencies

with very diverse missions, operating responsibilities, and clients. Tri-Met is service-oriented and responsive to daily demands of clients. METRO is structured for research, coordination, and policy-making, not day-to-day operations.

2. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having the transit agency having a closer tie to regional land use planning?

Since expanded transit is a key regional growth strategy, the region would benefit from closer ties between transit service and regional land use/transportation planning. The region does not have a regional land use plan, other than the amalgam of everyone's Comp Plans. Since METRO's Regional Urban Growth Management Plan is only in a preliminary stage, METRO's future authority in this arena is uncertain. If the region gives greater priority to regional growth management, then it makes sense to bring the transit agency under greater policy control of the regional land use plan and METRO. The study should examine other means than the merger, to accomplish closer policy coordination of regional land use goals with transit.

3. Is there a prospect for better transit service under Metro's governance structure as compared to the existing Tri-Met governance structure? Is there a threat to existing transit service? Are there ways to modify the governance structure to alleviate these threats?

There is no clear evidence that regional governments provide "better transit service" than separate transit agencies. Most regional governments exercise little control over transit services. Regional transit systems in North America are commonly governed by appointed boards like Tri-Met.

From limited research, the Tri-Met/METRO merger is unprecedented. Two of the most respected regional governments in North America, Twin Cities and Toronto, rely upon independent transit boards appointed by, but not merged with; the regional government. Few regional governments have a structure or powers similar to METRO; these governments have varied degrees of control over transit services. A thorough survey of similar regional governments should be included in the JFACT/METRO study (see below #6).

The merger could diffuse the efforts of the METRO council and management. With a wide mix of responsibilities, the METRO Council could spread itself too thin to effectively tackle the new transit operational issues it would face. Also, transit service decisions by the METRO Council could become more subject to political factors, than decisions by an appointed board. If the merger proceeds, the METRO Council should consider creating a separate transit board to govern transit planning and operations, with policy and budget oversight by the Metro Council.

4. Are there advantages or disadvantages to having JPACT more closely involved in transit service delivery?

If the region's ambitious transit program is to succeed, JPACT must become more involved in developing a transit-oriented future for the region, not the details of transit service delivery. To make enhanced transit service work, all JPACT entities need to participate in a regional strategy to support transit usage: cooperative transportation and land use actions by local and state agencies, specialized transit services and other incentives for transit use, and promotional activities. The proposed merger is not the only means for JPACT to do this.

5. If Metro and Tri-Met were merged, what impact would there be on Metro's federal MPO designation for transportation planning?

We are not aware that the federal MPO designation would be effected by the the merger. In two of five urbanized areas, state highway or transportation departments are designated to perform the MPO role. The merger committee needs to research whether any regional transit agencies are also the MPO and how well this works.

6. Are there lessons to be learned from organizational models affecting regional transportation planning and transit service delivery from elsewhere in the United States?

The inquiry needs to look at organizational models from Canada as well. Metro Toronto is the oldest metropolitan government in North America (1953); the Toronto region has achieved high coordination of land use and transportation with an exemplary transit system, something the Portland region aspires to. For example, Metro Toronto (the regional government) has a regional growth plan that focuses development in Regional Town Centres served by a rail transit network. Toronto transit has the highest modal split and one of the highest farebox recovery ratios (70%) in North America.

The Metro Toronto Council has 28 elected councilors and 6 who are Mayors of constituent cities. Metro Toronto, supported by a unified regional tax base, has direct responsibility for the region's major roads, waste disposal, ambulance services, welfare, daycare, senior housing, and Metro parks. Indirectly, Metro Toronto oversees, appoints, and sets budgets for commissions responsible for police, transit, exhibition-performing arts, licensing, and the zoo.

The Toronto Transit Commission is an independent 5-member commission chartered by Metro Toronto, currently composed of five Metro Toronto councilors. While the Commission reports to the Metro Council, TTC is a separate entity and controls its day-to-day operations. The separate commission, according to TTC management, provides needed autonomy, more focus on transit, and less-politicised decisions, than if the TTC were merged with the Metro Council. Mergers have been proposed and rejected in recent

years. Additionally, a regional Joint Technical Planning Committee of the Metro Council, TTC, and local jurisdictions coordinates both transportation and land use planning.

Another model to examine is the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities. The Twin Cities Council is a 16-member group, appointed by the Governor and legislature, which does overall planning for all regional services, and reviews all local planning under a Regional Development Framework (growth management plan). The Development Framework focuses growth and capital investment into designated growth centers; the region has a pooled regional tax base, based on 40% of the assessed value of new commercial-industrial development, which is dedicated to funding regional services (including transit) and some local revenue sharing.

The Council appoints separate boards to provide regional services in transit, water quality, parks, and airports. The Council approves policies and budgets of these agencies. The Regional Transit Board, an independent 11-member citizen board with geographic representation based on Council districts, plans and administers transit services. While there have been past proposals to merge the Transit Board with the Council, Twin Cities has opted for separation between regional policy/planning and regional transit planning/administration.

Seattle has a more typical agency doing regional transportation planning, the strictly advisory/coordinating Puget Sound Council of Governments. "Metro Seattle", the King Co. transit and sewer agency, is run by a 41-member Council composed of elected local and sewer district officials. There is currently a proposal to merge "Metro Seattle" with King Co., which could go to the voters in November. Similar proposals have been rejected in the past.

7. Would a merger create conflicts between the transit service provider and the road and highway jurisdictions or foster greater coordination?

There is currently extensive coordination between Tri-Met and highway jurisdictions (including local governments) in transit service planning and operations, and capital facilities. A merger per se does not foster more transit-highway coordination, except perhaps on a policy level. If a merger gives METRO direct control over transit services, METRO will have a new daily relation with local and state government. This relation could engender more potential local/METRO conflict, especially as METRO's regional powers or services grow.

8. Would the direct involvement of JPACT and the Metro Council in developing new transit financing mechanisms provide a greater or lesser likelihood of success as compared to the indirect participation that now exists?

Greater regional and state involvement in new transit financing mechanisms is desirable. Participation of JPACT and METRO in crafting these mechanisms is not essential to their success. With its more specialized focus and knowledge of the transit industry, Tri-Met could just as effectively bring successful proposals to the region's table, as it has done in the past. A question which needs examination is how effectively METRO (versus a separate transit agency) could pursue the public-private coventures proposed by the Public-Private Task Force on Transit Finance. Many transit agencies are successfully using joint development strategies to enhance regional land use goals and transit revenues; Tri-Met is beginning to do this with Project Breakeven. We are not aware of regional governments that have developed public-private coventures.

cc: John Andersen
Jeff Davis

10/23/90

To Earl Blumenauer
Fm John Frewing

Su TriMet Merger to METRO

I disagree with the draft report of the JPACT committee as forwarded recently by Felica Trader. I have several comments below which I would like to have considered or, if you will not have another meeting of the JPACT committee, attached to the report as a dissenting minority. I do want to have another meeting to attempt to do justice to this very serious subject.

1. I don't think we have to find some "problem" in order to consider a TriMet merger to METRO. The proper question is whether we, the Portland area, can do things better than today. The fact that TriMet recently won a national award should not diminish our interest in providing better transportation services at lower total cost.


2. I think that much of current transit planning is based on capturing real estate development opportunities rather than providing transit service to today's residents and workers. I believe a TriMet merger to METRO may open up some opportunities to better integrate transit planning with regional land use in a way that doesn't make transit a captive of real estate development interests and highway construction interests.

3. The draft report does not even try to answer the specific question I asked to be addressed at the last (and only) meeting, namely, 'how many transit districts have boards appointed by elected bodies, as distinguished from directly elected boards which is the information which TriMet brought to the JPACT committee?'

4. Felica's draft report simply quotes in large part from the untested assertions of several interests opposed to a TriMet merger to METRO. Maybe the METRO initial conclusion is wrong, but we haven't seen any analysis that proves that. What is the rush to complete this study? METRO has relaxed their time requirements; we should give the issue the thorough evaluation it deserves. A TriMet merger to METRO may represent a power threat to some existing government bureaucracies, but our job is to evaluate the best way of providing transit service to the community -- a TriMet merger to METRO was seen as the best eventual way to provide transit when METRO was formed as evidenced by the express authority given to METRO by the legislation creating METRO.

Please advise me of the next meeting time/place and ask Felica or JPACT staff to develop a work plan that does the job requested of the JPACT committee.

Sincerely,



CC VAN BEALEN
F. TRADER

ATTACHMENT B

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DECISION MAKING

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DECISION MAKING

Introduction

The way in which regional transportation policies are currently formulated and executed has become an item of discussion. Much is at stake because it impacts the very essence of a regional transportation consensus that has evolved over years, has resulted in a call for a balanced transportation system, and is widely owned not only by participating local government jurisdictions but several levels of government as well. To alter that very complicated, and rational set of relationships, suggests the need to move with great care. A new way of "doing business" could impact the regional community at many levels: the users of the transportation system, land use patterns and air quality, and the vitality of the regional economy. To that end, we are dealing with more than simply highways and public transit. Transportation infrastructure decisions will likely determine how the region grows and even more telling, how robust that growth will be.

An orderly discussion of the issues and proposed organizational alterations invites us to step back and seek answers to many questions. Some of the most important and basic questions might include the following:

- o How did the current transportation policy making system emerge? Does it continue to work?
- o What problems did the policy making structure, which can be traced to the mid-70's, seek to solve? Do those conditions still exist?
- o How did Tri-Met's service policy develop over the years?
- o How does our public transit system compare to other properties in terms of quality and quantity of service?
- o What does our history and experience suggest about transportation policy making and governance?
- o What transportation decision making structures best equip the region to solve the issues that will lead to the development of a balanced transportation system?

The materials which follow attempt to provide perspective and focus to those discussions.

I. History

This paper reviews the development of transit service levels and patterns in the context of regional transportation policy. The extent that transit service has responded to the regional consensus on transportation priorities is assessed.

Tri-Met has had to respond to service issues of regional significance (e.g., light rail, bus trunklines) as well as interests of local significance (e.g., service to a senior center or local employment center). There is a constant need to balance the complex service allocation decision: peak vs. off-peak; weekday vs. weekend; downtown vs. non-downtown; residential vs. employment; urban vs. suburban; frequency vs. coverage; transit dependent vs. choice rider; riders vs. non-riders.

Tri-Met's system-wide service concept (or philosophy) reflects regional transportation policy. Tri-Met is a multi-destinational transit system that is designed to attract a broad ridership base. In this way, Tri-Met is able to respond to the multiple goals that our regional partners have given us.

At a more detailed level, service allocation decisions are made as the result of a detailed analysis of effectiveness measures (e.g., rides per hour). Service is periodically adjusted as a result of this continual monitoring process. Service is allocated based on patronage potential and on the basis of meeting adopted goals. It is not allocated based on payroll tax collected in each jurisdiction or on the basis of each jurisdiction's population.

Five periods of transit development in the Portland region are presented. Each is tied to a set of goals adopted by the Tri-Met Board. The goals are compared to regional transportation policy; in some cases, a change in regional policy resulted in a change in Tri-Met's policy. The ability of Tri-Met to carry out regional policy is largely determined by the level of funding available to operate the system. In some periods, Tri-Met was unable to expand service because of regional, economic, and political conditions. Overall, though, Tri-Met has been a willing partner in regional transportation planning, and that partnership has resulted in a region with a transit system that:

- is recognized as the best in North America;
- provides a very high level of service;
- is planning to expand LRT and bus service;
- has effective linkages with all stakeholders in the transit system; and
- has met its regional goals.

A. 1970 - 1974: A New Agency Created - Service Collapse is Avoided - Environmental Concerns Take Hold

Tri-Met was created by the State legislature in 1969, a fertile time for establishing new metropolitan agencies. In addition to Tri-Met, there was the Metropolitan Service District, the Metro Boundary Commission, and the Port of Portland. These agencies were created in response to broad-ranging statewide concerns over the quality of the environment. Unplanned growth in suburban areas and the decline of population and jobs in the inner city was perceived to negatively affect the quality of life in the Portland region. By 1970, the suburbs contained 62% of the region's population, 44% of the employment, and 50% of the retail sales.

The State Legislature passed the legislation that created Tri-Met with near unanimous support. The intent was to "keep alive a gravely sick system and if possible restore it to health" (Tri-Met, A Year of Action, no date).

The region's official transportation plan in 1971, the Portland Vancouver Metropolitan Area Transportation Plan (PVMATS), proposed an extensive network of new freeways and highways to serve the entire metropolitan area. The transit component was not significant.

Shortly after Tri-Met began operations, the Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG) developed a 1990 Public Transportation Master Plan. The plan assumed the PVMATS freeway network (including the Mount Hood freeway), and developed a system of express bus routes on the freeways, with bus lanes and busways to avoid auto congestion. The express bus routes would serve suburban park and ride stations and a downtown Portland Transit Mall.

Tri-Met's goals for FY71-74 were broadly stated (Figure 1). One goal indicates a specific action: expanding suburban service and building park and ride lots, as called for in the 1990 Public Transportation Master Plan.

=====

Figure 1
1971 Goals

1. Provide superior transit for people who depend on it and make the service attractive so that people will switch from using cars.
2. Provide a completely new transit service for the suburban areas, featuring transit stations with park and ride lots and feeder buses.
3. Relieve traffic congestion and decrease the need for expanded roadways.
4. Help control air pollution by buying buses with exhaust emission controls and by providing an alternative to the automobile.

Summarized from: Tri-Met: A Year of Action, no date.

=====

Between 1971 and 1974, Tri-Met's policy was to stabilize urban service and rapidly expand suburban service in areas unserved and to offer more trips on the former Blue Lines routes. In the City of Portland, Tri-Met started new crosstown service. Annual vehicle hours grew an average of 6% per year (from 735,000 in FY71 to 887,000 in FY74). Originating rides per vehicle hour grew from 20 in FY71 to 23.2 in FY74.

