GUIDELINES AND STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT MODERNIZATION

Neighborhood Oriented Metropolitan Government Project HUD Contract H-1785

National Academy of Public Administration Foundation
1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
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METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT: AN OVERVIEW

A number of reorganization alternatives, or models, have been devised for metropolitan government. A brief review is provided here of the more prominent ones, followed by a discussion of how these various approaches fit into the context of the American federal system.

Consolidation

City-county consolidation has been the most widely attempted and most successfully implemented reorganization model. The "pure" model involves the establishment of a single government for a metropolitan area. Existing municipalities are combined with the county government to create the City and County of "X". Usually, two service districts are created: one to provide services to the urban residents and another to rural residents, with taxation linked to the level of services provided. Figure 1 is a graphic description of the city-county consolidation model.

In practice, most consolidation efforts do not result in only one government. Political and pragmatic considerations often dictate that small municipalities remain in existence, special districts continue to operate, and autonomous authorities are continued. The merger of Indianapolis and Marion County by the Indiana State Legislature in 1970 was given the label "Unigov." To the uninitiated, "Unigov" sounds like the ad man's answer to local government fragmentation. But, according to the 1972 Census of Governments, there are 52 units of local government in Marion County, including five municipalities, nine townships, and 27 special districts. The most prominent examples of city-county consolidation are Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida, which has nine units of local government (five municipalities, two school districts, and two special districts), and Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, with

The Consolidation Model

Federal

State

Consolidated City and County Government

 Metropolitan Area

Figure 1

15 local government units (seven municipalities and eight special districts).

Federation

Federated metropolitan government is exemplified by the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Canada. This model has been proposed in this country a number of times, but never implemented in the United States. Bollens and Schmandt describe the federated model as the approach which:

...involves the creation of a new areawide government on intercounty or one-county territorial scope. The new unit, usually designated as the metropolitan government, carries out areawide responsibilities. The municipal governments continue to exist, perform local functions for which the metropolitan government is not responsible, and retain the governing boards. I

Mogulof defines federation as "Two-tiered metropolitan governmental system where the policymaking of the areawide tier is controlled by governments of the first tier." In practice, the federated model is more complex than pictured normally. In 1969, Metropolitan Toronto had 101 special body governments, 19 of which operated areawide.

Two-Tier

In recent years, two-tier metropolitan government has been advocated as a balanced and feasible model for government reorganization. The ideal two-tier model was described best by the Committee for Economic Development in its publication, Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas. The CED two-tier model was not drafted in any detail, rather it consisted of a number of principles or guidlelines for metropolitan reorganization. The following quotes from the CED statement contain the key principles of this model:

⁻⁻ To gain the advantages of both centralization and decentralization, we recommend as an ultimate solution a governmental system of two levels.

⁻⁻Some functions should be assigned in their entirety to the areawide government, others to the local level, but most will be assigned in part to each level.

The Two Tier Model




Figure 2

- --More important than the division of functions is the sharing
 of power.
- -In those situations where the metropolitan area is contained within one county, a reconstituted county government should be used as the basic framework for a new area-wide government.
- --In cases where the metropolitan area spreads over several counties or towns, a new jurisdiction should be created which embraces all of its territory.
- --In addition to an areawide level, modern metropolitan government should contain a community-level government system comprised of "community districts." These units might consist of existing local governments with functions readjusted to the two-level system, together with new districts in areas where no local unit exists.

The two-tier model is depicted in Figure 2.

The two-tier concept has made a substantive contribution to the debate over metropolitan government reorganization. Still, the theoretical advances have exceeded its practical application. Modified two-tier plans have been developed in at least three United States metropolitan areas: Sacramento, California, where it was rejected by the voters by a two-to-one margin; Salt Lake City, Utah, which was voted upon in March, 1975, and also defeated; and Rochester, New York, which is awaiting a staged implementation process.

A pure two-tier form of metropolitan government does not exist anywhere in the United States. Miami-Dade County, Florida, is described often as a two-tier form of government, and while it possesses many characteristics of the model, is is not a good example. Approximately 45 percent of the residents in Dade County have only one tier of government. John DeGrove classes it as "a modified two-tier government," but then he admits that "For more than half the city-resident population; the two-tier description is accurate, but to the 530,000 residents of the unincorporated area there is only the Board of County Commissioners to serve them." It is probably more accurate to describe Miami-

Dade as a strong urban county form of government, which is not too dissimilar from other United States examples, such as Montgomery County, Maryland, and Nassau County, New York.

The Lakewood Plan

Los Angeles County, California, has been promoted as a different kind of model for metropolitan government. Under the Lakewood Plan, the County provides services to the municipalities through contractual agreements. Currently, there are some 1,600 agreements between the County and its 78 municipalities for basic public services. The Los Angeles example has been termed the polycentric model of metropolitan government which is based on the market approach for allocating functions to different levels of government. The municipalities serve as demand-articulating units which bid for services on a competitive basis with larger, more efficient units (special districts and the county). The Lakewood Plan allows for the provision of services on an areawide basis so that efficiencies and economies can be achieved, but preserves the autonomy of the local units.

The Metropolitan Council

Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota is the location of yet another approach to metropolitan government. The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council is a third tier of government established for the seven county region. Its policy board is appointed by the Governor from single member districts. This model is based primarily on the view that the multiplicity and fragmentation of local government is not the problem, but rather it is the lack of a regional mechanism for making areawide policy decisions. The Metropolitan Council employs strong coordinating powers to meet regional needs. It has budgetary and policy control over single purpose special districts, comprehensive planning powers

relating to a number of developmental functions, authority to set standards for environmental quality, and it has a role in fiscal equalization among the region's local governments through a tax sharing plan. This model retains local units and preserves a wide range of public services to their control and discretion. The role of the third tier of government is defined as involving only those public sector responsibilities which are clearly regional in scope and impact.

Metropolitan Government and the Federal System

The various models of metropolitan government which have been described briefly above do not exhaust the range of approaches which have been proposed or attempted, but they do illustrate the major concepts contained in the literature on local government reorganization. The utility of these several models of metropolitan government must be seen in the context of the American federal system which in 1972 contained 267 metropolitan areas in 47 states (Alaska, Vermont and Wyoming have no SMSAs), ranging in population from 55 thousand to ten million, and having from one county to up to 15 counties. Clearly, the diversity and complexity of U.S. metropolitan areas requires that the concepts and models for governmental reform be equally diverse and complex.

It is important also to place metropolitan or local government reorganization in the broader context of the federal system. The manner in which
we view governmental institutions has a profound influence on the solutions
which we propose. James Sundquist commented on this point in his book, <u>Making</u>
Federalism Work:

The Country...must learn how to manage a federal system far more complex than it has known before. So far the Country and the government have not learned to manage the system—first of all, perhaps because they have not even come to look upon it as a federal system.⁵

We do not view our towns, special districts, cities, counties, state and federal governments as a system. Rather we see them as separate, autonomous, and independent units. When public problems seem critical and some change is indicated and sought, the failure to perceive local governments as part of a system carries over into the work of charter commissions and study groups, and as a result proposals are fashioned to provide unity and promote symmetry and simplicity. The frequency of their failure is not surprising.

Clearly, a different approach based on a more realistic and broader perspective is needed if feasible and actionable reforms are to result. To return to the remark by Sundquist, we need to understand and accept the notion of the federal system as a system. All of the institutions which Americans have formed and shaped are part of a total government system—interrelated, interdependent, and influenced by one another—and which, ideally, are working toward a common objective of service to the citizen.

The next chart (figure 3) is an idealized version of the federal system of government as it exists currently in the United States. While this schematic drawing presents the governmental system in neat and simple terms which does not always reflect reality, it is useful as a device for viewing and understanding the total context in which local government operates. Except for perhaps the neighborhood level, most citizens are served by the various levels and institutions portrayed in figure 3. The chart is unrealistic in that it suggets an ordered pattern of hierarchical relationships among the several levels of government and their institutions.

A similar chart, reprinted from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations study, <u>Substate Regionalism and the Federal System</u>,

Volume I, is provided in figure 4. This chart was prepared by the ACIR as a way of illustrating the fragmentation of metropolitan areas: "[It] shows the

THE FEDERAL MODEL

| Federal Government | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|
| | 5 |
| National Level | |
| Multistate_Regions | a |
| State Government | 4 |
| State Level | |
| Substate Districts | |
| Multicounty Agencies Regional Level | 3 ^t |
| Special Districts | |
| County Government Areawide Level | 2 |
| Service DistrictsSpecial Districts | |
| Municipal Government Local Level | 1 |
| Service Districts | |
| Community Councils Neighborhood Level | |
| | |

broken lines represent optional institutions which are not general purpose government organizations.

b this level may not exist in all SMSAs.

Layers of Governance, Whitehall, Pennsylvania, 1972

- 17. United States of America
 - 16. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
 - 15. Air Quality Control Region
 - 14. Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission
 - 13. Western Pennsylvania Water Company
 - 12. Allegheny County
 - 11. Allegheny County Port Authority
 - 10. Allegheny County Criminal Justice Commission
 - 9. Allegheny County Soil and Water Conservation District
 - 8. Allegheny County Sanitary Authority
 - 7. City of Pittsburgh
 - 6. South Hills Area Council of Governments
 - 5. South Hills Regional Planning Commission
 - 4. Pleasant Hills Sanitary Authority
 - 3. Baldwin-Whitehall Schools Authority
 - 2. Baldwin-Whitehall School District
 - 1. Borough of Whitehall: Population 16,607

extent of multiple layering from the vantage point of a resident of Whitehall, a small suburban community located in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, who in late 1972 received services or benefitted from, and paid taxes or user charges in support of, 17 different governments or quasi-governmental units." ACIR could have included a number of interstate commissions on the chart of which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is a member and which directly or indirectly benefit the Whitehall resident, for example the Appalachian Regional Commission, Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, and the Great Lakes Commission.