B. 1974-1977: Calls for a Larger Role for Transit - Expanding Tax Revenues - Service Improvements Made

During its first few years, Tri-Met was primarily concerned with stabilizing the existing system, expanding service in suburban areas, and making basic improvements to the service. Meanwhile, a significant change had occurred in regional transportation planning. A regional consensus for a balance transportation system was developed. Long-standing policies that called for almost total reliance on highways to meet long-term travel needs were reversed. The region recognized that PVMATS and the 1990 Public Transportation Master Plan were in fundamental conflict. Transit would be the major transportation investment of the future. Instead of a region of freeways and urban sprawl, planners wanted a region with a strong downtown, livable urban neighborhoods, and suburbs focused on activity nodes.

The PVMATS plan was reversed by the Governor's Task Force on Transportation for the Portland region. Governor Tom McCall appointed the task force, which operated as a special committee

of CRAG. The task force brought together local elected officials and the leaders of the transportation agencies in the region¹. The task force made a commitment to a balanced regional transportation plan and recommended a reversal of the PVMATS plan because of:

- concerns about suburban sprawl
- resident's opposition to freeway disruption
- the 1974 energy shortage
- public ownership of Tri-Met

The political decision to withdraw the Mt. Hood freeway and use the money for transit projects instead was made by the end of the calendar year 1974.

The plan produced by the task force called for a transit system that would carry 290,000 weekday originating rides in 1990 (compared to 84,000 in FY74). A 10% mode split, more than twice the actual 1990 mode split, was projected based on 2.8 million daily person trips.

In addition to supply-side improvements for regional transportation, the state and City of Portland took steps to manage the demand for travel. Land use plans and policies were revised to encourage and accommodate higher density development, particularly in downtown Portland. Most important, the task force developed an agreement on how they would work together to identify and resolve issues and maintain a productive dialogue. They made a commitment to restructure CRAG so that it could be the permanent institutional focus for the region's transportation decisions. That arrangement has been maintained to this day.

The 1972 Downtown Plan, which was adopted before codification of state land use planning processes, provided a focus for public and private investments in a revitalized core area. The Downtown Parking and Circulation Policy, adopted in 1975, is the transportation part of the Downtown Plan. It set a lid on the number of parking spaces and limited the number of spaces per thousand square feet of office space. This policy encourages transit use rather than auto use for trips to downtown, particularly for work trips.

At the request of Mayor Goldschmidt, Governor McCall appointed a new Tri-Met board with a strong mandate to begin immediate

¹Appointed by Tom McCall, the Task Force included: Neil Goldschmidt, Mildred Schwab (City of Portland), James Gleason, Mel Gordon (Multnomah County) Glenn Jackson (Oregon Transportation Commission), Gerard Drummond (Tri-Met), Rod Roth (Washington County), Robert Schumacher (Clackamas County), William Young (CRAG), and F. Glenn O'Dell (Port of Portland).

revitalization and expansion of service. With representation on CRAG, the board would be more active in regional transportation decisions, particularly in advocating light rail service to east Multnomah County. Tri-Met responded to the new regional directive by improving service and by planning for the eastside light rail line.

Tri-Met also developed a new set of goals, adopted in 1974 (Figure 2). These goals reflected the larger role that transit was to play in regional transportation and land use planning. The goals were ambitious and set high quantitative targets for patronage and mode split for downtown Portland trips. They also responded to state interest in mobility for the elderly and disabled and supported Tri-Met's active involvement in land use planning.

The goals also referenced a set of adopted service standards that set forth Tri-Met's criteria for evaluating existing services. Between FY74 and FY78, annual vehicle hours of service increased by 15% per year, ridership by the same.

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Figure 2
1974 Goals

1. Provide efficient, convenient, safe service throughout the Tri-County area in accordance with adopted service standards to provide:
 - basic service to those without cars
 - attractive and convenient alternative to the automobile
2. Increase ridership from 72,500 originating rides in FY74 to 145,000 originating rides in FY79 in order to:
 - reduce congestion
 - save gas
 - reduce pollution
 - reduce highway expansion needs
3. Increase the downtown Portland transit mode split from 18% to 36% in 1979 to:
 - reduce congestion and pollution
 - reduce the need for long-term parking
4. Maintain farebox revenue at a minimum of 40% of operations costs to:
 - maintain fiscal stability
 - review productivity of each line
5. Increase service to elderly and disabled people to:
 - accessible regular service
 - start an "essential" special service

6. Support land use planning to:
- discourage sprawl
 - increase efficiency

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To encourage ridership, Tri-Met offered fare discounts. Tri-Met started a system-wide flat fare of 35 cents to encourage suburban ridership to downtown Portland. Fareless Square also started in 1975 in response to the State Implementation Plan for Air Quality and in support of the Downtown Plan.

- C. 1977-1983: Manifest Destiny - Energy Crisis Results in Increased Ridership - Agency Focuses on Productivity - Region Commits to Light Rail

In response to the regional directive to help carry out state land use plans, transportation and energy policies, Tri-Met planned on a grand scale in support of this effort. It also committed the agency to the Banfield LRT project.

Tri-Met continued to make improvements to the bus system, began engineering studies for the Banfield LRT line, planning for the Westside LRT line, and proposed scores of bus capital projects to support the service levels envisioned for 1990.

To reflect its regional mandate, the Tri-Met board drafted a new set of goals which were adopted in 1977 (Figure 3). These were similar to the 1974 goals, but focused more on financial capability and internal management. Tri-Met realized that, to carry out its mandate, it would need more continuing tax revenues than are available from the payroll tax.

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Figure 3
1977 Goals

1. Support regional growth without major new investments in highways by providing a transit system that is an attractive alternative to the automobile.
2. Implement a financing program to support construction and operation of the system through 1990.
3. Improve productivity with capital and operating investments and sound, innovative management policies.
4. Make a major contribution to the improvement of the regional environment and the livability of urban neighborhoods.
5. Maximize energy conservation and efficiency in the design and operation of the transit system.

6. Improve transit mobility for the transportation disadvantaged.
7. Encourage growth patterns within the regional land use plan which support efficient transit service.

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The 1977 goals were the basis for the 1980 Transit Development Plan (TDP). The TDP continued Tri-Met's tradition of providing service adequate to meet the responsibility that regional transportation policy had placed upon transit, acknowledging the need for a new revenue source to support service increase.

The TDP projected about 160,000 weekday originating rides in 1985, the result of 40-50% increase in service levels. It also proposed several productivity improvements: computerization of scheduling and runcutting, part time drivers, timed-transfer service, management information systems, self-service fare collection, service reductions on low ridership lines, and light rail.

In addition to a focus on increased productivity, this period saw a shift in Tri-Met's service allocation. More attention was given to serving non-downtown trips. The 1970's saw an acceleration of the trend of suburban population growth that first gave rise to concerns in the 60's. Now, in addition to population, employment growth in suburban areas accelerated. New regional shopping malls, Washington Square and Clackamas Town Center, were opened.

Tri-Met's response was a multi-destinational service design. Transit would attempt to tap not only the downtown Portland segment of the regional travel market, but also the non-downtown market. This would be made possible by continuing the service expansion of the mid-70's and financing those improvements from a new tax source.

- In 1979 Tri-Met introduced a timed transfer system on the Westside. Service hours increased 6.8%.
- In 1981 service hours in suburban east county and southeast Portland were increased 7.2%.
- In 1982, service hours increased 9.7%, new crosstown service was implemented.

D. 1983-1986: Recession Results in Service Reductions - Regan Revolution - No New Taxes

In 1982, Tri-Met increased service 9.7% with the understanding that new revenues would be forthcoming. However, economic conditions in the region brought on by a national recession prevented Tri-Met from adopting a new tax base for service

expansion. It had become clear that the region would not be able to provide a new source of operating funds to continue the service expansion of the 70's.

After increasing service 29% in the previous period, 1977-1982, Tri-Met was forced to reduce service 13% as a last resort, to maintain financial stability.

Between FY83 and FY86, vehicle hours were reduced an average of 4.4% per year. Ridership dropped 2.6% per year on average. Annual system costs were reduced about \$10 million. Cost per vehicle hour held steady and rides per vehicle hour increased from 21 in FY83 to 22.3 in FY86.

E. 1986 - Present: Light Rail Opens - Fiscal Stability - Ridership Rebounds

This final period saw a return to the preeminent role of transit in regional transportation policy. The Eastside LRT line opened with salubrious effects on ridership. MAX is so popular that the regional political coalition at JPACT developed a comprehensive transit funding package for the construction of the Westside LRT line and for preliminary work on an East Portland-Clackamas County line.

While there are plans for LRT expansion, it does not appear that there are funds in hand to expand the bus system at the same average rate as between FY71 and FY91 (6%). The focus over the last few years has been to provide peak capacity to match demand, to maintain schedule reliability, and to respond to pressing service requests in unserved areas.

Tri-Met, as a result, has not kept pace with suburban growth. For example, during the 80's there was reduction in the service levels in Clackamas County. The County has made the point that Tri-Met should be more responsive to their needs. In response, Tri-Met has given off-peak improvements to certain lines serving Clackamas County priority for April 1991 service changes. The proposed 1991 service changes address the most critical requests generated by riders in the area and by the the Clackamas County Transportation Coordinating Committee.

Tri-Met adopted a new set of goals in 1987, a decade after the last set of goals was adopted (Figure 4). These goals emphasize fiscal stability as a basis for the long-term development of the system.

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Figure 4
1987 Goals

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1. Achieve fiscal stability.
 2. Increase productivity and flexibility of operations.
 3. Attract and retain more public transportation customers.
 4. Retain the existing diversity of service.
 5. Develop new partnerships and identify advocacy groups.
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Since light rail startup annual vehicle hours have grown roughly 1.5% per year. Ridership increased an average of 4.3% per year.

Throughout its history, the Tri-Met board has acted as a partner in regional transportation planning, and developed goals that reflect Tri-Met's regional mandate. The focus on partnership and regional goals has resulted in one of the best transit systems in the country, and one of the few with a light rail system. In the next section, we examine how successful we have been compared to other cities.

II. Governance and Service -- The Present Situation

A. Putting Tri-Met in Perspective -- Comparative Transit Environments

Is there a prospect for better transit service under a new governance structure compared to the existing Tri-Met governance structure?

The data presented in Tables I-III and Graphs I-VII illustrate that whether a board of directors is appointed or elected provides no assurance that a good transit system--one that attracts high ridership, has low costs and provides a high level of service to the community--will result, and will be accomplished in a cost-effective manner that retains public support.

Tri-Met offers one of the highest levels of service to the community of any transit agency in the nation. Tri-Met service levels, ridership and costs compare favorably with cities that have appointed boards and strong regional planning structures, such as Minneapolis/St. Paul, cities with appointed boards and weak regional planning structures such as Houston and Los

Angeles, and cities with elected boards such as Denver and Oakland-AC Transit.

Among its peers, the twenty-seven largest non-heavy rail transit systems in the nation, Tri-Met ranks fourth in vehicle hours per capita, fifth in demand responsive service hours per capita, and carries the highest percentage of work trips to downtown. Tri-Met has low system costs per vehicle hour, ranking twenty-third among its peers. Tri-Met is sixth in boarding rides per capita and eleventh in boarding rides per vehicle hour, in spite of ranking eighteenth in population density. Tri-Met is one of six transit agencies with a light rail system.

On a per capita basis Tri-Met offers 42% more service than Los Angeles, Denver or Miami, 56% more service than Minneapolis or Cincinnati, 63% more service than Dallas or the combined San Diego systems, 71% more service than Houston, and 92% more service than St. Louis.

These are not minor differences. To put these figures in perspective, if Tri-Met were to offer to the community the level of bus service that Houston, Minneapolis/St. Paul, San Diego or Dallas offer to their communities, we would have to cancel all weekend bus service and roughly one third of weekday service, affecting 14 million annual bus boardings and 41 out of 74 routes.

In vehicle hours per capita, Tri-Met ranks only behind Seattle, Pittsburgh and Milwaukee. Milwaukee is a city-only system that serves a small, densely populated area, with a large university. Milwaukee provides no suburban service.

Minneapolis/St. Paul, a region with what is generally considered to be a paradigm of effective regional government, is average when it comes to transit services. Compared to Portland, their system offers 36% fewer service hours per capita and attracts only 6% more boarding rides per service hour, in spite of population densities that are 18% higher than Portland's. Minneapolis offers no demand responsive service.

Seattle Metro, the top ranking system in terms of service hours per capita, generates roughly the same number of boarding rides per capita as Tri-Met. Metro's service is less effective than Tri-Met's -- Tri-Met carries more rides per service hour than Seattle, and Seattle Metro's costs per hour are 17% higher. Seattle Metro has a farebox recovery ratio of 20%. Tri-Met's farebox recovery ratio is 25.5%. The difference between a 20% and a 25% farebox recovery ratio is large. For Tri-Met to support a farebox recovery ratio of 20%, we would require an additional continuing revenue source roughly equal to \$5 million annually.

Tri-Met also offers high levels of demand responsive service. Many agencies offer none. Since FY88 this ranking has probably improved as dedicated revenues for demand responsive Special Needs services have doubled.

No agency serves a greater percentage of work trips to downtown than Tri-Met. In spite of ranking eighth in CBD employment as a percentage of regional employment, Tri-Met ranks first in the ability to carry commuters to and from the CBD. Tri-Met carries a slightly higher number of suburban commuters than city commuters to the CBD every day. Our ability to achieve this success is the result of years of state and regional support for effective land use planning and years of regional cooperation and support for the Downtown Parking and Circulation Policy and the DEQ's Air Quality Plan.

The role of Tri-Met in tying together the suburbs and central city is, and will remain, important. Nationwide, and in the Portland region, commuting from suburbs to the central city has been increasing. Transit is necessary to assuring that our urban areas are integrated economic and social entities, rather than just two societies side by side. Transit will continue to be critical because we cannot construct new highway facilities through areas that are already highly developed. It will continue to have an important role in supporting land use plans and keeping employers in the city from moving to the suburbs. As we have seen in Orange County and Santa Clara, California our suburban road systems do not tolerate continued employment sprawl very well.