There are three major points to be made from this discussion

First, the governmental system is complex, layered, and difficult to

comprehend. And, second, local government is part of a larger governmental

system—a fact reformers must confront if they are to devise plans for meaningful

results. Third, there are a variety of ways to organize government in metro—

politan areas, and each area needs to define and achieve the arrangement which

suits it best. This handbook provides guidelines and suggestions for local

officials and citizens. It is directed particularly at the design of tiered

governmental arrangements which would generally follow these recommendations:

- 1) Require a genuine sharing of power and functions between an areawide political jurisdiction and local units.
- 2) Recognize a larger unit to permit economies of scale, to implement national policy objectives, to establish areawide legal authority and capacity to perform, to permit areawide planning and priority setting, to achieve equities in finances and resources, and to enhance the availability of new resources such as federal and state grants.
- 3) Recognize a smaller unit to permit the exercise of local power over matters which directly affect the life style of citizens.
- 4) Provide the possibility of some form of neighborhood recognition to permit the articulation of neighborhood needs and preferences.

- 5) Create arrangements that fit the social, economic, cultural, and political characteristics of each metropolitan area and community.
- 6) Assign some functions, and activities related to functions to the areawide government with participation of local units varying from the power to review and comment to the power to veto. Assign some functions completely to local units. Permit local units the option of performing other functions in accordance with standards and guidelines established by the areawide government.
- 7) Establish representation on the policy-making body of the areawide government on the basis of population rather than local units, in accordance with the principle of one-man, one-vote.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 476.
- 2. Melvin Mogulof, Five Metropolitan Governments (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1972), p. 13.
- 3. Committee for Economic Development, Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas (New York: CED, February, 1970), pp. 19-20.
- 4. John DeGrove, "Southern Regionalism", in <u>Regional Governance</u>: <u>Promise</u>
 and <u>Performance</u>, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on
 Intergovernmental Relations, 1973), p. 6.
- 5. James L. Sundquist, <u>Making Federalism Work</u> (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 13.

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHING THE STUDY COMMISSION

A local government study commission should be formed with four key criteria in mind; it must be broadly representative, bi-partisan, linked to local government, and have strong and active leadership. It should be representative of the major social, political, economic, geographic, and racial elements of the metropolitan community. The following sectors of the community should be included (not listed in order of priority): political party leadership, business and industrial community, local government, racial and minority elements, urban, suburban and rural residents, major community organizations, organized labor, and university faculty (if present). These members must, however, be chosen on the basis of their individual qualities, emphasizing leadership, judgment and commitment.

The commission should be bi-partisan, containing an appropriate mix of Democrats, Republicans, independents, liberals, and conservatives. In communities where one party dominates, it will be important to have members who represent different points of the party's ideological spectrum, as well as members of the minority party. In a sense, the commission is a non-partisan body, but its members, no matter how chosen, will not be. Government reform tends to involve highly partisan questions, and it is important to have the political parties and ideologies fairly represented.

The study commission must be closely linked to local government, either through the process used to appoint its membership or by including representatives of local government. It is highly advisable to have public officials on the commission because of their experience and the perspectives they bring to issues of political feasibility. However, it is preferable to

have elected, rather than appointed, officials serve on the commission. Both elected and appointed officials can be expected to make decisions on the basis of self-interest, but, when the commission reaches the stage of compromise and consensus and begins to make its final recommendations, the appointed official faces the personal dilemma of conflict between his loyalty to the commission and his loyalty to the government he serves.

The commission must have strong and active leadership, not only by its officers and heads of committees, but also as representatives of the community. Discerning who the leaders of the community are is a difficult process. Careful distinctions must be made between presumed leaders or "figure-heads" and the real leaders of the community. Community leaders are busy people with crowded schedules, but some are busier than others, and those with schedules that make active participation and faithful attendance impossible should not be appointed. If the commission is faithful to its charge, it will require extensive commitments of the members' time.

The selection and composition of the study commission is critical to its eventual success or failure. This is true not only because of what the individual members are able to contribute, but also because the commission's membership will decide its initial credibility with the larger community and determine its continued visibility and respect.

The commission members should be given a clear picture of the goals and objectives of the commission and of their own responsibilities as commission members. If the constraints of time and resources preclude the study of certain segments of public affairs, such as education, that should be made clear to the members. If certain premises or parameters were adopted to enable the commission's establishment, then those too should be made explicit.

Hopefully, a metropolitan study commission should have as few constraints as possible placed upon it before it begins its work. Its charge should be to examine the present system of government in the entire metropolitan area and to recommend whatever change it feels necessary in the assignment of functional responsibilities, the structure of political units, the forms of representation, and the system of financing public services. The commission should be given a free rein to analyze the present system of local government as fully as possible and recommend whatever they feel desirable and feasible. The commission should, however, be charged with one major test or criterion in their final recommendations—that of feasibility. They should be asked to produce an actionable plan that can result in implementation. If these points are stressed sufficiently and if the commission members are selected well, the result will be a series of actionable recommendations.

The obligations of the members should also be made clear and explicit. The commission should consider itself to be a working group, not an honorary or advisory body that votes on staff recommendations. They should be involved personally in the collection and analysis of data, the preparation and drafting of recommendations, and should subject their own conclusions to the critical scrutiny of fellow members and citizens. Full participation of the members is essential and the importance of regular attendance needs emphasis. (A major task of the staff will be to insure member participation through repeated reminders of meeting times and dates.) A useful technique to follow is to adopt a bylaw which requires members to secure an excused absence, and to dismiss any member who fails to attend three meetings in a row without an excused absence. Finally, it should be made clear that the members were chosen as individuals who must vote as their own consciences dictate, and not

as representatives of organizations or groups who must seek an outside mandate before they can reach conclusions.

The commission should adopt a policy of full and open participation with all of its meetings open to the public. No meetings should be held in camera. Closed and secret meetings can lead quickly to rumors and apprehension about the commission's purpose and work.

Participation in the commission's work should be encouraged by allowing non members to become involved. This can be done by creating two additional categories of participants--official observers and resource persons. Individual citizens should be invited to become official observers by formally declaring their interest and desire to participate. An official observer would receive all materials sent to commission members (certain limitations may be necessary because of cost considerations), would be notified of commission and task force meetings and would be free to participate in commission and task force deliberations. The main distinction between members and observers would be the right to vote. The second category of individuals to involve in the work of the commission are "resource persons." A resource person is an individual with particular expertise in an area of commission concern who can make a specific contribution because of his background or professional position. Fire chiefs, highway engineers, or planners fit in this category. They should be invited to relevant commission and task force meetings and be encouraged to comment on working papers of the commission.

The study commission will require strong leadership from its chairperson and executive committee. The chairperson must have visibility and the
respect of the metropolitan community. He must be able to represent the commission to the public. While this task can be shared with other members, it

will be his primary role. It is important that public relations be conducted primarily by the commission leadership, rather than by the staff director. The demands on the staff director will be heavy and public relations could detract from his ability to provide the administrative and research support required. If the chairperson is to work effectively, he must not be too strongly identified, at least in a negative sense, with one particular group or segment of the community.

Staffing the Study Commission

A full time staff and separate office are essential. The commission must have visibility in the community and establish an identity that is separate from local government and existing organizations and institutions, such as the League of Women Voters. While existing private organizations may have outstanding reputations, their public image could cause some elements to prejudge the commission's work.

The commission's office fulfills two basic needs; maintaining communications among its members, and serving as a point of contact between the commission and the larger community.

The administrative and logistical support requirements of a local government study commission are extensive. The staff must perform the following tasks:

- a) arranging commission meetings;
- b) securing members' attendance through written notices and telephone reminders;
 - c) maintaining a complete record of commission actions and decisions;
 - d) obtaining and distributing materials requested by the commission;

- e) informing the press and interested groups of commission meetings and plans; and,
- f) responding to inquiries from within and outside the community. The staffing patterns adopted by the study commission will depend on the financial resources available, and whether research support is performed by in-house staff or through contract with an outside organization. The minimum in-house staff required is a full-time executive secretary/staff director plus a full-time secretary. Additional staff needs will depend on the role of the staff director. He may provide administrative and logistical support only, or he may also be required to perform a research role such as data collection and analysis, or drafting of commission and task force reports. A study commission can operate effectively with a staff of two to three persons if the bulk of the research needs are met by an outside organization.

The data collection and research needs of a study commission can probably be met best by securing the services of an independent research and consulting organization. This approach has some advantages:

- a) employing research staff directly may be difficult because of the short-term nature of the commission;
- b) direct employment will increase the administrative burdens of the commission;
- c) and, the best qualified and knowledgeable researchers in the community may already be employed by organizations which could work on a contract basis.

If available in the community, a non-profit municipal research bureau or a university based governmental research institute can provide research support. Such organizations normally have had long experience in studying the public affairs of the community and are able to provide staff at competitive rates because of their public service orientations. Also, non-profit firms are often

able to attract experienced and senior professionals on a part-time basis.

For-profit consulting firms may be a potential source of research support, but only if they are based in the metropolitan area and have had considerable experience in working with local governments in the area. Generally, their rates are higher than those charged by non-profit firms, but this does not always hold true. If a for-profit firm is selected, the most important factor is not the reputation of the organization but the background and qualifications of the personnel who will be assigned to do the actual work.

Once a research firm or organization is selected, it is extremely important that a detailed and specific relationship between the commission and the firm be established. The researchers should not be given carte blanche, but should respond to specific requests of the commission and its task forces.

They should be asked to attend the meetings of the commission so that they may become familiar with the sentiments and desires of its members. In the initial stage of the study, the researcher's primary task will be to provide facts and data about the current governmental system. In later stages, as the commission begins to develop proposals, the research organization can be asked to prepare recommendations but these should be presented as alternatives and made as unbiased as possible. Additionally, reports of the research organization should be made to the commission only. Any public dissemination of research reports should be made in the name of the commission. Commission members are likely to become disenchanted with the study process if they perceive their role as simply ratifying the reports of a study firm.

Initiating the Study

The first substantive task of a local government study commission is

to engage itself in a process of self education and problem determination.

The study group must educate itself on four main topics: 1) the existing system of local government, 2) previous successful and unsuccessful efforts to reform the local government system, 3) national and foreign experience with metropolitan and local government reorganization, and 4) current community problems and strengths. The analysis and study of these four topics need not be exhaustive at his stage. However, the commission must acquire enough understanding and knowledge to provide a base from which to conduct more detailed analysis during later stages of its work.

It is assumed that the persons chosen for membership on the commission already will be familiar with local government and community needs. A number of members may have considerable expertise in some areas. The main difficulty, however, is that the knowledge and expertise the members bring to the commission will be very uneven. Some members may have extensive knowledge of local finances, but little understanding of the community development and planning process.

Others may understand county government, but have only a cursory background in town or municipal organization. The purpose, then, of this period of group education is to diminish the unevenness of the members' knowledge, and, as nearly as possible, to raise their understanding to a common level.

Studying the existing system of local government

The collection of basic data and information on the political units and public agencies in the metropolitan community will be the most formidable and, initially, important task in which the commission engages. This is not an overstatement. In almost all metropolitan areas, there is no single place where complete and up-to-date information on local governments can be obtained, and, in many cases, the needed information has not been compiled in useable form.

Compatibility of available data is another major problem, especially in the public finance area of local revenues and expenditures. Local jurisdictions and authorities often operate on different budget cycles and utilize various methods to account for and allocate expenditures.

The problem in data collection is, of course, magnified by greater governmental fragmentation. The more general purpose governments and special purpose districts in the metropolitan area, the more places there are from which data must be obtained. As a starting point, information may be available from a state or regional agency, but it will probably require updating and verification. In some communities, the League of Women Voters chapter will have prepared a handbook or guide to local government that provides basic information on structure and organization, forms of representation, and powers and duties of local officials.

Although the data collection task is formidable, it is essential to the commission's work. It is impossible for a study commission to make an assessment of the existing local government system and then develop recomendations for improvement unless it has full and accurate data on how public services are financed and delivered.

In this initial study period, the commission will need to collect the following materials for each political entity, including not only general purpose units, but councils of governments, special districts and other autonomous authorities:

- a copy of the City or county charter and/or state statute under which the entity derives its basic authority;
- 2) an organizational chart of its internal management structure;

- 3) a comprehensive list of the services and activities performed;
- 4) a map showing the geography served or area of jurisdiction;
- 5) a copy of the most recent capital and operating budget, including its total and major expenditures and its source of revenue;
- 6) a listing of its full-time and part-time employees, including number, salary range, and occupational or professional specialties; and,
- 7) a listing of the entity's boards, commissions, and advisory committees, including membership, form of selection or appointment, and duties and responsibilities.
- 8) other information on the existing pattern of citizen participation, including formal governmental arrangements and voluntary civic associations.

In addition, the commission will need to obtain copies of the major state acts and regulations affecting the structure, organization, powers, and finances of local government. This information can be obtained from a state agency, such as a Department of Community Affairs, or from the State Municipal League.

Collecting and compiling past studies

Invaluable contributions to the commission's process of self education and problem determination can be made by systematically collecting and compiling recent reports on local government and the metropolitan community. A thorough search will uncover numerous reports and studies on the metropolitan area, its governments and its services. Many of these documents will contain valuable data for the commission's deliberations and save the group time and money.

Of particular importance are reports of previous charter commissions and study groups. There may have been commissions formed earlier with a similar mandate which did not result in implementation. Studies probably also exist on individual units of local government, such as a city, county, or towns in the

metropolitan area. Position papers or reports from private organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce or League of Women Voters, should also be obtained if available.

Many states have formed local government study commissions which have analyzed state-local relations and the need for local government modernization on a state-wide basis. Their formal reports and background papers can be invaluable.

A regional planning council or council of governments is another potential source of information. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has helped finance, under its 701 program, a number of studies on management and planning, including internal reorganization, intergovernmental cooperation, and areawide planning. Local units have also used 701 funds for these types of studies, but the regional agencies have relied on them more extensively and are the best place to begin. Background reports and statistical data can be obtained about the community from the regional agency as well. A regional comprehensive master plan, if developed, should also be obtained for commission analysis.

Finally, consultant studies contracted for by local government agencies on specific services or activities may be helpful. A list of those available is likely to be found in the office of the mayor or city manager.

Understanding reform experience and reorganization alternatives

Before the commission begins to analyze its governmental system in detail and to develop recommendations, it needs to understand the history of local government reorganization in the United States and to acquire a basic grasp of the various reform options and reorganization models that may be applicable.

(Appendix 1 contains a basic list of books and reference materials that can be made available to the commission members.) United States and Canadian experience with metropolitan government should be related to the members, especially the cases of Jacksonville, Indianapolis, Miami-Dade, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and Toronto.

Two or three meetings of the full commission should be scheduled to brief the members on governmental reform and the various models and case studies. At this stage, outside expertise may be required. Representatives from national organizations, or academics who have worked and studied in the area of metropolitan government and reform, can be invited to share their knowledge and perspective with the commission.

An important objective of these educational sessions is to develop a common language and understanding among the members. Governmental reform as a topic has become a victim of incredible semantic confusion, and the terms used to describe various approaches or models are often emotionally laden. Problem determination

Attempts to reform local government grow out of the perception by a significant number of citizens and influential community leaders that the "problems" of the community are related directly or indirectly to the structure, organization, and financing of its public institutions. The presumption is, of course, that a reformed governmental system will solve or alleviate local problems. Thus, a study commission is established to decide the type of reform needed to cure the illness in the body politic. If the commission's prime objective is to be reached, then its members must agree on and understand the problems faced by the community.

Study commissions are sometimes formed after the community has en-

gaged in a formal process of problem determination. In Rochester, New York, a study commission was formed after a series of meetings of 100 community leaders held over a one-year period. The Brookings Institution and a number of local organizations sponsored an Urban Policy Conference which systematically assessed the community needs and problems, and then made a series of recommendations for action. One of the recommendations was to conduct a thorough review of the governmental system. In Tucson, Arizona, a study commission was recommended after approximately 200 citizens met for three days in a Town Hall Meeting on Community Development. In both of these examples, the commission began its work with a comprehensive statement of community problems which was developed through a consensus approach.

Whether such a consensus has or has not been reached, the commission must spend some time discussing the community conditions it is trying to improve or change. The members must ask themselves, individually and collectively—why reform? What major problems is the commission attempting to resolve? The members will have their own agendas, and will probably disagree on the priority of community problems. Some may consider the major problem to be uncontrolled growth, while others may view uncontrolled expenditures as a more serious threat. While a complete consensus is probably impossible, and may be undesirable, the members should agree on the major issues confronting the community. Determining the major problems and ranking them in some order of priority will enable the commission to apportion its time and to allocate its efforts more appropriately. For example, if it is agreed that community development and the local fiscal situation are primary issues, more resources can be devoted to those areas than to others.

Again, some of the early meetings of the commission should be de-

voted to this process of problem determination. One useful technique that may be employed is to ask the commission members to prepare individually a brief statement of what they view as the major problems and issues facing the metropolitan community. These written statements, perhaps supplemented by a questionairre to the members, can then form the basis of discussion by the group as a whole.

This process should not be an entirely negative one. The members should also consider the strengths of the existing system. What aspects of the current governmental system should be preserved? Answers to these questions can help set the parameters of the parameters of the commission's inquiry.

CHAPTER III

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

In the preceding sections, we described some preliminary steps a local government study commission must take before it begins its detailed analysis. It was recommended that the commission begin by engaging in a process of self education and problem determination. This process will continue throughout the life of the commission as the members sharpen their understanding of the governmental system and become more specific in their definition of community problems.

It is suggested that the commission begin its study process by analyzing public services and functions. By starting with functional analysis, the commission can develop a detailed understanding of how the current system of local government operates and identify weaknesses or problems within the system. Functional analysis will not yield ultimate solutions or provide a final design for metropolitan government. It is simply a convenient and logical way to begin. Once the functional analysis phase is completed, the commission must study the fiscal system, issues of structure and organization, political leadership and executive management, and broader questions of representation and citizen participation.

The functional analysis approach recognizes that a fundamental responsibility of local government is to deliver public services and to provide for the regulation and protection of the community. Judgments on the performance and capacity of government cannot be made out of context. If one were to ask if his local government is responsive, he must also ask: responsive to whom, or what? Questions of government efficiency or effectiveness are relevant only if

raised in regard to a specific activity. That is, are police services efficient? Are building permits processed efficiently? Does the fire department respond quickly to alarms?

The functional analysis approach is designed to provide specific answers to questions about the performance and capacity of local government. Detailed and sophisticated inquiry about local performance is required if meaningful improvements are to be suggested.

Beginning with functional analysis also enables the commission to have greater flexibility in the design of its final recommendations. It eliminates an initial bias or preconception that deficiencies in the system are attributable primarily to organization and structure. Rather, it presumes that a more important question initially is the assignment of functions and activities within the system. Past efforts to modernize local government have begun with the appriori assumption that fragmentation and the excessive number of local units are major obstacles which can be resolved by structural change. This study approach begins with the premise that judgments about the number or size of local political units cannot be made without first understanding the roles and functions assigned to those units.

Subfunctions and activities

Functional analysis requires the description of public services by breaking them down into their component sub-functions and activities, and then deciding on the basis of specific criteria whether those sub-functions and activities should be assigned to a local unit, to an areawide unit, or should be a shared responsibility of both. Each major function of government includes a number of distinct sub-functions. The police function can be used to illustrate this:

POLICE PROTECTION

Patrol services Investigation Intelligence Crime Laboratory Communication Training

Each sub-function has a number of activities associated with it.