Tri-Met has not met the mode split to downtown goals the district and the region set in 1975 for a variety of reasons, but we are head and shoulders above our peers and are remain committed to meeting peak hour demand to downtown.

Since light rail start-up, Tri-Met has increased bus service each year nearly 1.5%. We have developed plans for Westside light rail and a feeder bus system to support it. We have assured the City of Portland that we are committed to meeting peak hour demand to downtown. We have shared with the region and the state our concerns about the lack of funds for capital equipment, particularly given the drop in federal funds. We are presently working to identify our ten year service and capital needs, given regional plans, and will be going back to the state for additional revenues based on those results soon. We have secured a new source of revenue from the state that will add \$3.5-\$4 million to the district's continuing revenue stream in a few years.

The term "better" needs to be defined. However, one conclusion is unmistakable: through careful management, planning and inter-jurisdictional support, Tri-Met provides a high quantity and quality of low-cost transit service that places it among the top echelon of transit service providers in the nation. Public opinion polls,

which say that 60% of the public is satisfied with the amount of service Tri-Met offers, support this conclusion.

B. The Present Transportation Policy Structure

Tri-Met has arrived where it is today by acting as a partner in a regional transportation policy-making and planning process that was deliberately set forth in 1975 by the Governor's Task Force on Transportation to foster coordination and cooperation between the officials and staffs of local governments, regional jurisdictions, and the state. It is through the recommendations of this task force, in their report The Cooperative Transportation Planning Process in the Portland Metropolitan Area, that what is now called JPACT and TPACT, were created as presently constituted, with representation from Tri-Met, the Port and the State of Oregon as well as the counties and the City of Portland.

The task force recommendations were born out of a need to quickly resolve pressing transportation questions, to move the region toward comprehensive land use and multi-modal transportation planning, and to coordinate the various transportation planning efforts already underway in the region.

Some of these planning efforts were the Downtown Parking and Circulation Study, a decision on the Mt. Hood Freeway and I-205, Tri-Met service improvements and park and ride planning, light rail opportunities, the creation of the LCDC, the reorganization of the Oregon DOT with a public transit division, the implementation of the Clean Air Act, and the use of federal highway funds for transit projects.

The cooperative process developed by the Task Force and agreed upon by the region was simple in concept. First, at a policy level, the key transportation decision makers in the region made a commitment to work together through a common institutional focus, CRAG.

Second, each agency agreed to shared responsibility for producing the necessary plans. Thus Tri-Met would have responsibility for transit planning and operations. ODOT and the counties would have responsibility for highway and road planning and maintenance.

These features were considered by the Task Force, to be "a big step above the usual situation in which the staff of one agency would report to a committee made up of other agencies. Under that kind of arrangement, some agencies perform only a review function, and the transportation program is not viewed as theirs. The staff relationships established in Portland assured that there would be a common program developed by all agencies and, therefore, they would have more commitment to the effort."

The Task Force recognized that a balanced regional transportation plan would only emerge with the commitment it needs to succeed

through an institutional structure that fostered consensus and ownership. The institutional structure they recommended is known today as JPACT.

Institutional realignment today could threaten these time-honored and complex relationships. It would eliminate the mediator role that Metro plays and would establish a new institutional arrangement for regional transportation planning where the MPO would have responsibility for transit planning and operations and would also review the transportation plans of other jurisdictions, an arrangement that was rejected by the Governor's Task Force.

The JPACT policy making structure has set the policy context under which transit and highway transportation investment decisions have been made for the last fifteen years. These efforts have brought the region MAX and one of the top bus systems in the nation. The Tri-Met board has acted as a partner in the process.

Tri-Met has been successful in keeping costs low because productivity and cost control have been constant concerns of the Tri-Met Board and staff. This emphasis is a reflection of the fact that the Tri-Met board is selected to fairly represent the transit system's taxpayers--the employers who pay the payroll tax and who, over the years, have come to consider themselves stockholders in the transit system. How would a new structure insure adequate representation for the payroll taxpayer, a small percentage of the electorate?

Given the effectiveness of the current arrangement, it is important that proponents of any alternative demonstrate how the current transportation policy making process would be strengthened and how the new structure would lead to better outcomes. There is no evidence that the current system does not provide accountability. It is accountable to citizens and local governments in the region through the public participation process and the involvement of the political leadership of JPACT.

What relationship does Metro council envision it would have with the State of Oregon, and how would the stability of this relationship be assured in election after election?

From the beginning, the State of Oregon has assumed a vital role in the success of Tri-Met. The state has supported Tri-Met efforts to use vehicle for mass transit, developed supportive comprehensive land use planning, reorganized the Oregon DOT to include public transit. The State of Oregon has provided Tri-Met with millions in capital funds, provided dedicated taxes for Special Needs Transportation, making Tri-Met second only to Pittsburgh in the amount of service dedicated to the elderly and handicapped. The state provided one-half the local match on the Banfield project, and committed one-half the local match on the Westside project. The state has supported Tri-Met efforts to extend the payroll tax to the

self-employed, to state employees, and to schools and municipalities. In the future, as federal operating and capital support for transit continue to decline, support from the state for additional resources for mass transit will become even more critical.

Tri-Met is part of an institutional environment that has worked.

- o It is the strongest arrangement for generating commitment and cooperation among the many transportation interests in the region.
- o It is a structure that focuses on products and projects
- o With Metro in a mediating and supporting role, it is a structure that insures consensus and ownership in regional transportation policy that is necessary for moving projects forward quickly
- o It is action oriented
- o This consensus building, cooperative process in which support and responsibility for both road and transit projects are shared by the region in the regional transportation plan has generated support for transit and transit solutions that, without the support of JPACT, would probably not have found support in the public.

This is a critical period for transportation in the region. It is imperative that proponents of institutional change identify how the forum for regional transportation policy making created in the 70s have been unsuccessful, or why it is inappropriate for the issues we face in the 90s.

III. Some Major Transportation and Transit Issues for the 1990's.

The Tri-Met Board of Directors already has begun a review of the major transit issues which will confront the agency and the region during the decade of the 1990's and beyond. The real question becomes: "What system of governance and inter-jurisdictional cooperation will be most effective in achieving the level of consensus, ownership and resolve that is necessary to address the next decade's transportation issues?"

- o Will the region be able to meet the travel demand generated by downtown Portland?

In order to meet increasing peak period ridership to downtown, it will be necessary to increase peak period service and to buy additional vehicles (bus and rail). Since peak service is the most expensive to provide,

what agency best understands these issues and what governance arrangement is best able to minimize the costs and increase the efficiency of such service expansion?

- o What level of off-peak service is necessary to meet downtown Portland growth projections?

Increasing ridership in the off-peak might require additional service in order to alleviate overcrowding. Now the frequency of service is determined by policy, rather than demand during the midday. It is possible that higher ridership will require more frequent off-peak service to meet loading standards. To whom should such policy leadership fall?

- o What approaches are necessary to meet a target mode split of 35% of all downtown trips?

City and regional plans call for 35% of all regional trips to downtown Portland to be on transit. While items 1 and 2 above account for passenger demand, it might be necessary to induce ridership through additional service improvements and/or the implementation of policies that influence travel decisions. These policies, which include land use and parking prices, gasoline prices and vehicle fees are as important in shaping travel as investments in additional transit service or capital infrastructure and will require concerted efforts by the state, Tri-Met and local jurisdictions above and beyond those which respond to demand. Purely supply side solutions to transportation problems are limited. To enhance the existing service, and to ensure continued growth in mode split, it will be necessary to manage the demand side of the equation more effectively. What governmental arrangements are best suited to make these choices?

- o What level of service will be needed to serve the non-downtown travel market?

This market segment is difficult to serve effectively with transit. Expectations from the public and jurisdictions indicate that Tri-Met will continue to receive requests to improve service in the suburbs. What governmental arrangements are necessary to adopt and enforce the land use controls and other regulations necessary to make transit work in suburban areas?

- o What will be the role of non-traditional fixed route service in the 1990's?

Contracted service offers an opportunity to reduce unit operating costs and improve service in low demand suburban areas. Answers to many of the questions listed above will indicate the importance and possibly the necessity of contracting service in the 1990's. This is a delicate union-management issue. What governmental arrangement best provides the possibility of achieving that goal?

- o What will the level of Tri-Met's financial involvement be in the development of the regional rail network?

Capital costs for LRT lines are high, and will compete against other pressing capital needs in the region and the district. In part, the level of capital support for the system is determined by the level of bus service. What governmental entities must be involved in the dialogue for determining the level of funding for not only transportation infrastructure development but also the mix between highways and transit?

- o What will be the desirable level of special needs transportation service, given the American's with Disabilities Act and the eventual 100% accessibility of the fixed route system?

Tri-Met's SNT service is very good compared to peer cities. Should it continue to grow at a rate commensurate with a fixed route system, or should it be planned independently? This is a state sponsored program. Which units of government are best equipped to make these decisions?

- o How will the transit industry, and Tri-Met in particular, deal with eroding productivity introduced by new federal law?

The Americans with Disabilities Act, clean air legislation and drug testing regulations will all introduce new cost requirements on transit operations during the 1990's. A range of responses are available in each area, each response will impact the operating cost structure of transit operations for decades to come. What governmental arrangement offers the best opportunity to develop the most effective response to these new requirements?

- o How will Tri-Met and its regional partners secure the necessary capital and operating funds for the envisioned system?

The primary source of operating revenue (payroll tax) is at its statutory limit. Federal resources are in a period of decline and greater reliance on state and regional resources will be required. State match for

on-going capital replacement is no longer available. For years, public polls have indicated no support among the electorate for additional taxes to increase bus services or to operate additional light rail lines. Development of the transit system assumes heavy front-end as well as on-going capital replacement costs. What inter-governmental structures and arrangements are needed to achieve a consensus on transit funding and are best able to help secure an appropriate resource base?

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TABLE I

TRANSIT SYSTEM	VEHICLE HOURS PER CAPITA	NUMBER OF BOARD MEMBERS	METHOD OF BOARD SELECTION
1 SEATTLE	1.83	40	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY COUNCIL (7); REMAINING MEMBERS ARE ELECTED OFFICIALS FROM THE REGION.
2 MILWAUKEE	1.61	5	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.
3 PITTSBURGH	1.56	9	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
4 PORTLAND	1.42	7	- APPOINTED BY GOVERNOR.
5 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT	1.32	7	- DIRECTLY ELECTED.
6 BUFFALO	1.29	11	- APPOINTED BY NY GOVERNOR.
7 BALTIMORE	1.20	0	- DOES NOT HAVE AN OUTSIDE BOARD; OPERATED BY STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.
8 CLEVELAND	1.17	10	- APPOINTED BY CITY (4), COUNTY COMMISSIONER (3), AND MAYORS ASSOC. (3).
9 SAN ANTONIO	1.07	11	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS (3), CITY COUNCIL (5), MAYORS (2), AND BOARD ITSELF (1).
10 SANTA CLARA	1.07	5	- COUNTY COMMISSIONERS (5, ELECTED) SERVE AS THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.
11 DENVER	1.00	15	- DIRECTLY ELECTED.
12 LOS ANGELES	1.00	11	- APPOINTED BY CITY SUPERVISORS (5), MAYOR (2), AND CITY COMMITTEE (4).
13 MIAMI	0.98	9	- COUNTY COMMISSION (8 DISTRICTS PLUS 1 COUNTY-WIDE REPRESENTATIVE).
14 MINNEAPOLIS	0.91	5	- APPOINTED BY REGIONAL TRANSIT BOARD.
15 CINCINNATI	0.90	12	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONER.
16 DALLAS	0.87	25	- APPOINTED BY CITY COUNCILS.
17 SAN DIEGO*	0.87	7	- APPOINTED BY MAYOR (4), CITY (1), COUNTY (2); MTDB CHAIR SERVES AS 8TH EX OFFICIO MEMBER.
18 HOUSTON	0.84	9	- APPOINTED BY CITY OF HOUSTON (5), COUNTY (2), AND MAYORS OF MULTI-CITIES (2).
19 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE	0.74	10	- APPOINTED BY CITY/COUNTY OFFICIALS (5 ILLINOIS, 5 MISSOURI).
20 SALT LAKE CITY	0.72	13	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
21 DETROIT	0.65	7	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY COUNCIL.
22 INDIANAPOLIS	0.64	5	- APPOINTED BY COUNTY COMMISSIONER (3), AND MAYOR (2).
23 SACRAMENTO	0.61	7	- APPOINTED BY CITY (4), AND COUNTY (3).
24 ORANGE COUNTY	0.55	5	- APPOINTED BY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (2), CITY COUNCILS (2), AND BOARD ITSELF (1).
25 KANSAS CITY	0.48	10	- APPOINTED BY GOVERNOR OF EACH STATE (5 KANSAS, 5 MISSOURI).
26 HARTFORD	0.46	0	- DOES NOT HAVE AN OUTSIDE BOARD; OWNED BY STATE.
27 PHOENIX	0.35	5	- MAYORS OF 5 LARGEST CITIES IN SYSTEM REGION.

* BOTH TROLLEY AND BUS HAVE THE SAME BOARD COMPOSITION, BUT WITH DIFFERENT MEMBERS.

TRANSIT SYSTEM	VEHICLE HOURS ** PER CAPITA	TRANSIT SYSTEM	BOARDING RIDES PER CAPITA	TRANSIT SYSTEM	BOARDING RIDES/VEHICLE HOUR	TRANSIT SYSTEM	AS A % OF TOTAL VEHICLE HOURS	TRANSIT SYSTEM	POPULATION DENSITY	TRANSIT SYSTEM	EXPENSES PER VEHICLE HOUR
1 SEATTLE	1.83	1 MILWAUKEE	75.9	1 LOS ANGELES	53.16	1 PITTSBURGH	24.7%	1 MILWAUKEE	7,423	1 DETROIT	\$87.29
2 MILWAUKEE	1.61	2 BALTIMORE	59.2	2 BALTIMORE	49.39	2 ORANGE COUNTY	16.6%	2 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE	6,522	2 DALLAS	\$82.26
3 PITTSBURGH	1.56	3 PITTSBURGH	57.1	3 MILWAUKEE	47.23	3 SAN DIEGO*	13.2%	3 PHOENIX	4,706	3 MIAMI	\$79.43
4 PORTLAND	1.42	4 LOS ANGELES	53.1	4 CLEVELAND	40.42	4 DALLAS	10.6%	4 SANTA CLARA	4,417	4 SANTA CLARA	\$71.90
5 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT	1.32	5 SEATTLE	51.1	5 PITTSBURGH	36.54	5 DETROIT	8.6%	5 KANSAS CITY	3,714	5 CLEVELAND	\$66.95
6 BUFFALO	1.29	6 PORTLAND	48.1	6 MINNEAPOLIS	35.79	6 PORTLAND	8.6%	6 MIAMI	3,658	6 PITTSBURGH	\$66.45
7 BALTIMORE	1.20	7 CLEVELAND	47.3	7 MIAMI	35.44	7 CINCINNATI	6.4%	7 LOS ANGELES	3,478	7 SACRAMENTO	\$66.25
8 CLEVELAND	1.17	8 BUFFALO	43.0	8 HARTFORD	35.33	8 SALT LAKE CITY	6.2%	8 CLEVELAND	3,279	8 ORANGE COUNTY	\$65.16
9 SAN ANTONIO	1.07	9 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT	35.8	9 DALLAS	34.24	9 CLEVELAND	5.7%	9 SAN DIEGO*	3,158	9 LOS ANGELES	\$61.66
10 SANTA CLARA	1.07	10 MIAMI	34.8	10 CINCINNATI	34.09	10 SAN ANTONIO	5.6%	10 ORANGE COUNTY	2,954	10 HOUSTON	\$58.94
11 DENVER	1.00	11 SAN ANTONIO	34.1	11 PORTLAND	33.88	11 KANSAS CITY	5.1%	11 CINCINNATI	2,770	11 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT	\$56.58
12 LOS ANGELES	1.00	12 MINNEAPOLIS	32.4	12 BUFFALO	33.23	12 INDIANAPOLIS	3.5%	12 SACRAMENTO	2,512	12 SEATTLE	\$56.55
13 MIAMI	0.98	13 CINCINNATI	30.6	13 SAN ANTONIO	31.80	13 BALTIMORE	2.9%	13 HOUSTON	2,465	13 BALTIMORE	\$55.78
14 MINNEAPOLIS	0.91	14 DALLAS	30.0	14 SACRAMENTO	31.15	14 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE	2.3%	14 DALLAS	2,201	14 KANSAS CITY	\$55.13
15 CINCINNATI	0.90	15 DENVER	27.8	15 HOUSTON	30.58	15 HOUSTON	0.2%	15 MINNEAPOLIS	2,200	15 BUFFALO	\$53.98
16 DALLAS	0.87	16 SAN DIEGO*	26.4	16 SAN DIEGO*	30.40	16 BUFFALO	0.0%	16 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT	2,133	16 CINCINNATI	\$53.68
17 SAN DIEGO*	0.87	17 HOUSTON	25.7	17 KANSAS CITY	30.13	17 HARTFORD	0.0%	17 PITTSBURGH	1,875	17 DENVER	\$53.27
18 HOUSTON	0.84	18 SANTA CLARA	24.9	18 DETROIT	29.46	18 LOS ANGELES	0.0%	18 PORTLAND	1,851	18 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE	\$50.63
19 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE	0.74	19 DETROIT	19.1	19 PHOENIX	29.00	19 MIAMI	0.0%	19 INDIANAPOLIS	1,756	19 HARTFORD	\$49.49
20 SALT LAKE CITY	0.72	20 SACRAMENTO	19.1	20 SEATTLE	27.96	20 MILWAUKEE	0.0%	20 BUFFALO	1,620	20 MINNEAPOLIS	\$49.24
21 DETROIT	0.65	21 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE	18.8	21 DENVER	27.70	21 MINNEAPOLIS	0.0%	21 BALTIMORE	1,125	21 SAN DIEGO*	\$48.88
22 INDIANAPOLIS	0.64	22 SALT LAKE CITY	17.4	22 ORANGE COUNTY	27.30	22 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT	0.0%	22 SAN ANTONIO	921	22 PHOENIX	\$48.81
23 SACRAMENTO	0.61	23 HARTFORD	16.4	23 OAKLAND-AC TRANSIT	27.01	23 PHOENIX	0.0%	23 DENVER	768	23 PORTLAND	\$48.46
24 ORANGE COUNTY	0.55	24 INDIANAPOLIS	15.9	24 ST LOUIS-BI-STATE	25.50	24 SACRAMENTO	0.0%	24 SEATTLE	663	24 INDIANAPOLIS	\$44.11
25 KANSAS CITY	0.48	25 ORANGE COUNTY	15.1	25 INDIANAPOLIS	24.77	25 SANTA CLARA	0.0%	25 SALT LAKE CITY	267	25 MILWAUKEE	\$43.19
26 HARTFORD	0.46	26 KANSAS CITY	14.4	26 SALT LAKE CITY	24.28	26 DENVER	N/A	26 DETROIT	N/A	26 SALT LAKE CITY	\$36.85
27 PHOENIX	0.35	27 PHOENIX	10.0	27 SANTA CLARA	23.30	27 SEATTLE	N/A	27 HARTFORD	N/A	27 SAN ANTONIO	\$34.68
AVERAGE	0.97	AVERAGE	32.7	AVERAGE	32.93	AVERAGE	4.8%	AVERAGE	2,737	AVERAGE	\$57.24

*INCLUDES SAN DIEGO TRANSIT SYSTEM, N. SAN DIEGO TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT, SAN DIEGO REGIONAL TRANSIT SYSTEM, AND SAN DIEGO TROLLEY.

**DOES NOT INCLUDE DEMAND RESPONSIVE SERVICE HOURS.




TABLE III

	MODE SPLIT		CBD/ REG EMPLOY
1 TORONTO	56	1 CALGARY	26.23%
2 EDMONTON	54	2 PITTSBURGH	24.58%
3 VANCOUVER	51	3 EDMONTON	23.00%
4 PORTLAND	43	4 SEATTLE	19.71%
5 CALGARY	43	5 CLEVELAND	17.05%
6 CLEVELAND	40	6 VANCOUVER	16.78%
7 MINNEAPOLIS	40	7 SACRAMENTO	15.72%
8 PITTSBURGH	40	8 PORTLAND	15.55%
9 SEATTLE	35	9 MINNEAPOLIS	15.00%
10 DENVER	29	10 TORONTO	14.89%
11 DALLAS	28	11 CINCINNATI	14.22%
12 HOUSTON	28	12 MILWAUKEE	13.24%
13 OAKLAND	27	13 KANSAS CITY	12.64%
14 BUFFALO	25	14 SAN DIEGO	11.30%
15 CINCINNATI	25	15 DENVER	11.27%
16 MILWAUKEE	24	16 BUFFALO	10.18%
17 MIAMI	23	17 INDIANAPOLIS	9.97%
18 LOS ANGELES	21	18 OAKLAND	9.77%
19 PHOENIX	20	19 SAN ANTONIO	9.28%
20 SAN ANTONIO	20	20 SALT LAKE CITY	5.59%
21 SALT LAKE CITY	17	21 PHOENIX	3.17%
22 KANSAS CITY	15	22 SAN JOSE	2.50%
23 INDIANAPOLIS	11	
24 SACRAMENTO	11	AVG	13.71%
25 ST LOUIS	10		
26 SAN JOSE	10		
27 SAN DIEGO	7		
		
AVG	28		

SOURCE: PHONE SURVEYS COURTESY OPERATIONS PLANNING AND SCHEDULING, 1989 AND 1990.







Table I
VEHICLE HOURS PER CAPITA



* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit System, and San Diego Trolley.


Table II

BOARDING RIDES PER CAPITA



* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit System, and San Diego Trolley.

Table III
**SYSTEM OPERATING EXPENSES
 PER VEHICLE HOUR**




system operating expenses

* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit System, and San Diego Trolley.

Source: 1988 Section 15 Data

Table IV


BOARDING RIDES/VEHICLE HOUR



Pages
81,
83,
85,
87,
89,
Blank

* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit System, and San Diego Trolley.


POPULATION DENSITY



* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit System, and San Diego Trolley.

Table VI


**DEMAND RESPONSIVE SERVICE AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL VEHICLE HOURS**



* Includes San Diego Transit System, North San Diego Transit Development, San Diego Regional Transit System, and San Diego Trolley.

Table VI

TRANSIT SHARE OF HOME-BASED WORK TRIPS TO DOWNTOWN



Source: Phone Survey
 Tri-Met Source: May 1988 Origin/Destination Survey

ATTACHMENT C

JURISDICTION GOALS FOR TRANSIT SERVICES

	PAGE
Portland, "City Goals and Objectives for Transit"	91
Washington County, "Alternative Concepts for Providing Transit Services	99

PORTLAND
CITY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR TRANSIT
(DRAFT)

Comprehensive Plan Policies

Public Transportation

Encourage a safe, efficient metropolitan public transportation system serving Portland as an alternative to the automobile by providing more direct cross-town service to residential neighborhoods which connect commercial areas to other centers of activities and employment throughout the city and the region.

Transit-related density

Reinforce the link between public transportation and land use by increasing residential urban densities along designed major transit streets and near commercial centers, where practical.

Transit-dependent population

Encourage a public transit system that addresses the special needs of the transit-dependent population.

Arterial Streets Classification Policy

City-Wide Policies

Highest priority should be given to development of regional transit facilities and "demand management" programs, consisting of ride sharing, flexible working hours, and parking management to reduce the need for new regional traffic facilities.

For transit to best serve the needs of City residents and reduce the impacts of travel on neighborhoods, the Regional Transit System should be designed to serve as an alternate to the automobile system. Transit should not be viewed simply as a method of reducing peak hour, work trip, congestion on the automobile network but should serve as a wide range of trip types. Such a system will require the integration of inter-regional bus, air and rail service with a regional system which is supported by high-quality local service, taxis and special transportation services.


North Portland Policies

The basic objective for North Portland is to route industrial-related traffic and residential through traffic along the northern edge of the residential area.

Additionally, increased transit service on Lombard and to the industrial areas, increased ride sharing and flexible working hours shall be encouraged in order to relieve traffic congestion and reinforce neighborhood commercial services.

Continued improvement of transit service linking North Portland to areas other than the downtown, especially surrounding industrial areas and Lloyd Center, shall be encouraged.

Transit services within the District shall be encouraged, in order to provide connections from North Portland neighborhoods (residential areas) to downtown St. Johns, the Kenton and Linnton business districts and other activity centers.



Northeast Policies

Because there are few streets which can appropriately be classified as Major City Traffic Streets within Northeast Portland, a basic objective shall be to stabilize traffic volumes by emphasizing ride sharing, flexible working hours, and transit service improvements in the Downtown, Lloyd Center, the Hollywood Business District, and within Northeast neighborhoods. Through automobile and truck traffic shall be encourage to bypass the area on the Banfield Freeway, I-205, I-5, and Columbia Blvd.

Southeast Policies

Through traffic from East Multnomah and Clackamas Counties shall be encouraged to bypass the Southeast District via I-205, the Banfield Freeway and McLoughlin Boulevard. Modifications to Neighborhood Collector Streets shall have the general objectives of maintaining or reducing current traffic volumes, especially during peak periods when many of the trips are regional trips, as well as improving intersections to allow left turns. Cross town transit service should continue to be expanded and improved to provide service to activity centers other than Downtown (Lloyd Center, Hollywood, etc.) Increased ride sharing and flexible working hours shall also be encouraged.

Southwest Policies

Residential and commercial growth in suburban areas has resulted in increased traffic columns on Southwest District streets. This through traffic shall be encouraged to travel around residential areas and emphasis shall be placed on improving public transportation services within existing corridors to provide an alternative to travel by automobile in peak and off-peak periods. Increased ride sharing and flexible working hours shall also be encouraged.

Transit service improvements shall be encouraged to better serve trips within the district, particularly trips between residential areas and commercial centers.

Because of the regional significance of the University of Oregon Health Sciences University complex, limited or express transit service from Major

Transfer points would be appropriate, but additional rights-of way acquisition for transit would be inappropriate.

Northwest Policies

The major objective in Northwest Portland is to route non-local and industrial traffic around residential areas and to encourage continued and increasing reliance on public transportation, ride sharing, and flexible working hours.

As future residential development occurs adjacent to Forest Park, it should be developed to encourage a high level of transit utilization in order to minimize the impact of future commuter traffic on streets in the Northwest District.

Central City Plan

General Objectives

Continued increases in transit service to handle growth.

- a. Light Rail Transit (LRT) transit corridors as spines for the higher density development.
- b. An expanded role for transit (LRT and vintage trolley) for shopping and special events access.
- c. Development of a specialized transit circulation system to serve all the Central City districts.

Transit (vintage trolley, water taxi) as an adjunct to increased recreational use of the Central City.

Transit-related Action Items

- GH1 Develop a light rail and vintage trolley connection between the Civic Stadium and Morrison Park east and west.
- T2 Engineer and construct the Westside light rail line.
- T3 Plan and construct the remaining portions of the regional light rail system. (6-20 years)
- T4 Plan and construct an inner-city transit loop (possibly on Grand Avenue)
- NW1 Establish a loop vintage trolley/light rail line which links Union Station, Fremont Place, and the 13th Ave. Historic District (not PDOT).
- ED7 Extend the vintage trolley and light rail system to link the Central City with Portland's commercial, high density housing and recreational areas and

attractions outside the Central City.

T11 Reinforce the Union Station area as a transportation center.

NB2 Extend the Transit Mall north on 5th and 6th to Union Station (not PDOT).

NW15 Increase transit connections/service to the (Northwest Triangle) district.