Activities are those operations that cut across or are common to a variety of functions. Thus all functions might require a planning, funding, and delivery process, and some may involve regulation. Combining these four activities with the list of sub-functions will enable the development of a profile on how public services are currently being performed. The following matrix can be constructed for each major function and used in the analysis:

POLICE PROTECTION

Planning

Funding

Delivery

Regulation

Patrol Services
Investigation
Intelligence
Communication

As the commission analyzes the delivery of specific functions and sub-functions in the metropolitan community, it can employ such a matrix to determine how service responsibilities are allocated among political units.

A function-by-function analysis of public services in the metropolitan area will enable the commission to have a clear picture of 1) local functions, 2) shared functions, and 3) areawide functions. The activity roles of the lower and higher jurisdictions also become more evident as the responsibilities for planning, funding, delivery and regulation are identified. Allocation criteria

After developing a profile of how public functions and activities are allocated throughout the system of local government, the commission can then begin to develop its recommendations for reallocation of functional re-

sponsibilities. In order to do this, it must have some criteria against which to judge the performance of the current system.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), in its recent study of functional assignments, has recommended four main criteria: (1) economic efficiency, (2) fiscal equity, (3) political accountability, and (4) administrative effectiveness. ACIR explains these criteria as follows:

- 1) <u>Economic Efficiency</u>: Functions should be assigned to jurisdictions that:
- a. are large enough to realize economies of scale and small enough not to incur diseconomies of scale,
- b. are willing to provide alternative service offerings at a price range and level of effectiveness acceptable to local citizenry, and
 - c. adopt pricing policies for their functions when appropriate.
- 2) Administrative Effectiveness: Functions should be assigned to jurisdictions that:
- a. are responsible for a sufficient number of functions and that can balance competing functional interests,
- b. encompass a logical geographic area for effective performance of a function,
- c. explicitly determine the goals and means of discharging assigned public service responsibilities and that periodically reassess program goals in light of performance standards,
- d. are willing to pursue intergovernmental means of promoting interlocal functional cooperation and reducing interlocal functional conflict, and
- . e. have adequate legal authority and management capability to perform a function.
 - 3) Equity: Functions should be assigned to jurisdictions that:
- a. are large enough to encompass the costs and benefits of a function or that are willing to compensate other jurisdictions for the service costs imposed or benefits received by them,
- b. have adequate fiscal capacity to finance their public service responsibilities in a manner which insures interpersonal and interjurisdictional fiscal equalization, and

- c. are able to absorb the financial risks involved.
- 4) <u>Political Accountability</u>: Functions should be assigned to furisdictions that:
- a. are controllable by, accessible to, and accountable to their residents, and
- b. maximize the conditions and opportunities for active and productive citizen participation.

Understanding the criteria

Before the commission begins to apply the criteria, it should spend some time, as a group, discussing the meaning of the criteria, the types of measures which can be used to judge their fulfillment, and most importantly, the value implications they hold for local government.

The first criterion, efficiency, is perhaps the most traditional and readily understood. It suggests that public agencies should be judged like busineds firms. Efficiency and productivity are parallel considerations, and involve the relationship between the amounts of inputs used to the amounts of outputs produced. How many manhours did it take to produce X amount of service? How many dollars did it cost to produce X amount of service? The more dollars and manhours used, the lesser the efficiency. Efficiency does not speak to service quality or the meeting of need.

The criterion of effectiveness considers quality of service and program impact. It requires an evaluation of performance on a goal-oriented basis. The water department may be highly efficient if it delivers water to homes at a low cost, but yet be ineffective if there are wide fluctuations in water pressure or if the water fails to meet standards of purity when it flows from the tap. Similarly, a police force can meet standards of efficiency by employing low-paid patrolmen and using outmoded equipment, but would not be considered effective if

the crime rate soared and arrests and convictions declined.

While efficiency deals with the cost of service and the amount of resources used, effectiveness involves the consequences of service performance. What results were obtained? Results should be measured both objectively, using indicators of performance—number of arrests, cleanliness of streets, etc.—and, subjectively, in terms of citizen and consumer satisfaction.

Equity is probably the most difficult criterion to define and understand. Basically, it involves the distribution of services and resources relative to need. There are issues of service equity and fiscal equity which deal with the central question of the fairness of local government. Is the distribution of public services fair according to need? Do citizens pay equal amounts for equivalent services?

These questions are not answered easily, because government does not treat everyone equally for valid, democratic reasons. Government is responsible for the redistribution of income and resources, and citizens have different needs and different capacities to pay for public services. Individuals in like circumstances—similar needs, similar incomes—should receive the same amount of services and pay the same. If this is the case, "horizontal equity" has been obtained. "Vertical equity" is met when equal results are reached. Areas of high crime rates will need greater levels of police protection. Individuals with lower incomes should be taxed at a lower rate, but still receive a certain level of public services. Equity can be measured objectively by looking at tax rates and service levels, but this criterion is dependent, to a large extent, on questions of political philosophy.

Responsiveness is the most subjective of the four basic criteria. It is judged bast by evaluating the perceptions and opinions of citizens. The central question is: Are the preferences and needs of the citizenry satisfied. It

involves issues not only of citizen control but also the accessibility of public services. Services should be responsive to the needs and people and accessible to those in need. Public agencies may develop programs with extensive citizen input, but then over-centralize the delivery of services, so that they are remote and inaccessible. Responsiveness also implies the tailoring of public programs and services to meet the varying demands and preferences of different communities or neighborhoods.

Applying the criteria

A major difficulty arises in the application of these ideal criteria to real world performance because they tend to conflict. An efficient system is not always a responsive one, and it is often necessary to sacrifice some degree of efficiency for increased citizen access and control. Thus, political and value judgments must be made in weighing these criteria against one another. The priority given to the criteria will depend, in large measure, on the particular function analyzed. Highly technical and seemingly routine public services such as water supply or waste treatment may not directly affect individual life styles or be subject to differing consumer preferences. Efficiency may be more significant for such public services than are standards of political accountability or equity. Other public functions such as zoning and police patrol services have a greater impact on life styles, and questions of citizen preference and consumer demand will be relatively more significant than those of economy and efficiency.

While the four main criteria must be balanced against each other and some tradeoffs made among them, they should be given equal consideration. Some priority will have to be given to the individual criteria when applying them to specific public services. In some cases, efficiency may be more critical than

responsiveness, but only in degree. An efficient system of government must also be an equitable one. Administrative effectiveness should not be sought at too great a price in responsiveness.

Technical considerations and factual data are essential background elements for the commission's analysis. Collection of data on unit costs, service requirements, manhours, minimum staffing requirements, etc., will be needed to apply these criteria to specific functions and sub-functions. Yet, in the final analysis, decisions on the proper allocation of public service responsibilities will tend to be more judgmental than technical. For this reason, the composition of the study commission and the extent of public participation in its deliberations will be critical.

Levels of functional assignment

In developing its recommendations for functional assignments, the commission can safely ignore, for the time being, the current structural and jurisdictional framework of the metropolitan community. By proceeding initially with functional analysis, the commission can work without regard to the existing political boundaries and make its first set of recommendations as to which level a particular sub-function and its related activity should be assigned. Based on the four main criteria, assignments can be recommended to the following governmental levels:

- 1) Neighborhood To political subunits of the central city or other municipalities.
- 2) Local to community governments which may be analogous to existing towns or cities.
- 3) Areawide to jurisdictions above the municipal level, which, most likely, will be existing or reconstituted county governments.

- 4) Regional to the multi-county level, which may be a special district, a council of governments, or metropolitan government.
 - 5) State government.

Although five distinct levels of government are described here, this scheme is not applicable to all metropolitan areas. Smaller and less complex metropolitan areas may function well with only two levels of government—municipal (local) and county (areawide). State government is involved in every instance and its role will need to be considered carefully. The appropriateness of assigning certain activities to a neighborhood or regional level depends on the characteristics of the area under study and the influence of local political culture.

With these potential levels of assignment in mind, the activities spoken of earlier--planning, funding, delivering and regulating--become more important. The delivery of most functions will doubtless be appropriate for the local or areawide units. Planning and coordinating of a number of functions may be appropriately lodged, in whole or in part, in a regional agency. And the state government may have to play a more expanded role in the financing of public services if the four criteria, particularly that of equity, are to be met.

Again, the importance of this more sophisticated process of functional analysis, with its focus on sub-functions and activities, is that greater flexibility in functional assignment is maintained, and responsibilities can be vested consistent with the general role of each level of government.

The concept of shared responsibility also avoids neat, simplistic assignments made for purposes of symmetry rather than pragmatics and effectiveness. Duplication and overlap have been traditional concerns of government

reform groups, and while they are still valid preoccupations, there are other areas of government responsibility where redundancy can be highly beneficial. For a large number of public services, it is important to have broad participation on an intergovernmental basis in the planning, policy and decision—making process.

Forms of power relationships

The Committee for Economic Development in its policy statement,

Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas, placed major emphasis on the concept of shared responsibility, and urged that, "More important than the division of functions is the sharing of power." John G. Wofford in an article published by Resources for the Future, Inc., listed eight separate forms of power that can be exercised by the areawide or local level in the context of specific functions:

- 1) the power to veto, absolutely;
- 2) the power to veto, subject to override:
- 3) the power to delay for a specified period of time;
- 4) the power to propose;
- 5) the power to advise;
- 6) the power to review and comment;
- 7) the power to appeal (to the next step in the hierarchy, or to a different branch of government);
- 8) the power to go forward only if a specified majority of a council or legislature has been achieved (simple majority, absolute majority, two-thirds, three-fourths, and so forth).

Another variant of the shared power concept has been adopted by the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in Minnesota and was incorporated in the ACIR

proposed legislation for an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization. This is the power of the areawide or regional unit "to resolve inconsistencies between the plans and programs of each level. This is a more subtle form of the power to veto, which does not allow the higher unit to deny a particular project, but forbids the project from going forward until the differences are negotiated and a compromise is reached.