WASHINGTON
COUNTY,
OREGON

October 1, 1990

Metro Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation
Subcommittee on Metro/Tri-Met Merger
2000 S.W. First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201-5398

RE: ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS FOR PROVIDING TRANSIT SERVICES

We as a region are presently analyzing various future organizational structures for providing transit services. The discussions come at an exciting time as we enjoy the success of the eastside MAX and as we look forward to the extension of MAX to other areas in the region.

To date, discussions have focused on the future roles of Tri-Met and those of Metro in providing "traditional" transit services. However, perhaps these discussions should go further to also explore the best method for providing "non-traditional" transit services. These non-traditional services respond to the unique travel demands of suburban residents and may, upon further study, be best provided by local governments or more localized transit authorities.

A recent study performed jointly by Tri-Met and Metro entitled Suburban Transit Study, April 1989, suggests the need to go well beyond the provision of conventional transit services in order attract a largely untapped suburban transit market whose travel demands are different than the current market being served. The study, prepared with the assistance of Crain & Associates and JLM Consulting, comprehensively analyzed the suburban transit market in Washington County and provided interesting insight into the range of services that would be most successful in meeting this County's future transit needs. In my view, the findings are significant and should be considered in the evolution of future transit services.

To begin with, the study concluded that "Tri-Met presently does an excellent job serving work trips between Washington County and downtown Portland, capturing 25% of all trips. In contrast, the study indicated that Tri-Met carries a very low share of work trips that occur entirely within Washington County. Only 0.9% of these trips are made by transit and that there would appear to be considerable potential for tapping the intra-suburban work trip market."

"Another major travel market in Washington County are shopping, personal business, and recreation trips. Trips made entirely within the county are more numerous in this category than work trips. However, transit has an even smaller share of this market. Only 0.6% of these trips are made by transit, indicating that this market is also largely untapped."

The study further indicates that "while transit is operated reasonably effectively in Washington County, route coverage falls short of what is needed to serve the growing number of suburban office park locations. One-third of the County's office park employment sites are not accessible by transit. There are also several residential areas in the developed area of the County which are not well served by transit. The gaps in employment and residential coverage call into question the effectiveness of transit in fully serving the developed portion of Washington County, and suggest that there is an opportunity for reaching a larger and broader transit market."

The second focus of the study was to evaluate alternative service methods that will be most useful in serving areas that are presently unserved and which feature low density populations or employment levels, areas where Tri-Met service is unproductive, and special markets where a different type of service is needed to attract new transit riders.

After evaluating various transit service methods, the study indicated that "contracted small buses can best be used on fixed routes where Tri-Met service productivity is low. Contracting with private providers offers the greatest opportunity for cost saving, irrespective of a change in service type. In addition, Dial-a-Ride can be used in low density areas where fixed route transit would be too costly to operate, and as a supplement to fixed route transit to serve specialized markets."


The study also notes that "the opportunity to improve service availability and the financial performance of its suburban transit service by contracting for service has significant labor implications. Given this study and the desire of Washington County to improve transit ridership, we believe that as an alternative to the Metro/Tri-Met consolidation review, consideration should be given to the possibility of Local Transit Authorities under a County authority or a county-wide service district. A County or county-wide special district may provide not only service advantages to transit riders but also funding options that may not be

Transit Services
October 1, 1990
Page 3

available to Metro or Tri-Met alone or as a consolidated agency. This alternative is presented in the spirit of Commissioner Earl Blumenauer's guideline that this subcommittee should look at what is in the best interest of Transit for the region.

In conclusion, I feel it is important to further analyze the Suburban Transit Study findings and to include their consideration in future analyses and discussions of how future transit services will be provided.

Sincerely,



Bonnie Hays, Chairman
Board of Commissioners


c: A. Cotugno
JPACT Membership
Cities of Washington County

ATTACHMENT D

TRI-MET RESEARCH ON GOVERNANCE AND PLANNING STUDIES

	PAGE
Organizational Approaches to Transit Governance, Summary of Findings	106
Experience with Elected Transit Boards	112
Organizational Form and Transit Performance	122
Tri-Met Metro Merger - A National Context	134
Tri-Met's Metro Merger: Status of Research	142
Minneapolis Planning Structure	146
Los Angeles Planning Structure	156
Transit Organization in Miami	162

TRI-MET
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: Oct. 8, 1990
TO: Bob Post
FROM: G.B. Arrington 
SUBJECT: Organizational Approaches To Transit Governance - -
Summary Of Findings

Over the past month we have conducted an extensive review of the experience around the county with transit governance. At the suggestion of the JPACT Sub-committee we looked at three successful innovative structures: Los Angeles, Miami, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. We also looked at the experience of the three elected transit boards in the nation: Denver RTD, Oakland A-C Transit, and San Francisco BART. Other studies included a review of the forces leading to a change in transit structure and the relationship between transit performance and structure. A copy of each of those individual analysis is attached.

Overall our findings can be summarized as follows:

What conditions lead to structural change?

Organizational change has come in response to a series of problems - - financial crisis, disaffection of the suburbs over lack of service, accountability, crisis of confidence over a transit board's ability to do its job, or a lack of progress toward building a rail system. Tri-Met no longer fits that profile, nor did we attempt to turn the equation around and look for problems at Metro that would be solved by merging with Tri-Met.

What movement do we see toward a "model" of transit governance?

We found "no magic" approach to transit governance that delivers more accountability or better results. Each approach tends to be an outgrowth of larger forces at work in the community with its own set of pluses and minuses. In other words, there is not model for success that we should copy

Bob Post
Page 2
Oct. 8, 1990

What is the experience elsewhere with regard to the location of policy-making and operation?

We did find an evolving national trend toward separating policy setting from transit operations. The current situation where Metro and JPACT set transportation policy and Tri-Met implements it is consistent with this trend. This separation can also be found throughout Canada and with San Diego MTDB, Los Angeles, LACTC, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Chicago RTA, and New York MTA.

What happens when existing organizational arrangements are altered?


A side effect of changes in governance has been a loss of momentum and an interruption in progress. The process of "working out the details" has consumed considerable senior level energy in each city we talked to. As a consequence other things suffered. In Los Angeles, Denver, and Minneapolis-St. Paul the journey to organizational change has been marked by approximately a decade of in-fighting and turf wars. In Denver the shift from an appointed to an elected transit board resulted in years of indecision by RTD on whether or not to proceed with a regional LRT system.

How prevalent are elected boards?

Elected transit boards are the exception to the rule nationally. Out of over 300 transit agencies in the nation only three have elected boards. A fundamental problem with elected transit boards has been establishing high enough visibility with voters to attract and retain quality members. This has been a problem with BART, A-C Transit, and Denver's RTD.

Is there a relationship between structure and operational efficiency?

Special authorities have been found to be more efficient than transit managed by general purpose governments. Contrary to the expectations of researchers at the Institute For Transportation Studies University of California Irvine), transit systems managed by special systems authorities like Tri-Met are more efficient than transit systems managed under general governmental systems like Metro.



Bob Post
Page 3
Oct. 8, 1990

What structures call forth strong transportation leadership?

Changes in governance did not create leadership. Structure seems to be largely a consequence of the local political dynamic in each region. Achieving results on the other hand seems to be a consequence of funding (Los Angeles, San Diego, Miami), individual leadership (San Diego) more than structure, and the magnitude of the problem (Los Angeles).

What structures help achieve regional transportation concensus?

A move to elected transit boards has tended to shift regional consensus. In both Denver and San Francisco their newly elected boards has a tendency to see themselves as independent of other governments because they were elected. Their agendas were described to be at odds with other governments. In each case the shift to an elected board resulted in a deterioration in their relationship with other governments.


As is true with architecture in issues related to governance, success can be achieved when form follows function. The lesson from our analysis seems to be that the form you end up with needs to be guided by what you want to achieve more than how you want it to look.

GBA: fhl

Attachments:

- Transit Organization in Miami
- Los Angeles Planning Structure
- Minneapolis Planning Structure
- Tri-Met's Metro Merger: Status of Research
- Tri-Met Metro Merger: A National Context
- Experience With Elected Transit Boards
- Organizational Form And Transit Performance

TRI-MET
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: Sept. 17, 1990
TO: Bob Post
FROM: G.B. Arrington 
SUBJECT: Experience With Elected Transit Boards

The proposal for a Tri-Met/Metro merger centers on the proposition that an elected transit board is inherently better than an appointed board. A direct link with voters, supporters argue, brings more accountability and that translates into a better chance of securing more tax support. A review of the experience nationally provides a context to evaluate whether the philosophical expectations have played out in reality.

Elected transit boards are the exception to the rule nationally. Out of over 300 transit agencies in the nation only three have elected boards. Interestingly, this is a very western proposition:

Denver RTD
San Francisco BART
Oakland AC-Transit

There is a lot of anecdotal evidence in the transit industry about the problems with elected boards. That may be because they are the exception to the norm or it may have more to do with each local situation. Whatever the reason, the history of elected transit boards is at best a mixed bag.

Denver Case Study

Of the three elected transit boards nationally, Denver's experience is probably the most analogous to Portland's. Portland and Denver both:

- o created regional transit districts with appointed boards in 1969;
- o implemented successful downtown transit malls;
- o restructured bus routes to create a grid system;
- o were the focus of considerable public scrutiny and controversy in the early 1980's; and,
- o have similar expectations for building a regional light rail system dating back to the mid-1970's.

In both systems the implementation of a grid system coincided with considerable fireworks. Tri-Met's service expansion and restructuring in 1982 led to service cuts, ridership losses, and an erosion of public support when we "zigged instead of zagged." In Denver citizen disaffection with their re-routing scheme "mired RTD in scandal," according to DENVER POST Transportation writer Gary Dehlson. That controversy coupled with a lack of progress toward a regional LRT system lead Denver voters in 1980 to defeat a 1 cent sales tax for LRT and to approve a referendum that threw out the appointed RTD Board and mandated an elected board.

Denver's elected board took over in January, 1983. As Table One shows experimentation with transit governance in Denver has not ended with the creation of an elected board. Dissatisfaction with progress by the elected RTD Board toward building LRT was a factor in leading the legislature to create a separate Transit Construction Authority (TCA) in 1987 to plan, finance, build, and operate LRT. The seven member appointed TCA board which included some of the best connected business leaders in Denver started work in earnest on LRT. In 1988 progress again bogged down when the TCA and the RTD submitted competing light rail proposals to UMTA for alternatives analysis. For now, rail planning is again the responsibility of the RTD. The TCA submitted its final report in 1989 and quietly went out of business when it was not re-authorized by the legislature.

In Denver one of the consequences of an elected board has been a high turnover of board members and executive staff, according to a recent Denver general manager. He characterized his primary function to protect the board from its self. "No one knew who they were when they got elected and they fought with each other all the time once they got here." He believes that only two of the seven Denver Board members are running for reelection. "They are frustrated because they cannot get anything done."

The Colorado legislature is now considering various governance alternatives for how to deal with Denver's transportation future. Among the choices getting serious consideration is changing Denver's Board back to an appointed one in order to attract and retain quality board members. The political issue is whether the legislature wants to give that power to the governor. Stay tuned.

AC Transit

The Alameda-Costa County Transit District in Oakland has a seven member elected board of directors. In the fertile political climate of the San Francisco Bay area both the AC Transit and BART boards historically have been characterized by local observers as "low visibility, and hence a low priority with voters."

The AC Transit board's low profile made re-election easy, which

led to stagnation, a decline in service quality, a full fledged scandal, and finally, the criminal indictment and forced resignation of a majority of the board. In late 1987 AC Transit employees and concerned citizens blew the whistle and went to the grand jury to complain about improper use of public funds and mismanagement by the board. The district was teetering on the proverbial financial brink of ruin (cash reserves had declined from \$35 million to \$3 million) causing the quality of transit service on the street to deteriorate.

The scandal broke with the grand jury accusing the board of being asleep at the switch and the criminal indictment of five of the seven board members for mismanagement and misuse of public funds. By the spring of 1988 four of the board members were forced to resign and a new management team was put into place. The surviving indicted board member is up for elected this year.

San Francisco BART

Of the three elected transit boards, BART's situation is the least analogous to Tri-Met, given their narrow scope of responsibilities. In 1974 BART changed from an appointed to an elected board. By all accounts BART was able to attract high quality members to its initial elected boards. Then, according to a former BART executive "They got frustrated with the petty politics, dropped out, and did not run."

A major consequence in the shift from an appointed to an elected board was a deterioration in BART's relationship with other Bay Area governments. "The board has a tendency to see themselves as independent of other agencies because they are elected. They do not network well and therefore don't get the support of other agencies." As for their internal workings, "The BART Board has not been effective in providing leadership. They are very fragmented and tend to operate through vote trading to advance individual agendas. There is no cooperative board vision."

Conclusion

Denver's elected board has been unable to provide the leadership to secure transit finance or move closer to building a light rail system. Lack of progress by the Board moved the Colorado legislature to create a separate Transit Construction Authority with an appointed board to plan, finance, and build light rail.

In terms of accountability, the presence of elected boards has politicized the process of adjusting service and setting fares for each of the three systems. Transit professionals complain that the boards are either preoccupied with avoiding controversy that could effect their election chances or taking very high profile positions in opposition to each other and their government partners.

In Oakland the elected board was accused of being asleep at the switch by the grand jury when they oversaw the near financial ruin of the district and deterioration of transit service.

The criminal indictment and forced removal of a majority of Oakland's board for misuse of public funds is probably an extreme example. It does highlight the fundamental problem of creating enough visibility for a transit board to attract quality members, peak voter's interest, and maintain accountability. This is a consistent problem mentioned by professionals who work with all of the elected boards.

While the philosophical expectations for elected transit boards are high, the experience in Denver and Oakland is far from encouraging.

GBA:fh


c: Dick Feeney Doug Capps
 Bruce Harder

TABLE ONE

Denver RTD: A Selected History

- 1969
 - o RTD created
 - o 21 member board appointed by local government
- 1973
 - o Voters approved a 1/2 cent sales tax geared to a 100 mile fixed guideway system
- 1978
 - o Free fares off-peak for 1 month to promote ridership
 - o Grid system/massive bus re-routing implemented
- 1980
 - o Construction starts on bus mall
 - o RTD "mired in scandal" over citizen disaffection with bus re-routing
 - o Voters reject 1 cent sales tax for regional light rail system
 - o Voter referendum threw out appointed board, mandates elected board
- 1980-82
 - o Legislature works out mechanics of elected board
- 1982
 - o Four week transit strike
 - o 77 mile LRT plan approved by appointed RTD Board
 - o Election of new RTD Board
- 1983
 - o 15 member elected board sworn in
- 1987
 - o Lack of progress on LRT by RTD Board leads legislature to create separate transit construction authority (TCA)
 - o TCA seven member board appointed
 - o TCA starts work to plan, finance, and operate 18 mile LRT line
- 1988
 - o TCA and RTD submit competing rail proposals to UMTA
- 1989
 - o TCA releases final report, not re-authorized by legislature, goes out of business
- 1990
 - o RTD planning for rail continues
 - o Legislature considering governance options for Denver's transportation future including giving the governor the power to appoint RTD's board

TRI-MET
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: Sept. 17, 1990
TO: Bob Post
FROM: G.B. Arrington 
SUBJECT: Organizational Form and Transit Performance

The organizational form of transit agencies has been shown to effect their performance. The most definitive look at the relationship between performance and structure is the 1984 study Organizational Form And Transit Performance: A Research Review And Empirical Analysis conducted by James L. Perry of the Graduate School of Management and Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California Irvine.

The Perry study is part of a flurry of UMTA sponsored research during their push for privatization. In comparing transit agency performance, one of Perry's four research hypothesis was that publicly-managed general government transit (the Metro model) will be more efficient than will public-managed transit under special authorities (the Tri-Met model). That did not turn out to be the case:

"We found that subsidized private systems are more cost efficient than most public systems, except publicly-managed special authorities. Contrary to our expectations, we found that public agencies owned by general governments were less efficient than special authorities."

The analysis covered 249 transit agencies and utilized UMTA Section 15 Report information as the data base. That represents about 95% of all fixed-route bus systems in the U.S. The methodology involved an analysis of 25 indicators to measure three performance concepts, cost efficiency, cost effectiveness and service effectiveness.

Tri-Met Vs. AC Transit

A 1988 analysis by Santa Clara County Transit, Annual Update Of Performance Comparison Of Santa Clara County Transit And Six Comparable Transit Properties provides a poignant, independent picture of the performance of Tri-Met versus one of the nation's three elected transit boards, AC-Transit.



Tri-Met outperformed AC-Transit in every comparison of both key performance measures and in tracking performance over time (1984 to 1988). The Santa Clara study compared operating cost per hour, operating cost per boarding rider, total rides per revenue hour, total scheduled miles between mechanical road calls, and miles between collision accidents.

GBA:fh

c: Doug Capps
Dick Feeney
Bruce Harder



Performance Evaluation Comparison Portland—Tri-Met and Oakland—AC Transit

(Source: Santa Clara County Transportation Agency)





Performance Evaluation Comparison Portland—Tri-Met and Oakland—AC Transit

(Source: Santa Clara County Transportation Agency)




Performance Evaluation Comparison Portland—Tri-Met and Oakland—AC Transit

(Source: Santa Clara County Transportation Agency)




Performance Evaluation Comparison Portland—Tri-Met and Oakland—AC Transit

(Source: Santa Clara County Transportation Agency)



TRI-MET
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 17, 1990
TO: Bob Post
FROM: G.B. Arrington 
SUBJECT: Tri-Met Metro Merger - A National Context

Change in transit governance has been a continuous evolutionary process nationally since the move from private operators to regional transit agencies in the late sixties and early seventies. The purpose of this memorandum is to review what's happened, look at the prevailing underlying reasons for change, and to speculate a bit about what that portends for Tri-Met.

Historical context = 3 generations of change

The transit industry has been criticized from time to time for being slow to evolve into new more efficient organizations. In light of that, it is interesting to see the degree of change that has occurred in response to unpredictable funding, shifting demographics and travel markets, and political expectations for transit to play an expanded role in addressing urban mobility.

The transit industry has witnessed three recent generations of restructuring in response to a range of pressures. The first generation of change occurred with the shift from multiple private operators to regional transit agencies like Tri-Met. Second generation restructuring occurred in the mid-70's with the creation of separate regional funding and oversight agencies like the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC). By in large, these agencies did not become operators of transit service.

A possible Tri-Met Metro merger is part of the third generation of reorganization now underway. The forces behind this change include a broad range of issues including the desire to build regional rail facilities, secure new taxes, increase service brokering and coordination, and achieve better transportation and land use integration.

Note: Much of the information in this memorandum is drawn from Transportation Research Board Special Report 217: Organizational Responses To Changing Transit Environment.

Bob Post
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September 17, 1990

A primary objective of many of these third generational changes is the desire to separate responsibility for policy making from that of operations management. This is seen as a logical precondition to thinking more broadly about the appropriate role of transit. The separation of policy from operations has been identified as an emerging trend in the United States. On the other hand, it is more common in Canada. Throughout Canada, policy boards set policy standards (i.e., define the regional transportation plan including transit service objectives and performance criteria), and the transit boards implement them (annual service plan and service delivery). For the Portland situation that would imply a continuation of the current situation where JPACT and Metro set transportation policy and Tri-Met carries it out.

Change: A Response to Solve Problems

In each of the three generational restructuring, change has occurred in response to a combination of fiscal, ridership, service, and management issues. The prevalent motivation for a change in governance has been to solve a problem.

Financial concerns seem to be the most common cause of externally directed organizational change. Funding crises for the transit operator (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Dallas) or the desire to plan, finance, construct, and operate a rail system are reoccurring themes (San Diego MTDB, Los Angeles LACTC). Suburban dissatisfaction with the level and quality of their transit service versus the central cities has also been an underlying force for change (Chicago RTA, Minneapolis-St. Paul RTB). The other prevalent factor has been a crisis of confidence over the ability of the transit operator to do its job (Denver RTD, Minneapolis-St. Paul RTB).

Some agencies have taken the initiative in redirecting their mission or redesigning themselves in response to change. Tri-Met is often included in this category. In Washington, DC (WMATA), change meant refocusing attention on areas of traditional strength. After focusing on the construction of its subway system, WMATA selectively withdrew from suburban markets to concentrate its resources on its traditional inter-city market. Boston (MBTA) and Pittsburgh (PAT) are examples of agencies where cost controls and increased productivity came from self-directed change.

Hostile Takeover Model: Minneapolis-St. Paul

Minneapolis-St. Paul is often pointed to as the classic example of establishing a new oversight and policy-setting agency over the existing transit agency. Minneapolis-St. Paul suffered from all of

the conditions that might warrant a change in governance -- financial crisis, disaffected suburbs, crisis of confidence, and a lack of progress toward LRT. In response to that, in 1984 the legislature established a transit planning structure that is unique in the U.S. The legislature limited MTC (the transit operator) to transit operations and short-term planning while allowing the region's MPO, the Metropolitan Council, to continue long-range transit planning and policy setting. In addition, a third agency, the Regional Transit Board (RTB) was established to conduct mid-range planning, implement policies and plans of the Metropolitan Council, and arrange for transit services.

The RTB's first policy issue was LRT. The region's desire to implement LRT actually predates Portland's. Planning for LRT under the new structure began in 1984 and consumed an extensive amount of the RTB's attention. Concerned about the desirability of LRT and the RTB's attention to it, the 1985 legislature prohibited additional RTB study of LRT until a full assessment of the region's transit needs was completed. In 1987 the legislature gave the primary authority for rail planning to 7 separate rail authorities established by counties.

According to the Minnesota office of the legislative auditor, the creation of RTB was a bold legislative experiment in response to a series of problems. The RTB's overall record to date is mixed. It has improved the region's transit service planning, and has given greater attention to the cost-effectiveness of transit service. The RTB has not proven to be an effective problem solver, so it is unclear whether the 1984 experiment has been a success.

Conclusions

National experience provides a useful framework to put the Metro merger proposal into context. A couple of dominate themes or thresholds emerge from this analysis which help answer the question:

Based on what's happened around the country, is a change in transit governance warranted in Portland?

Those dominate themes can be simply stated as follows:

1. Organizational change nationally has been in response to a series of problems -- financial crisis, disaffection of the suburbs over the lack of service, a crisis of confidence over the transit board's capability to do their job, or a lack of progress toward building a rail system.

Bob Post
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Tri-Met no longer fits the profile of a transit agency facing a series of problems to the extent that organizational change is warranted. Five years ago that may have been the case. Today, however, the Metro merger proposal is a bit of a solution in search of a problem. Some outside observers note that Tri-Met's lack of big problems, its financial stability, light rail projects and an all-time high level of public support make it an especially attractive target for a hostile Metro takeover.


2. An emerging national trend organizationally is the desire to separate responsibility for policy-making from that for transit operations. Los Angeles (LACTC), New York (MTA), and Minneapolis-St. Paul (RTB) are some notable examples. This is also consistent with what has been the case for some time in Canada.

A Tri-Met takeover would be inconsistent with the trend to separate policy from operations. The current situation where JPACT and Metro set transportation policy and Tri-Met carries out the transit piece is consistent with the latest thinking on organization strategies to cope with change.

GBA:etf

c: Doug Capps
Dick Feeney
Bruce Harder

TRI-MET
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: Sept. 17, 1990
TO: Bob Post
FROM: G.B. Arrington 
SUBJECT: Tri-Met's Metro Merger: Status Of Research

National experience provides a useful framework to put the question of a Tri-Met Metro merger into context. The attached memorandums attempt to look at the issue from three different perspectives:

1. What has been the experience with the three transit boards in the country that are elected;
2. What were the prevalent causes of organizational change in the transit industry; and,
3. How does organizational form impact transit performance?

The conclusions from the three attached memorandums can be summarized as follows:

1. In terms of elected boards, while the philosophical expectations are high, the experience in Denver, San Francisco, and Oakland is far from encouraging. The Denver Board, for example, has not been able to provide leadership to secure transit finance or move closer to building a LRT system.

There is a consistent problem in creating enough viability for an elected board to attract quality members, keep voter's interest, and maintain accountability. The criminal indictment and forced removal of a majority of the Oakland Board for the misuse of public funds was a consequence of their low profile with voters.

2. Organizational change has come in response to a series of problems - - financial crisis, disaffection of the suburbs over lack of service, crisis of confidence over a transit board's ability to do its job, or a lack of progress toward building a rail system. Tri-Met no longer fits the profile of an agency in need of a white knight to take us over and set things right.

The current situation of Metro and JPACT setting transportation policy and Tri-Met implementing the transit piece is consistent with an emerging national trend to separate policy setting from operations.

3. Contrary to the expectations of researchers at the Institute For Transportation Studies (University of California Irvine), transit systems managed by special authorities like Tri-Met are more efficient than transit systems managed under general governmental systems like Metro.

The California study looked at 249 transit agencies and used UMTA Section 15 data to compare 25 separate indicators in terms of cost efficiency, cost effectiveness, and service effectiveness.

GBA:fh

attachments:

- Experience With Elected Transit Boards
- Tri-Met Metro Merger: A National Context
- Organizational Form and Transit Performance

c: Doug Capps
Dick Feeney
Bruce Harder

TRI-MET
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4 October 1990
TO: G.B. Arrington
FROM: Dan Hoyt *DH*
SUBJECT: Minneapolis Planning Structure

Introduction

The Twin Cities has a three tiered planning structure. Attachment 1 is a summary of the functions of the three main tiers of organization structure. The three organizations are the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC) which operates the buses, the Metropolitan (MET) Council which is a regional policy setting body, and the Regional Transit Board (RTB) which implements the MET Council's policies. Attachment 2 has a description of these organizations as found in the RTB 1989 Annual Report.

In 1984 the Minnesota legislature created the RTB, thus a three tiered transit planning structure. Other than political maneuvering, the RTB was created for the following reasons:

- a) a transit funding crisis;
- b) two studies recommending structural separation of service planning from operations.
- c) a history of regional government which separated policy making from operations;
- d) a reluctance to involve the MET Council in system detail;
- e) a poor working relationship between the MTC and the MET Council, as well as legislative dissatisfaction with the MTC's chair; and,
- f) municipal officials concerned that transit service in their cities was worth less than their financial contributions (property taxes).

Discussion

Following a slow start and a poor performance audit, the state legislature discussed abolishing the RTB. As the region became more desirous of light rail and frustrated with RTB, the state legislature limited the power of RTB and gave counties the authority to pursue rail independently, resulting in seven county rail boards studying a dozen rail lines. The state is also looking at ways to increase the involvement of the state department of transportation. In addition, the MET Council is taking on some management functions to "get closer to the problems their policies are intended to resolve."

A review of the above and of the attachments illuminates the opaque lines of responsibility among these organizations. Because of this complex structure, it is not surprising that interagency coordination, accountability and communication have suffered. Specific problems include:

- a) confusion over sponsorship of public hearings;
- b) impracticalities of managing contracts without operating responsibility;
- c) impracticalities of designing and implementing programs without operating responsibility;
- d) difficulty balancing policy leadership with prudent management;
- e) lack of diligence by the MET Council in its oversight of RTB actions;
- f) stagnation in leadership, innovation, and public discussion of new ideas; and,
- g) delays and confusion related to light rail planning.

Conclusion

The addition of the RTB to the Twin Cities' planning structure, between the regional policy-setting body (the Met Council) and the transit operator (MTC) is the most recent attempt to address a host of local transportation issues in the area.

From my reading and a telephone conversation with a member of the MET Council staff, it seems clear that a complex organizational planning structure has evolved in the Twin Cities as a result of a host of service problems and politically motivated decisions.

G.B. Arrington
Page 3
Oct. 4, 1990

The region is "struggling with its identity and various power grabs," and as a result transit service may be suffering. With respect to light rail, leadership appears to be emerging at the county level, not as a result of the planning structure but because that is where the individuals with leadership abilities are found.