As can be seen, the analysis and deliberations of the commission become sophisticated and complex in this process of functional analysis. Decisions must be reached on the assignment of sub-functions, their related activities, and the types of power relationships which should operate between the various levels of government. For example, the commission may recommend that the delivery of water services be an areawide responsibility with the funding of supply and treatment facilities shared by the areawide, state and federal government, with regulation carried out by the federal and state levels, and with the planning of water services a shared responsibility of all levels. In this case, the local unit's participation in planning for water services might be limited to the powers of proposing, advising, reviewing and commenting.

Organizing the commission for functional analysis

In order for the commission to study thoroughly the wide range of public services and activities performed by units of government in the metropolitan area, it will have to divide itself into a number of sub-groups, or task forces, which can specialize on a manageable number of related functions. The number of task forces established will depend on two main factors: the member-ship size of the commission and the resources available to staff each task force. Each task force should have jurisdiction over a broad but coherent group of functions, so that it can consider the interrelationships between public services.

The "right" number of task forces will probably lie somewhere between four and seven.

A comprehensive list of major functions and sub-functions is provided at the end of this chapter. A major intellectual challenge for the commission leadership is to arrange these functions into four to seven meaningful bundles and to assign each bundle to a separate task force for detailed study. Again, the problem determination phase urged as a beginning step for the commission becomes important in deciding task force responsibility. If land use and community development are priority issues, it may be advisable to establish two or three task forces to study the functions related to those problems, so that the analysis can be done in greater depth.

Task force examples

The Greater Rochester Intergovernmental Panel organized four task forces to accomplish its functional analysis: Human Services, Physical Services, Public Safety, and Taxation and Finance. In retrospect this division worked well with the exception of the Physical Services task force. The total number of functions included within their purview was so great that it became difficult for the members to study each function in sufficient detail and to adhere to the time schedule adopted by the Panel.

The Commission on Improved Governmental Management in Tucson and Pima County, Arizona organized seven task forces:

- 1) Administration, Finances and Taxation and Personnel;
- 2) Crime, Corrections, Courts and Public Safety;
- 3) Public Works and Transportation;
- 4) Water, Wastewater, Solid Waste and The Environment;
- 5) Planning, Zoning, Platting, Building Permits and Urban Growth;
- 6) Cultural, Educational and Recreational Services and Needs; and

7) Health, Welfare and Human Services and Needs.

Although a larger number of task forces enables the members to study functions in greater depth, it requires more coordination between task forces and may result in some duplication of effort.

Taxation and finance task force

A taxation and finance task force will be essential to the work of the commission. This task force is not comparable to the other "functional" task forces, but is concerned with an "activity" common to all functions. It is obvious that the reason that local governments levy taxes and raise revenues is to provide services to its citizens, whether those services be in the form of police protection, street lighting, or welfare checks. There are, however, certain functions that are necessary to taxation and finance, e.g., property assessment, tax billing, disbursements, etc. These functions can be studied separately from other public services and are themselves amenable to measurement through such criteria as economies of scale, administrative effectiveness, and political accountability.

The most important work of this task force will have to wait until the other "functional" task forces have completed their analysis. The taxation task force must decide the appropriate financing mechanism for each function. This depends not only on the type of public service, the beneficiaries of the service in question, the economic character of the service (public vs. private goods, pricing policies, externalities), but also on the level to which the funding responsibility is assigned. Use of the optimum financing or revenue-raising device will depend on the administrative capacity of the responsible unit. For example, it is difficult for local units to administer an income tax, and it may be too cumbersome for them to handle some types of user charges.

The taxation task force, then, will have to continue beyond the functional analysis phase of the commission's work. During the functional phase, it should work closely with the other task forces and provide them criteria for tentatively deciding which level the funding of individual subfunctions should be assigned.

It is appropriate at this point to digress and reconsider the main criteria of equity. Equity has two principal dimensions, one is service equity and the other, fiscal equity. Both dimensions operate on an interpersonal and interjurisdictional basis, that is, between individuals and between units of government. The functional task forces will need to consider primarily the question of service equity: does the assignment of a particular function to one level or another assist in providing a fair distribution of that service between individuals and political units. The taxation task force must operate with an overriding concern for the question of fiscal equity, and insure that financing is fair, in relation to income and need.

Task force reports

After the task forces have been established, members assigned to them, and functions appropriately divided among them, the detailed work of the commission can begin. The most useful way to proceed is to study each major function individually and to produce a working paper or report on the task force's findings and conclusion on each function. For example, a task force report on water services should cover 1) the current performance of water services: who the providers are and whether they are general purpose units, special districts, or private companies; 2) how the current performance measures up against the criteria, including the strengths and deficiencies in the present system; and

3) the task force recommendations for reassignment in the allocation of subfunctions and activities, including any change or redirection in the current provision of water services.

The task force will need to report back to the full commission periodically on their progress and interim conclusions. This will help avoid functional myopia in the work of the task forces and enable the whole commission to stay abreast of the entire effort.

Integrating the Functional Reports and Recommendations

After the functional task forces have completed their reports on individual functional areas, e.g., transportation, police services, etc., analysis which cuts across the individual functions must be undertaken. First, each task force should analyze the functions it has studied to determine the linkages among them. An overview report should be prepared for each major functional area (public safety, physical services) which would assess the impact the functions have on each other, determine what changes are needed to improve their coordinated delivery and planning, and identify any gaps that have arisen from focusing on the functions individually.

This cross-cutting analysis may result in the need to re-think the recommendations on the individual functions. For example, ambulance, fire and police services can be studied individually, but there are significant inter-relationships between those functions. A consolidated emergency communications and dispatch system can be created which may improve the economy and efficiency of their operations. In addition, manpower can be shared for some aspects of these functions. These types of linkages may not be recognized if the functions are not viewed together at some point during the study.

Following the preparation of the individual functional reports and the overview reports of each major functional area, the commission should prepare an interim report which summarizes their conclusions and findings in a single document.

been identified by the task force and highlight the general pattern of the functional recommendations. A consolidated listing of the functional assignments proposed by the task forces is the key element of the interim report. What functions and activities have been deemed appropriate for the local level of government? For the areawide level of government? Which functions and activities are recommended as a shared responsibility? Other significant questions should be addressed in the interim report: Which functions seem to require greater citizen input? Which services require more equitable financing methods? Which functions need to be decentralized? Centralized? In what ways: delivery, financing or planning? The interim report thus provides a general blueprint for change and highlights the major problems which must be addressed.

Beginning the structural analysis phase

When the commission has completed its analysis of local government functions and activities, it should have a series of specific recommendations and suggested reassignments among the various levels of government. Up to this point, the commission has not been concerned with the organizational and structural components of the governmental system. It was suggested earlier that the functional analysis phase proceed without regard to the existing structure, and that recommendations not be made with specific political units in mind, but only with regard to the level at which a service or function should be assigned.

After preparation of the interim report, which distills the recommendations from the functional analysis phase, the commission can then begin the structural analysis

phase of its work program.

Structural analysis involves seeking the answers to two basic questions:

Can the functional recommendations be implemented within the existing structural machinery of local government?

if not, what changes in the structure and organization of the current system of local government are necessary?

If structural changes are found to be necessary, it is important to recognize that a wide range of approaches can be utilized, many of which can be used in combination. The chapters which follow explain the concepts and issues involved in the structural analysis phase.

| Trans | por | ta | tion |
|-------|-----|----|------|
|-------|-----|----|------|

Conduct studies, research for planning

Determine needs

Prepare plan

Design and construct land terminals

Operate and maintain land terminals

Design and construct airports

Operate port and harbor facilities

Operate and maintain airports

Operate and maintain public transit

Establish route, schedules for public transit

Construct mass transit system

Operate mass transit system

Construct highways, expressways

Maintain highways

Construct local roads

Maintain local roads

Pavement markings

Snow removal

Street lighting

Street cleaning

Traffic lights

Parking lots

Roadside and street landscaping

Motor vehicle regulation

License vehicles for hire

Establish traffic control regulations

Police

Operate patrol

Book and retain custody of prisoners awaiting dispositions

Man traffic duty posts and patrols

Morale regulation-prostitution, narcotics, intoxicants, gambling

Maintain records and files

Maintain communication system

Personnel management: recruitment, training, review board

Criminal investigation

Laboratory services

Education and public relations

Work with juveniles

Property Management and administration

Hospitals

Construction and operation of: General hospitals

Psychiatric hospitals

Convalescent and chronic hospitals

Nursing homes

Diagnostic and treatment centers

Rehabilitation centers

Operation of ambulance service

Housing

Establish building standards

Enforce building and housing codes

Construct housing

Operate and maintain housing of poor

Operate and maintain housing for elderly

Subsidize low income housing

Community Development

Identify blighted neighborhoods

Plan for redevelopment

Acquire land and property

Rehabilitate structures

Relocate displaced persons, businesses

Clear land

Dispose of land

Fire Protection

Establish fire regulations

Perform inspection

Operate and maintain fire fighting apparatus

Conduct public relations and education fire prevention programs

Arson investigation

Training

Maintaining communication systems

Recreation

Facilities:

Maintain local parks

Maintain local playgrounds

Maintain athletic fields

Maintain historical sites

Maintain regional parks

Construct, operate amusement parks

Construct, operate sports facilities: arenas, stadiums, rink, etc.

Construct, operate swimming pools

Construct, operate golf courses

Construct, maintain zoo and/or aquarium

Construct, operate cultural centers

Programs:

Operate athletic program

Operate music program

Operate drama program

Operate craft program

Operate special program

Support aesthetic groups: symphony, ballet, opera

Sanitation

Establish regulations and standards

Collect solid waste

Treat solid waste

Dispose of solid waste

Inspection

Pest Control

Public Health

Environmental health and sanitation: food inspection sanitation standards, rabies and animal control, rodent and fly control

Communicable disease prevention and control programs: immunization, quarantine regulations, diagnostic centers, medical treatment

Public health nursing

Vital statistics registration and records: birth, death, disease

Maternal and child care services

Operate laboratories

Conduct health education programs

Cemetaries

Libraries

Construct facility

Maintain facility

Purchase materials

Operate search and lending procedure

Air Pollution Control

Establish regulations and standards

Enforce regulations and standards

Issue permits for equipment and/or contruction

Survey pollution sources

Public education program

Provide technical assistance and consultation

Conduct complaint follow-up

Sponsor research and study

Planning

Conduct research and maintain statistics

Prepare comprehensive area plan.