The RTB's track record has been described as containing many mistakes and missed opportunities. With the addition of light rail planning efforts in the region, RTB's abilities are receiving increased scrutiny and regional planning has become more chaotic and fractionalized.

Finally, the point was made that whatever organizational changes are made they will trigger political adjustments. All these changes require a great deal of time (years) to settle before the desired program or service adjustment come about. Thus, forbearing and staying-power will be required to achieve the objectives of mergers.

DH:fh

c: Bruce Harder

Reference:

Alter, Joel, Transit Planning in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, Organizational Responses. 1988

Attachment 1

Minneapolis Transit Planning Structure

Metropolitan Transit
Commission

- 3 members appointed by RTB
- Transit operations
- Short term planning
- Created by the legislature in 1967, charged with developing a comprehensive plan for Twin Cities Transit
- Acquired the area's largest bus company in 1970

Metropolitan Council

- 16 member appointed by Governor
- Long range transit planning
- Policy setting
- Created by the legislature in 1967 as a regional policy making body
- Accountable to the state legislature
- MPO

Regional Transit Board

- 11 member board¹
- Mid-range planning
- Metropolitan Council policy implementation
- Accountable to the Metro Council
- Created by the legislature in 1984 to more closely link planning to local needs
- Joint Light Rail Transit Committee² -- an advisory body

Aside from the three agencies noted, the RTB contracts with two administrative agencies and has established four separate advisory committees. Also, the state legislature gave primary responsibility for light rail planning to rail authorities established by counties. (There are seven counties in the metropolitan area.)

¹ Created as a 15 member board; restructured twice to nine, and now 11 members. The Metro Council appoints eight members, six are local elected officials. The Governor appoints three members - the chair, a disabled, and a senior citizen.

² This is being viewed as an emerging fourth tier of the planning in the region.

Attachment 2

PURPOSE AND NATURE OF ORGANIZATION

The Regional Transit Board (RTB)

The RTB directs, coordinates, and prioritizes transit services in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area through needs assessment, policy development, distribution of public funds, facilitation of the implementation of programs and research, and demonstration projects. This is accomplished within the direction of the Legislature and the long-range transportation policy planning role of the MET Council. The RTB facilitates the implementation of transit service programs recognizing the transit operating role of the MET Transit Commission and other transit service providers, and the need for continuous involvement of local units of government and the public.

It is the opinion of the RTB that it is neither a component unit of the MET Council nor is the Metropolitan Transit Commission a component unit of RTB.

Metropolitan (MET) Council

The MET Council selects RTB board members but not its management. The MET Council has only limited authority over RTB budgets and no authority over its contracts, hiring, properties, or in resolving matters affecting recipients of RTB services. The geographic area and populations served by both entities are substantially the same. However, the MET Council does not provide funding to RTB, nor does it have responsibility for funding any RTB deficits or guaranteeing any RTB debt, nor can it use the RTB fund balances.

The RTB authorities, funding sources, and functions over which the Council has limited or no oversight responsibility lead to the conclusion that the RTB is not a component unit of the Council.

Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC)

The RTB selects commission members of the MTC but cannot designate its management. RTB reviews and approves MTC budgets but does not approve its outside contracts, control its properties, or resolve matters affecting recipients of MTC services. The RTB is not required to fund any MTC operating deficit. The MTC may pledge the taxing power of the RTB only with approval of the RTB and only for a one-year period for any issue of debt. RTB's geographic service area is larger than that of MTC, and includes significant areas served by other transit providers.

While a number of the MTC authorities, funding sources, and functions are dependent on the RTB, the significance of those that are not leads to the conclusion that MTC is not a component unit of RTB.

TRI-MET
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4 October 1990
TO: G.B. Arrington
FROM: Dan Hoyt *DAH*
SUBJECT: Los Angeles Planning Structure

Introduction

Los Angeles has a two tiered planning structure. The Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) and the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) are responsible for transportation funding/planning and transit operations, respectively. The relationship between these two agencies was described to me as strained and characterized by "turf wars."

SCRTD was created by the state in the mid 1960s as the regional transit agency. SCRTD operates most of the bus service in the area, as well as the light rail line, making it one of the nation's largest transit systems with over 2,700 vehicles.

In 1976 California law created the LACTC as an overall funding and coordinating agency for public transit and highways in the County. LACTC was given broad, although somewhat nonspecific, powers to improve the transportation decision making process in the county. The LACTC is an "umbrella" organization which oversees programming of capital and operating funds, and monitors SCRTD operations.

In sum, the reason given for creating the LACTC, above political maneuvering, include:

- a) the need for better overall transportation planning;
- b) a lack of confidence in SCRTD; and,
- c) the need for transit to take a more prominent role.

In November 1980, county voters unexpectedly passed Proposition A which established a half cent sales tax for countywide transit projects. In fiscal 1988 this tax produced over \$330 million. Virtually ignored since its creation, LACTC was launched into a position of power with the passage Proposition A. Proposition A gave LACTC the purse strings, thus control over SCRTD. While this allowed an ambitious rail program to proceed it allowed the Commission to manipulate SCRTD--a temptation not resisted by LACTC according to staff at SCRTD.

In November 1990, county voters will have a chance to increase the sales tax to a full penny. This is estimated to generate an additional \$400 million annually for transit.

Discussion

In each of the past four years legislation has been introduced to reorganize, or realign, these two organizations. According to a staff member with LACTC the two agencies have "bumped heads" from the onset due to an overlap in perceived responsibilities. In 1990 a compromise measure was passed that directs the agency boards to develop and approve a plan for consolidation, and forward that plan to the legislature by January 1, 1992.

In the past year there has been adverse publicity on management and budget problems at SCRTD and perceived conflict or lack of coordination between SCRTD's metro rail construction activities and LACTC's light rail program. In addition there has been local dissatisfaction with SCRTD's efficiency, safety, and responsiveness to the public and suburban jurisdictions.

Within the past year a Rail Construction Corporation (RCC) was created to take over responsibility for building rail projects. Plans call for over 400 miles of heavy and light rail in the next ten to fifteen years. The RCC took over the METRO rail construction from SCRTD and light rail construction from LACTC. The RCC has a seven member board with three members appointed by the RTB, three appointed by the LACTC, and one appointed by those six individuals. The RCC is a subsidiary of LACTC. Some staff at SCRTD believe the LACTC may be interested in taking on operating responsibility for the rail lines in the future.

Attachment 1 contains a description of the board structures of the two organizations. The boards contain overlapping membership of elected and appointed individuals.

Conclusions

The state legislature created a two tiered planning structure in L.A. when it created a higher level of government (LACTC) above the regional transit operator (SCRTD). The situation has been politically charged since LACTC's inception.

As a result of continued squabbles between LACTC and SCRTD, as well as criticism of their performance, the two planning bodies have been directed by the state legislature to consolidate their efforts by January 1, 1992.

The creation of a Rail Construction Corporation has added another layer to the transit structure which may be quelling problems between SCRTD and LACTC.

Thanks to a one half cent sales tax for transit, L.A. has been able to undertake a massive rail program and operate the largest bus system in the Country. It is not clear whether planning structure can be credited with this success or the area's legendary mobility problems--forcing drastic changes.

Attachment 1
Board Membership

LACTC 11 Members

- * The five L.A. County Supervisors;
- * The Mayor of L.A.;
- * Two members appointed by the Mayor of L.A.--a member of the City Council and traditionally, a private citizen;
- * Two city council members appointed by the L.A. County City Selection Committee to represent the other 84 cities in the county (in addition to L.A. and Long Beach); and,
- * The district director from caltrans also sits on the board as a non-voting member.


SCRTD 11 Members

- * The five L.A. County Supervisors;
- * The Mayor of L.A.;
- * An appointee of the Mayor of L.A.;
- * Four member appointed by the County City Selection Committee to represent the other 84 cities in the county (in addition to L.A.

Elected officials are allowed to appoint alternates to carry out their duties. As can be seen above at least six seats on each board are filled by the same person.

c: Bruce Harder

TRI-MET
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: Oct. 3, 1990
TO: Bob Post
FROM: G.B. Arrington 
SUBJECT: Transit Organization in Miami

Transit in Miami is operated as a department of Metro-Dade County. This "super county" structure is unique in the county. Metro-Dade provides general purpose government functions for the 1.7 million residents of the county. The county has 8 commissioners and a mayor. The commissioners must reside in their district, but like the mayor, voting for each position is countywide. Metro-Dade's home rule charter and \$2 billion annual budget make it a potent political power.

METRORAIL EXPERIENCE

The county's political clout together with the backing of Miami Congressman Lehman (Chairman of the Transportation Appropriations Committee) has made Miami very successful in securing funding for major transit capital projects. Miami Metrorail, a two-legged heavy rail line, and Metromover, a downtown people-mover are notable examples. Local funding for Metrorail was part of a \$132 million "Decade of Progress" property tax bond measure approved by voters in 1972.

Critics of transit in Miami complain that they have spent a lot of money building things, but have done very little toward improving transit service levels in Miami. Implementation of Metrorail was less than successful. Political considerations, for example, kept duplicate bus and rail service on the street so that minority riders would not be forced to transfer. Ridership on the line was much lower than expected, while operating costs vastly exceeded estimates.

In the face of large unanticipated Metrorail losses Metro-Dade chose to maintain the high visibility rail service and cut costs in other areas. Bus service was cut as well as some general purpose functions of the county, including police.

Bob Post
Page 2
Oct. 3, 1990

TRANSIT FINANCE

As one of many county departments transit is in direct competition with other county services. Some \$90 million of transit's \$162 million annual budget comes from county general funds. Cutting police service to maintain rail service is one dramatic example of the trade offs at work. Whether the choices have gone the other way (transit cuts for police) is unclear.

A transit funding proposal on the November ballot highlights some of the dynamics that can come to play in funding transit within a general purpose government structure. Voters are being asked to create a dedicated source of funds for transit by raising the sales tax. The new tax would raise \$100 million in its first year. The proceeds allow for the improvement of transit service and provide matching funds for extending downtown's Metromover. However, the transit proposal is as much a shift in resources within the county as a transit funding measure. Creation of a dedicated source for transit would increase transit funding by \$10 million annually and free up all of the \$90 million in county general funds going to transit for other uses, including parks, police, human services, public works, a trauma center, and a \$45 million property tax debate.

CONCLUSION

Metro-Dade is a "super county" structure which incorporates a board range of city and county general purpose responsibilities. The transit department, for example, represents less than 10% of Metro-Dade's \$2 billion annual budget. That scale means that the mayor and eight commissioners carry considerable political clout which they can use on behalf of transit. Miami's Metrorail is a good example. On the other hand, transit is only a small piece of what they do so it has suffered because of the lack of an advocate on the Board. Again Metrorail serves as an example. Problems with costs, ridership, and feeder bus service for Metrorail are a national example for how not do rail transit successfully.

In terms of day to day functions, transit's status simply as a department within Metro-Dade insulates it a bit from politics. Transit policy decisions (fare, service adjustments, capital plans) are all acted on by the Metro-Dade commissioners. A 1984 comparison of decision making by Metro-Dade and Atlanta's appointed transit board of 17 elected officials from six different political units found that Miami's decisions were perceived to be less political than Atlanta's. Transit has considerable political visibility in Miami, but does not seem to be a factor in commission elections.

The creation of a dedicated funding source for transit would stabilize funding, increase service, and help build the downtown Metromover. Some local transit professionals complain that the transit benefits are negligible. What it really does, they complain, is shift \$90 million in general funds to a laundry list of general purpose functions and increase transit funding in the first year by only \$10 million.

GBA: fh

NOTICE OF SPECIAL ELECTION

Pursuant to Resolution No. R-162-90, adopted on March 6, 1990 by the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, Florida, and in accordance with Section 100.342, Florida Statutes, notice is hereby given of the special election to be held in Dade County on November 6, 1990.

The following question shall appear on the ballot:

DADE COUNTY TRANSIT SYSTEM SURTAX


Shall Dade County be authorized to:


- (1) levy an additional 1% tax on transactions subject to state taxes imposed on sales, use, and other transactions;
- (2) deposit the proceeds in a rapid transit trust fund; and
- (3) use the proceeds only for development, construction, equipment, maintenance, operation, supportive services, including a countywide bus system, and related costs of a fixed guideway rapid transit system?

The polls at such special election shall be open from 7 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the day of the special election. All qualified electors of Dade County, Florida shall be eligible to vote YES or NO for this question.

This special election shall be held and conducted in accordance with applicable provisions of general law relating to special elections and the provisions of the Dade County Home Rule Charter.

David C. Leahy
Supervisor of Elections
Dade County, Florida





Department of Transportation

HIGHWAY DIVISION

Region I

9002 SE McLOUGHLIN, MILWAUKIE, OREGON 97222 PHONE 653-3090

October 25, 1990

In Reply Refer To
File No.:

David A. Mazza, Vice Chairman
Columbia Group
Sierra Club
2637 SW Water St.
Portland, OR 97201

Subject: Western Bypass Study

As we discussed, I have delayed responding to your letter to me dated July 30 and a similar letter to Governor Goldschmidt on August 16 because I felt these issues warranted an in-person discussion. Also, this has been a dynamic study process, and I wanted further clarification from your Board on some of these issues. I would still like to meet with your Board, but because there has been no room on your agenda to date, I felt it appropriate to respond in writing to the concerns you raised in your letters.

1. Non-responsiveness of ODOT Staff

We also had concerns on potential implications of Mr. Bothman's interview as it appeared in the Hillsboro Argus. However, Mr. Bothman was quick to clarify his position in a letter to the editor and a letter to study committee members. These, along with a cover letter from me, crossed your letter of July 23 in the mail. Your follow-up letter of July 30 arrived while I was on vacation, and I did not have time to respond before your letter of August 16 to Governor Goldschmidt.