Prepare plans for other functions, i.e., transportation, housing, utilities, etc.

Prepare capital program and budget

Regulate land use

Approve subdivision

Mapping and Zoning

Public Welfare

Setting Standards

Conduct investigations

Institutions for aged and children

Assistance for aged

Maternal and child care programs

Assistance for handicapped, disabled, and blind

Medical assistance for aged, and indigent

Employment and Manpower

Assistance for unemployed

Job programs

Job training

Job referral

Water Resources

Planning for needs

Flood control

Protection of water resources

Collection of water

Purification of water

Delivery of water

Collection of water bills

Collection and disposal of rainfall

Collection of liquid waste

Treatment of liquid waste

Disposal of liquid waste

Maintenance of trunk system

Maintenace of connecting systems

Judicial

Operate civil court

Operate criminal court

Manage probation and parole system

Provide prosecuter and public defender services

Operate detention and correction facilities

Financial Management

Assess property

Register land

Levy Taxes

Collect taxes

Borrow money and manage debt

License business

Purchase supplies and equipment

CHAPTER IV

UNDERSTANDING DECENTRALIZATION

I heard citizens attribute the power and prosperity of their country to a multitude of reasons; but they <u>all</u> placed the advantages of local institutions in the foremost rank.

Alexis DeTocqueville, 1835

Americans have always believed in a decentralized system of government and have, at times, equated centralization with tyranny. Jefferson set the tone for the evolution of local government in the United States in his defense of yeoman democracy which would be close to the people and drew its authority from the consent of the governed.

Local government in the United States is decentralized with over 78,000 units of local government including school districts, special districts, municipalities and counties. One hundred and thirty-two million citizens of the United States live within municipal jurisdictions and forty five percent of those residents are served by cities of less than 50,000 population. While most Americans already enjoy the advantages of small government, a substantial portion of citizens live in unincorporated areas or within large central cities and are governed by units which are local in name only.

Decentralization has been a topic of increased interest and attention since the early 1960's. In part, this is attributable to the focus of Great Society programs on citizen participation and community action and the articulate demands of minorities for greater control. It can also be seen as a return to earlier, traditional values of home rule and grass roots democracy. Lastly, the growing importance and impact of local government on personal

budgets and individual life styles has doubtlessly rekindled interest in local politics and stimulated the search for decentralized forms.

Forms

For purposes of discussion, decentralization should be divided into two basic forms: political decentralization and administrative decentralization. Within the context of local government, political decentralization involves the granting of decisions or policy making authority from a county or municipal government to citizens of a sub-unit. Administrative decentralization involves the transfer of functions or authority from a higher unit to a lower unit within a single governmental entity. A further division of administrative decentralization can be made, that is, command decentralization and physical decentralization. Command decentralization is exemplified by the Chief of Police delegating authority for certain decisions to a local precinct commander. The establishment of police sub-stations throughout a city is an example of physical decentralization.

The various forms of decentralization—political and administrative, command and physical—may occur in combination or independently. It is possible to have political decentralization without administrative decentralization, or command decentralization without physical decentralization.

Arguments for decentralization

The justifications for "neighborhood government" have been described by one observer as falling into four categories: political, psychological, administrative, and economic.

The political rationale is perhaps the most forceful with its suggestion that large centralized government with its professional bureaucracies tends to ignore neighborhood interests and promote sameness from community to community in the level and kinds of services and the execution of policy.

Because there is no institutional focus for neighborhood political action,

citizen participation tends to be negative, <u>ad hoc</u> and directed at single issues. A decentralized system, it is suggested, would provide opportunities for local citizens to participate in planning and policy-making processes on a regular positive basis.

The psychological justification is based on the claim that big, remote government has resulted in political alienation and contributed to the lack of community identity and civic spirit. This can be overcome only by redistribution of power down to the neighborhood, according to the supporters of this rationale.

The administrative rationale is directed at control over public services by the "expert" or professional bureaucrat. The voice of the consumer, the ordinary taxpayer, and the neighborhood resident has been lost in the strivings for efficiency and economy. The answer then is to broaden participation in service delivery and provide the non-expert resident the means to influence the administration of services.

The economic justification is addressed to the imbalance in resources between neighborhoods and aimed principally at the inner-city ghetto. The normal recommendation is to establish a community cooperation, controlled by residents, which would stimulate investment and promote the economic growth of the community. Decentralization is also justified in terms of less costly public services. Some analysts claim that considerable savings can be realized by reducing overhead expenses of centralized administrations and by involving citizens more directly in service provision.

Another analyst has listed these rationales for decentralized municipal systems:

1. Citywide bargaining structures are complicated. Although new groups can and do enter the process and exercise influence, many people are deterred from trying by the dense mysteries of the traditional arrangement. Decentralized institutions might—at least in the beginning—be easier

to understand. Because the institutions would be geographically closer to the citizenry, more persons might seek to play a role.

- 2. The present citywide systems may not take sufficient account of local conditions and may not be flexible enough to achieve different outcomes where varying circumstances require them.
- 3. The present systems overrepresent certain groups in the population and take too much account of their needs, conveniences, and desires as against the interests of other groups. Decentralized institutions are likely to be more responsive to groups that are too little regarded by the present arrangements.²

A Governmental Study Committee in Fairfax County, Virginia, examined the need for decentralization of their local government and presented recommendations to the Board of Supervisors which follows the "Community Council" concept. Their report, issued in July, 1973, listed a number of advantages to be gained from "Community Councils." While some are repetitive with those listed above, they are worth quoting in their entirety:

- -Fosters meaningful citizen participation in local government by providing a more accessible forum than at the County level. Hopefully, would increase participation levels.
- -Minimizes fragmentation because all powers are derived from the County and the County retains ultimate responsibility for delivery of services.
- -Provides an alternative avenue of participation which is geographically oriented and thus may provide an alternative to the existing avenue of the functionally oriented citizen boards and commissions.
- -Provides training ground for future participation in Countywide appointive posts.
- -Only those areas which wish to have a community council would have one.
- -Fosters a sense of identity with a community within the larger County.
- -If properly developed and implemented, it would preempt encouraging development of competing systems of governance, i.e., special service districts, incorporated areas, private governments.
- -Provides avenues for more systematic and balanced input to the Board of Supervisors than that offered by conven-

tional pressure groups, advisory committees on a particular subject, etc.

-Provides and additional mechanism for volunteer social service to the County which potentially supplements the County staff capability of delivering services.

These and other arguments for "neighborhood government" and decentralization illustrate that the new debate over local government is a sophisticated one and most of its claims are well stated, although yet unproven.

Arguments against decentralization

The case against decentralization and neighborhood governments has not been made in a comprehensive fashion. Dr. Henry Schmandt, a political scientist, indicated why there are so few critics:

Perhaps the most important reason for the relative dearth of critical analysis in that most Americans, liberal and conservative, are ideologically sympathetic to the concept of decentralization. And because its applicability to municipal government has thus far received only minimal translation into concrete forms, few have seen necessary to question it.³

Opposition has arisen to specific proposals for neighborhood government and the more ambitious plans have been termed "radical" or unrealistic. The most widespread criticism made against decentralization is that it can lead to more intense parochialism and greater fragmentation of government. Since neighborhood government is unlikely to lead directly to reduced costs or tax savings, it is often attacked on fiscal grounds. Local officeholders have normally opposed decentralization schemes which would would reduce their power and influence.

Schmandt summed up the charges made against decentralization by its critics:

It would promote racial separatism, intensify social friction, weaken the capacity of local government for vigorous and effective action, ignore the technical and social forces that demand centralized control and treatment, and result in oligarchical patterns of rule by locality cliques and interest groups.

The Governmental Study Committee in Fairfax County also cited some presumed disadvantages to the "Community Councils":

- -Some increase in administrative costs.
- -Raises spectre of "another layer of government", though in this case the term layer should not be interpreted as a duplication of function.
- -Could result in destructive political "warfare" between the Supervisor and a constituent Council.
- -Could lead toward an unintended autonomy from the County in the long run.

While everyone agrees that greater citizen participation in government and better access to public institutions is a worthy goal, some question whether the basic apathy of citizens can be overcome by establishing neighborhood governments. Some would argue that local government residents are basically satisfied with the public services they receive, and thus would not take advantage of opportunities to have a greater voice in local politics.

Another argument which has been made is that schemes for neighborhood government may be appropriate for inner-city residents--minorities and
other disadvadtaged groups--but that the middle-class, suburban population,
which is not presently served by small government, has enough sophistication and
understanding of how their government works to gain access to it whenever they
feel compelled to do so. A final criticism of decentralization, in unincorporated suburban areas particularly, is that residents are already well organized
into such groups as private civic associations, chambers of commerce, business
clubs, Leagues of Women Voters, etc. These groups, it is maintained, have good
access to local policy makers, keep informed of local decisions, and voice their
objections routinely.

Benefits to local officials

The justifications discussed above and found most often in the existing literature rightly concentrate on the advantages or disadvantages

decentralization offers to the citizen. But new forms of neighborhood government and increased citizen participation may also provide benefits to elected and appointed urban officials. Certainly, it will make life more complicated for the local official. Decisions are easier to make when few people are involved in the process. But, will they be good decisions, especially in terms of satisfying local residents?

Some evidence of the value of citizen participation, as judged by local officials, was produced in a survey conducted by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:

A solid majority--72%--of the 326 replies that could be classified from 226 municipal chief executive or administrative
officers agreed with the statement that their decentralizationcitizen participation effort has been "a difficult but very worthwhile experience resulting in increased trust and understanding
between citizens, city hall officials, and public administrators."

Policymakers and executives of large communities are often forced to make decisions on matters which affect only a small segment of the population. While such decisions are often made with a view toward satisfying neighborhood interests, learning what local residents desire can be a major problem for local leaders. Who represents the neighborhood? Who can speak for the community? Under a centralized system, self-appointed spokesmen, with special interests, have gained the policymaker's ear while the ordinary citizen fails to communicate. And if he does, it is when he learns of a decision made or action taken. Decentralization, with its potential for greater citizen input, promises the policymaker a better understanding of constituents' needs and desires, thus enabling him to reach decisions which more closely fit public desires.

Under large, centralized systems, the tendency exists for both trivial and substantial conflicts to be escalated upward. The escalation of trivia

detracts from the policymaker's ability to engage himself in major issues of long range impact and to explore innovative approaches. The Council agenda becomes laden with routine matters of a "brush fire" nature. Neighborhood forums can provide a focus for resolution of minor and purely local problems, and the central policymaking body can devote more of its time and energies to areawide and substantive issues which affect the entire community.

Another advantage in the establishment of neighborhood units lies in the opportunity it provides for experimentation and innovation. Such units can be a source of new ideas for improving the efficiency of public service delivery. They can also serve as laboratories or testing grounds for the evaluation of pilot projects. Improvements in municipal services are often delayed or rejected because of concern about applying an unproven method to the entire area at the risk of a considerable investment. The utility of neighborhood units for public innovation may prove to be substantial.

Examples

There have been substantially more cases of administrative decentralization in local government in the United States than examples of political decentralization. Howard W. Hallman has reviewed the numerous cases of decentralization, both proposed and implemented, in his book, Neighborhood Government in a Metropolitan Setting, and the number and variety of examples are impressive. The Center for Governmental Studies in Washington, D.C., has published a bimonthly bulletin called Neighborhood Decentralization since November, 1973, which carries current information and articles on this topic.

The "Little City Halls" program initiated by Mayor Kevin White of Boston is probably the most well-known form of physical decentralization. Complaint and service centers manned by staff of the Mayor's office have been located in 14 neighborhoods. The staff of the Little City Halls have not been delegated any

authority, rather, they are physically located in the neighborhood to serve as a link between the citizen and the bureaucracy and to make city government more accessible.

Mayor Lindsay's Office of Neighborhood Government in New York City is a prominent example of command decentralization, combined with some physical decentralization. Under the New York plan, a full-time district level coordinator (district manager) was located at the community level and served as chairman of a district service cabinet consisting of district-level officials of city agencies.

Political decentralization has reached the proposal stage in a wide number of counties and cities, but has been implemented in only a few. Detroit and New York City provide examples of political decentralization of the education function with elected community school boards that have been delegated some significant powers. The State of California has enacted a general law which enables county governments to establish elected community councils. The East Palo Alto Municipal Council in San Mateo County is probably the most significant example of political decentralization in the Country. The Municipal Council operates as a de facto city government with five elected members of a council and a professional staff. Community councils have been established in other California Counties, including Sonoma, Santa Barbara, and San Bernadino.

The contextual setting

Another factor which contributes to the confusion and misunderstanding which surrounds decentralization is the context in which it occurs. Decentralization is a relative concept which has little meaning in the abstract. The particular form, degree and extent of decentralization can be discussed appropriately only within the context of a specific case. For example, a number of Borough

Presidents and a state study commission developed decentralization plans for New York City during the period of 1970 to 1972. Their neighborhood government proposals were predicated on districts ranging in population size from 100,000 to 300,000. One hundred thousand people hardly constitutes a neighborhood, and 300,000 is larger than many of our major U.S. cities (Tucson, Sacramento, Tampa, and Syracuse). However, in a city of almost eight million persons, decentralization of that magnitude is significant.

It has been argued often that while many talk of the need for decentralization, most reform proposals inevitably recommend measures which lead to greater and greater centralization. While this statement may be true, it need not be diagnosed as a symptom of the predilection of reformers to centralize, but rather a reflection of the fact that our local government is basically a decentralized system. In 1970, the urban population of the United States was 73.5 percent (three out of every four persons lived in an urban place), yet only 15.6 percent of the American population live in a jurisdiction of over one half million persons. It is inevitable that the number of proposals advocating centralization would exceed those suggesting movement in the other direction, expecially in a nation that has 18,517 municipalities and over 3,000 counties. Thus, a significant percentage of persons do live in small to medium sized governmental units and already enjoy the virtues of decentralization. Whether good or bad, some citizens do have more government than others.

Another contextual question which needs to be addressed is: Decentralization for what? What results are being sought through the reduction of the scale of government. If greater citizen participation and control is desired, then some form of political decentralization is indicated. If increased efficiency or greater economy of operation is the goal, then the need may simply be some form of administrative decentralization. Decentralization advocates are often pursuing

multiple objectives, and thus seek to combine the various forms of decentralization. But decentralization should not be sought for its own sake; there must be a motivating purpose, and, in turn, a response equal to the issue.

Size of decentralized units

A great deal of intellectual energy has been expended over the question of the optimum population size for a unit of local government. While a number of scholars have addressed the question, no one has yet provided a definitive answer. Still, their efforts have not been wasted; such research has yielded important clues on the minimum size units should be to perform specific functions. And we have learned that we cannot consider size without considering purpose. This is the Goldilock's dilemma, the question which was best posed by political scientist Robert A. Dahl:

Can we find units of government that are "just right" - small enough to facilitate participation and yet large enough to exercise authority so significant as to make participation worthwhile.

Dahl rephrased the dilemma in another way:

Thus for most citizens, participation in very large units becomes minimal and in very small units it becomes trivial.

When decentralization is viewed on the context of community control, an obvious but often overlooked point is that the smaller the unit, the fewer functions and responsibilities it can handle, which leads to the question of control over what.

Within the context of assigning public functions to "appropriately" sized units, two key variables become important—size of the geographic area and size of the population. These two variables must be considered together. In less densely populated areas, a significant bundle of public services can be provided efficiently and economically over a large geographic area to a relatively small number of citizens. In places like Manhattan, the reverse is true.

Functional assignment criteria and decentralization

Research into public service performance and delivery has yielded four main criteria which are generally accepted standards for determining the appropriate assignment of functions to local government units. The four criteria, which are explained in detail in the chapter on functional analysis, are: economic efficiency, fiscal equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness. While these criteria are very useful in deciding which functions should be performed at which level of government and by what size jurisdiction, they present a basic problem for the design of decentralized units. The difficulty lies in the application of the criteria to individual functions; the optimum sized unit for each function may be different. One study has found that a hospital would need to serve between 400,000 and 500,000 to provide a full range of services economically; that at least 50,000 inhabitants are required for efficient library service; but that a population of 14,000 can support an elementary school. A local unit below a minimum size cannot provide a full range of services economically or effectively. As the size of the unit increases, the number of services that can be provided, and still meet the assignment criteria, increases. To repeat the observation made by Professor Dahl: the larger the unit, the more services it can provide; the more services the more significant it is to control; the larger the unit, the more difficult individual participation becomes.

Summary

Decentralization is difficult to define in the abstract, but when applied to specific problems and specific situations it becomes easier to understand. There are two basic forms of decentralization—political and administrative—the first involves power and decisionmaking, the second related more to management and service delivery. The type and form of decentralization to be

used depends on the motivating purpose—what results are being sought?

Decentralization proposals must consider the question of geographic area and population size, but those questions depend on the public services involved. In turn, the range and type of services will determine the significance of community control.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Donna E. Shalala, <u>Neighborhood Governance</u>: <u>Issues and Proposals</u> (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1971).
- 2. Lance Liebman, "Metropolitanism and Decentralization," in London Wingo, Series Editor, Reform of Metropolitan Government. (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1972).
- 3. Henry Schmandt, "Municipal Decentralization: An Overview," <u>Public</u>
 <u>Administration</u> <u>Review</u>, Vol. 32, Special Issue, October, 1972, p.577.
- 4. (Ibid).
- 5. Carl W. Stenberg, "Decentralization and the City," in <u>The Municipal Year</u>
 <u>Book</u>, (International City Management Association, Washington, D.C., 1972).
- 6. Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
- 7. Robert A, Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1967).
- 8. Juan de Torres, Government Services in Major Metropolitan Areas, (New York: The Conference Board, 1972).

CHAPTER V

DESIGNING LOWER TIER UNITS

The two-tier, or multi-tier, model of metropolitan government calls for a system of community governments at the first tier, or local level. These community governments would provide services which are defined as local in character and also allow for greater citizen access to, and control over, areawide services. This section explores some of the relevant issues in designing and establishing lower tier units.

It should be recognized that there are at least four different circumstances in which the design of lower tier units can occur:

- 1) the establishment of community governments in the unincorporated areas of a county, where none presently exist;
- 2) the adaptation of existing local units (small municipalities, towns, or villages) into a two-tier framework;
- 3) the replacement of a large political unit, such as a central city, with a number of smaller community governments; and,
- 4) the subdivision of a larger political jurisdiction, such as a central city, into community governments.

In some metropolitan areas, these different approaches can be used in combination. The extent to which existing governments are retained, adapted or abolished and new units created will be important in the design process, yet those decisions should not be made until a careful analysis of the existing structures is made. It is suggested that a set of goals and criteria for the lower tier units be developed which can be used to assess the existing units and determine what additions or alterations in the existing lower tier system are needed.