Because of the importance of the issues and concerns you raised, I requested the opportunity to meet directly with your executive board rather than attempting to resolve these sensitive issues through the mail. The Oregon Department of Transportation has actually responded at several levels. In addition to my efforts and the letters of Mr. Bothman, Michael Hollern, Chairman of the Oregon Transportation Commission, attended the last Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) Meeting to reiterate the Oregon Transportation Commission's commitment to a broad and open study that looks at a full range of reasonable alternatives to a bypass.

2. Bias of Study Committee Members

You have expressed concern that members of committees formed for this study are biased toward a bypass and were selected based on this bias. Attached is a list of members of the CAC which clearly shows a very broad representation of interests, both within and outside the study area. We specifically avoided selecting members based on their positions on a bypass, since this could unfairly bias the study. Instead, we sought a balance of the key stakeholder groups and issues. Representatives were selected after lengthy and numerous interviews based on their ability to objectively evaluate technical information and make reasonable decisions regardless of their personal feelings for, against, or indifferent to a bypass and based on their ability to be effective liaisons with their constituents.

The Steering and Technical Committee memberships are comprised of jurisdictions within the study area boundary and agencies with a direct jurisdictional interest in the study. You requested that Clackamas and Multnomah counties and the City of Portland be included on our committees. This issue was raised with the CAC for their recommendation on expanding committee membership. Because of the number of jurisdictions wishing to participate in this study, and particularly because all jurisdictions mentioned participate through JPACT in the decision-making process anyway, it was voted by majority not to recommend expansion of the committees. I explored this further with Multnomah and Clackamas counties, and representatives from both counties stated they preferred their representation through JPACT.

The boundary for committee membership was not arbitrarily drawn, but was drawn to include those jurisdictions who are most affected by the results of this study and to allow us to control the size of the committees. The offer was made to the City of Portland to address our Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) to make a formal request to participate on the study, but it is important that specific criteria be established so that we can explain to other jurisdictions with an interest in the study why the City of Portland was added.

You expressed a concern on the representation of the City of McMinnville on the CAC. The City of McMinnville is not directly represented on any committee. A member of the CAC lives in McMinnville but represents the Oregon Tourism Alliance. The OTA includes Portland as well as cities and counties west of the study area that have a major interest and concern in the outcome of this study, much as your involvement for the broader Sierra Club interest.

3. Resistance of the Study Team To Consider Any But Bypass Alternatives

The study committee is very committed to looking at reasonable alternatives to a bypass. Clearly, a bypass will be considered as an alternative since the recommendations from Metro to ODOT were to study a bypass facility. As we have stated numerous times, we are also looking at alternatives to a bypass including a more intensive transit system, improvements to the existing highway network, and other means to reduce traffic demand. It has been suggested that we also consider a land use alternative, and we have requested that this be better defined so we can assess whether this is possible within the context of our study. To date, we have received broad requests to consider other alternatives, but have received no specifics on what they might be.

4. Concern That Regional and Land Use Planning Are Not Adequately Addressed Through This Study

We clearly recognize that land use affects transportation and vice versa. These issues will continue to be considerations in this study. However, it should be remembered that this is not a broad regional, county, or city transportation plan, but rather a specific implementation effort to respond to a specific request from JPACT to look at the feasibility of a western bypass to address the transportation needs in the southwest Portland metropolitan area.

The Regional Transportation Plan, developed through Metro with participation by all regional jurisdictions, is responsible for regional transportation planning. Likewise, all jurisdictions are responsible for development of land use plans that are subsequently acknowledged by LCDC as being in compliance with state-wide planning goals. A Regional Transportation Plan has been adopted by Metro, and all jurisdictions in the study area have acknowledged land use plans that are the basis for the study we are currently conducting.

Like several other transportation projects in the area, Western Bypass Study has regional implications. These will be evaluated by JPACT at appropriate points in the Study to address regional issues or concerns.

5. Replace The Study Steering Committee With JPACT

It has been the policy of JPACT and the State that implementation of projects becomes the responsibility of the jurisdiction that is impacted once a project is included in the RTP. JPACT is well represented on the Steering and Technical Advisory committees. However, participation only by JPACT would eliminate some substantial interests in this study--the majority of cities in the study area (one

person represents all Washington County cities) and DLCD. It would also add interests substantially outside the study area, such as Clark County and Washington Department of Transportation.

6. Expand Citizens Advisory Committee Membership To Include Special Groups Such As Physically Impaired Or Others With Special Transportation Needs

It is very important that the special needs of these groups be considered in transportation planning. Input from these groups has guided the development of transportation policies and design criteria at a state and regional level. These policies and criteria as well as special local needs are then incorporated in the actual design of a facility. The Western Bypass Study is not a broad policy study (see #4) nor is it a design level study. However, we are sensitive to the needs of these groups and will address any comments on special needs if they are raised by any special interest group.

7. Expand Public Information on the Study

Within the last year, we have published four newsletters, held three open houses, two public workshops, and six Citizens Advisory Committee meetings that are advertised in the newspaper and are open to the public. We maintain a mailing list of about 1,400 interested people who are sent regular information on the study. Several local newspapers also run regular stories on the status of the bypass study and we maintain a full-time public involvement coordinator to respond to individual questions from the public. I am also available to speak to groups of any size and interest to provide current information on the study. I have addressed an average of two or three such groups a week.

It is the nature of this type of study that public interest is less active during development of goals and objectives and evaluation criteria. If your concern is that more public is not attending meetings, I expect this will change when our technical analyses are completed and more controversial issues are discussed.

Again, I would emphasize that we are continually looking for ways to improve our public involvement effort, and your specific recommendations that will make this a better process are welcome.

8. Issue a New Mission Statement For the Study That States All Alternatives Will Be Considered

Our current "Mission Statement" for the study already states that all reasonable alternatives will be considered. As far as a land use alternative is concerned, we

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have requested 1000 Friends of Oregon to provide a definition of what such an alternative would look like. They have recommended a "land use" process that we are now evaluating. In addition, we will provide an opportunity in this study for local jurisdictions to reconsider land use allocations if they so desire.

I would like to clarify that no time has been lost in the study responding to the issues you have raised. The issues you have raised are important, and we have attempted to deal with them as best we can. At the same time, our consultants have continued to work under their existing contract and schedule. Hopefully, we can continue to address issues as they arise without impacting our long-term goals.

The Sierra Club provides an important perspective to the study we are currently conducting, and we appreciate your interest and willingness to raise sensitive and difficult issues. It would be a loss to the study for the Sierra Club to resign from the Citizens Advisory Committee; however, we realize that you cannot participate in this study if you do not feel it represents or responds to your concerns.

If you have further questions, or would like to discuss these issues further, I would be happy to attend a meeting of your Executive Board or a broader Sierra Club meeting.

Sincerely,



Michal A. Wert
Special Projects Manager

MW:am3102590

cc: Sierra Club Executive Board
Governor Neil Goldschmidt
Michael Hollern, Chairman, OTC
Robert Bothman, Director, ODOT
Don Adams, Odot Region 1 Engineer
JPACT
Susan Brody, Director, DLCD
Fred Hansen, Director, DEQ
Metropolitan Service District
Portland City Council
Multnomah County Commissioners
Clackamas County Commissioners
Washington County Commissioners

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Vera Katz, Speaker of the House
John Kitzhaber, Senate President
Senator Jane Cease
Senator Jim Whitty
Senator Dick Springer
Senator Bob Shoemaker
Senator Joyce Cohen
Senator Jeanette Hamby
Senator William McCoy
Senator Frank Roberts
Representative Tom Mason
Representative Judy Bauman
Representative Ron Cease
Representative Dave McTeague
Representative Delna Jones
Representative Beverly Stein
Representative Mike Burton
U.S. Senator Bob Packwood
U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield
U.S. Representative Les AuCoin
U.S. Representative Ron Wyden
Federal Highway Administration



August 16, 1990

COLUMBIA GROUP

Governor Neil Goldschmidt
State Capitol Building
Salem, Oregon 97301

Dear Governor Goldschmidt:

The Sierra Club wishes to bring to your attention our concerns over the handling of the Western Bypass Study, an Access Oregon project in which we are currently participating as citizens advisory committee environmental representative. We bring this matter to you after receiving no response from the Oregon Department of Transportation to our earlier voiced reservations that the agency is not committed to an impartial study of transportation strategies, and, in fact, is committed to a freeway alternative regardless of the study's outcome. Evidence of this bias has raised the question in the minds of the Club's 4700 members in the metropolitan area and over 10,000 members in the state whether this is a project in which our organization should continue to participate.

The Sierra Club came to the Western Bypass Study committed to participating in an objective study of transportation problems and needs in the southwestern metropolitan area as they related to the regional transportation network and urban structure. Unfortunately, the study process has been a source of disappointment and concern from the start. The study team's selection of committee members has resulted in overwhelming majorities on each committee of individuals closely affiliated with earlier support of the Western Bypass and totally lacking in the impartiality and regional vision called for in the study's mission. The study team, in particular Project Manager Michal Wert, has actively promoted discussions of freeway dependent solutions, while equally resisting efforts to broach discussions of the other transportation alternatives called for by the study. The study team has done little to facilitate communication between the committees, or between members on a particular committee. Efforts to involve certain local jurisdictions immediately outside the arbitrarily drawn boundaries of the study area, such as Portland, have been strongly resisted by the study team, while other outside jurisdictions, those on record as supporting the bypass alternative such as McMinnville, have been given a voice in the process. Efforts to engage the public inside the study area have been feeble while efforts to engage taxpayers outside the area have been non-existent. Lastly, Director Bob Bothman last month saw fit to declare the western bypass inevitable, over a year before his agency's study would be completed. These are not the actions of an agency willing or

SIERRA CLUB

2637 S.W. Water Street-Portland, Oregon 97201

capable of addressing regional problems with regional solutions, aimed at promoting regional well-being into the next century.

As already stated, all the above has been brought to the attention of the Oregon Department of Transportation twice by the Sierra Club. In an effort to salvage what is fast becoming a mockery of regional transportation and land use planning, the Club requested a number of steps be taken by the agency. To date, those requests have not been addressed nor is there any indication of the agency's intent to do so in the future. Consequently, the Club now turns to you, requesting the following changes be made to the study process.

1. Reorganize the study committees' membership to truly reflect the regional nature of this project. Recent requests made by the City of Portland, and rejected by the study team, clearly indicate the current membership is not representative. The Club feels this goal could most quickly and effectively be achieved by either replacing or augmenting the strategy/steering committee with the members of JPACT. This would give the structure both the geographical and jurisdictional diversity now lacking and take the study out of the hands of individuals who have bankrupted their credibility on this issue.

2. Augment the citizen advisory committee to include proportional representation from the entire metropolitan region, aiming at a similar mix of citizen, business and special interests. Special interests, in particular, should be expanded beyond the current study definition to include such groups as the physically impaired and others with special transportation needs.

3. Expand the public education elements of the study to include residents throughout the metropolitan region. Equally important, and totally lacking to date, organize these workshops in a fashion which transmits usable and impartial information. Go beyond the minimal efforts thus far and encourage these events by publicizing them in the media and through other avenues, as well as holding them at accessible locations (e.g. on bus lines).

4. Issue a new mission statement to the public stating that the study shall consider all transportation alternatives, including mass transit, land use reconfiguration, time management and varying combinations, in addition to a freeway. The public statement should also include a retraction of earlier statements by agency personnel which have promoted in the public's mind the inevitability of the western bypass.

As already stated, the Club feels the only chance of retrieving the time lost due to the Oregon Department of Transportation's efforts to undermine its own study is by instituting the above recommended changes. Failure to take action will only further convince a broad segment of the metropolitan area's population and organizations representing various interests that the current Western Bypass Study is incapable of producing a valid result. For the Sierra

Club, it will also mean that it will have to reevaluate its commitment to this process. The Club is not willing to sacrifice the public trust it has won over the past ninety eight years of working for the environment, nor is it willing to lend unwarranted credibility to a bankrupt process. The Club hopes that in view of your past commitment to progressive answers to urban problems, especially those related to transportation, that you will give this problem the attention it deserves on act upon our recommendations.

Very Truly Yours,


David A. Mazza
Vice Chairman

cc: ODOT
JPACT
DLCD
DEQ
Metropolitan Service District
Portland City Council
Multnomah County Commissioners
Clackamas County Commissioners
Washington County Commissioners
Vera Katz, Speaker of the House
John Kitzhaber, Senate President
Senator Jane Cease
Senator Jim Whitty
Senator Dick Springer
Senator Bob Shoemaker
Senator Joyce Cohen
Senator Jeanette Hamby
Senator William McCoy
Senator Frank Roberts
Representative Tom Mason
Representative Judy Bauman
Representative Ron Cease
Representative Dave McTeague
Representative Delna Jones
Representative Beverly Stein
Representative Mike Burton
U.S. Senator Bob Packwood
U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield
U.S. Representative Les AuCoin
U.S. Representative Ron Wyden
Federal Highway Administration

COMMITTEE MEETING TITLE

SPACT

DATE

11/8/90

NAME

AFFILIATION

NAME	AFFILIATION
M - Marjorie D. Schunk	Cities of Mult County
MA - Bob Frost	TRI-MET
M - Ed Wiedegiest	Clackamas Co.
MA - Les White	C-TRAN
G - Craig Tomnicki (SIAS alt.)	Cities of Clack County
M - Bonnie L. Hays	Washington County
MA - Dan Adams	ODOT
M - Gary Demich	WSDOT
M - Melvina Caderson	Multnomah County
M - Earl Blumenauer	City of Portland
MA - Jim Gardner	Metro
M - Clifford Wash	Cities of Wash. Co.
M - RICHARD DEUKIN	METRO
M - George Dan Benjamin	Metro
G - Howard Harris	DEB
G - PAUL HAINES	CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO
G - GBARRINGTON	TRI-MET
G - ROD SANDOZ	CLACKAMAS COUNTY
G - Dennis Mulvihill	Wash. Co. Ty
G - G. Mooney	
G - Ted Jensen	ODOT
S - Karen Thackston	Metro
S - Dick Freney	Tri - MET