Municipalities vs. advisory councils

Community governments may range from elected advisory councils with review and comment authority vis-a-vis the upper tier unit to full-fledged incorporated municipalities, depending on the circumstance in which they are established and the desires of the local electorate. Under the ideal two-tier model, the lower tier units should correspond more closely to municipalities which have a defined status and relationship with the area-wide, or upper tier, government. Recent reform experience tends to support the thesis that the electorate is not inclined to support metropolitan re-organization proposals with decentralization features which do not devolve significant authority upon the community governments. Charter proposals in both Sacramento and Salt Lake City provided for community councils under a two-tier arrangement, yet the lower tiers were designed clearly as subordinate units with little more than advisory functions. While there were probably several reasons for the defeat of these two plans, the weakness of the lower tier units was seen as a contributory factor.

A municipal type structure and authority is required if the community governments are to play a significant role in provision and delivery of public services. The performance of local functions by a community government requires a policy making capacity through a representative, legislative body, a management capacity through a professional staff, and some form of revenue raising authority.

Options for service provision

In the effort to match the recommendations developed during the functional analysis phase of the study with structural considerations, it is important to keep in the mind that the lower tier units have at least four options in performing the functions and services assigned to them: (1) they can provide the services directly through their own administrative organization and employees;

(2) they can enter into joint municipal agreements or contracts with other lower tier units; (3) they can contract with the areawide government for the provision of one or more services; and, (4) they can enter into a contract with a private firm for a particular service. And, of course, these approaches can be used in combination. Developing community governments which have the capacity of utilizing each of these options would allow a great deal of flexibility in the local governmental system. With such flexibility, an optimum mix of service delivery modes can be achieved to meet the overall criteria of efficiency, equity, effectiveness and responsiveness.

Rochester design criteria

The Greater Rochester Intergovernmental Panel developed a detailed set of design criteria for use in their process of establishing model lower tier governments in Monroe County, New York. Their criteria are listed below.

- 1) Establish a form of lower tier government which will have the capability to render those services and responsibilities having local community or neighborhood concern as assigned to the lower level of local government and possessing:
 - a. legal authority to plan, fund, regulate, administer and to determine the level and the location of services to be rendered;
 - b. authority to select the most suitable administrative structure through home rule or optional forms:
 - c. authority to contract for services;
 - d. authority to participate in shared or delegated powers with other governments;
 - e. adequate area, population and fiscal base:
 - f. adequate mix of service responsibilities; and.
 - g. flexibility of structure and service modes to deliver different levels of services.
- 2) Establish jurisdictional boundaries of lower tier government within the county to relate as closely as possible to "natural communities" having common and interrelated needs, concerns and associations, and recognizing:
 - a. physical boundaries such as lakes, rivers, bays, canal, expressways, railroads, and large contiguous land uses such as manufacturing, parks, and conservation lands, airports, and institutions;

- b. primary social and economic associations such as schools, village centers, neighborhood shopping centers, libraries, churches, recreation areas, cultural centers, town halls, fire companies, etc;
- historical or political associations;
- d. transportation or communication links—local newspapers, post office, bus stops; and,
- e. common language, ethnic or cultural ties.
- 3) Design a lower tier governmental structure and procedures which will maximize responsible citizen participation in local governmental affairs and policy decision making and including:
 - a. a legislative body representative of various groups and local interests and based on one-man, one-vote representation;
 - b. policy formulation councils which can determine extent of special or urban services desired;
 - c. linkages for citizen input into the administrative process affecting the delivery of services through advisory committees, citizen complain processes, etc; and,
 - d. provision for a local voice into the formulation of areawide policies and programs having an impact on local communities, e.g., hearings, advisory reviews, veto powers, etc.
- 4) Insure the provision and support of public services on a fair and equitable basis including:
 - a. uniform availability and access to general governmental services as needed:
 - b. fair distribution of taxes and charges for communitywide and special district services;
 - c. equitable representation and employment of minority group members.
- 5) Maximize efficiency and effectiveness of the planning, management and delivery of lower tier governmental responsibilities through:
 - a. effective governmental structure providing for professional and technical management capabilities;
 - b. adequate fiscal base to provide support for the necessary level of manpower, equipment and facilities;
 - authority to raise taxes and revenues most suited to the support of services rendered;

- d. proper sized service districts and service mix to allow for the efficient delivery of services;
- e. flexibility of service districts, delivery modes, and contractural arrangements to permit delivery of services as desired in the most efficient manner possible; and,
- f. interrelationships with upper tier government which are complementary to the purposes and objectives of each level.

Design Issues

Criteria such as those developed through the Rochester study can be very useful as decision guides in the effort to design a system of lower tier units, but they are sometimes difficult to apply in a real-world situation.

A number of issues will arise in the application of the design criteria. A few of the more salient ones are discussed below.

The dilemma of designing units that are "just right" was discussed in a general sense in the previous chapter on "Understanding Decentralization," but there are a number of other points that should be made on this issue. Population size

A minimum population size will become evident if the study process suggested in this manual is followed, that is, the functional analysis phase should result in a proposed list of functions and responsibilities which are to be assigned to the lower tier. This set of "local" functions should indicate a certain range of population that is required of the lower tier units, if they are to provide the services recommended and still meet the criteria used in the assignment process.

Howard Hallman has compiled the table below which attempts to depict the kinds of functions which can or cannot be handled by small units of government. It is based on his review of professional opinion, statistical evidence and municipal experience.

Table 1
Activities Which Can and Cannot be Handled by a Neighborhood

| Functions | Activities which can neighbor 10,000 population | Activities which cannot be handled by a neighborhood | |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---|
| Police | Patrol Routine investigation Traffic control | 25,000 or more Same | Crime laboratory Special investigation Training Communications |
| Fire | Fire company (minimal) | Fire companies (better) | Training Communications Special investigation |
| Streets and Highways | Local streets, sidewalks, alleys: Repairs, cleaning, snow removal, lighting, trees | Same | Expressways Major arteries |
| Transportation | | | Mass transit Airport Port Terminals |
| Refuse | Collection | Same . | Disposal |
| Water and Sewer | Local mains | Same | Treatment plants Trunk lines |
| Parks and Recreation | Local parks Playgrounds Recreation centers Tot-lots Swimming pool (25 m. | Same plus Cornmunity center Skating rink Swimming pool (50 m.) | Large parks, zoo Museum Concert hall Stadium Golf courses |
| Libraries | Branch (small) | · Branch (larger) | Central reference |
| Education | Elementary | Elementary Secondary | Community colleges Vocational schools |
| Welfare | Social services | Same | Assistance payments |
| Health | | Public health services Health center | Hospital · |
| Environmental Protection | | Environmental sanitation | · Air pollution control |
| Land Use and Development | Local planning Zoning Urban renewal | Same plus Housing and building code enforcement | Broad planning Building and housing standards |
| Housing | Public housing management | Public housing management & construction | Housing subsidy allocation |

Source: Howard W. Hallman, <u>Government by Neighborhoods</u>, (Washington, D.C., Center for Governmental Studies, 1973), p. 24.

The study which was done in Rochester proposed a population range of 20,000 to 40,000 for the lower tier units. This was based not only on the functions assigned, but on the relationship between effective planning and management potential and population. A 1970 survey by the Center for Governmental Research, Inc., showed that towns within Monroe County having populations from 15,000 to 20,000 paid an average of \$16,147 for a supervisor's salary while the smaller towns below 15,000 paid an average of \$5,600. As a result, the smaller towns had only a part time management capability and had difficulty attracting persons to compete for those executive positions. Another study of a small town within the county done by the Center revealed several management problems which were related directly to the part-time status of the supervisor. Significant disparities were also noted between towns below 20,000 and those above in their ability to support an in-house planning staff. The smaller towns were dependent on planning consultants paid with HUD "701" funds or the free advice of county planning staff.

Finding natural communities

The Rochester design criteria include a number of physical or geographical factors (rivers, railroad tracks, etc.) that should be considered in determining the boundaries of lower tier units. Physical barriers do tend to shape natural communities in a negative sense, that is, they set limits on the ability of residents to communicate and relate with other residents. There are also positive factors which help to shape communities such as public facilities (parks, theaters, and shopping areas) which promote communication and interaction. While such factors must be considered and may prove useful, they still only serve as guidelines for making boundary decisions.

Identifying communities is more difficult in some areas than others.

The older metropolitan areas of the Northeast usually have traditional and wellrecognized neighborhoods that have persisted for generations, while newly ur-

banized areas such as those in Florida and the Southwest may not. If
no clear sense of community exists, it may be possible to begin one simply
by designating an area as a political entity. This possibility has been
argued by Bert Swanson:

A sense of community is not a necessary factor in the construction of a political community. In fact, the establishment of a political community may provide the condition necessary for the growth of a sense of community.

Where political communities already exist, they, of course, should be retained or used as building blocks, as is suggested by the CED model.

Number of lower tier units

Although the functional analysis phase will provide some indication of minimum populations required for the lower tier units to perform their service roles effectively, that population range must be balanced against the questions of how many lower tier units there should be overall. This question should be considered in light of the total population contained in the metropolitan area.

The problem can be illustrated by some simple mathematical calculations. In a county of one million population, lower tier units with ten thousand persons each would mean 100 community governments; if each community council had five elected officials, that would mean 500 elected officeholders at the local level. The chart below indicates the possibilities for metropolitan areas of varying sizes. It is, of course, based on the assumption that each lower tier unit would be equal in population.

Population and Number of Lower Tier Units and Officeholders

| Total | Metropolitan | ropulation |
|-------|--------------|------------|
| | | |
| | | |

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|---|-----------|---------|-------------|
| i | 1.5 Million | 1 Million | 750,000 | 500,000 |
| Units of 10,000 each | No. of Units 150 No. of Officials | , 100 | 75 | 50 |
| | 750 | 500 | 375 | 250 |
| • | /No. of Units | | | |
| Water - 4 | 60 | 40 | 30 | 20 |
| Units of 25,000 each | No. of Officials 300 | 200 | 150 | 100 |
| | | | | |
| Units of | $ \frac{\text{No. of Units}}{30} $ No. of Officials | 20 | 15 | 10 |
| 50,000 each | | 100 | 75 | 50 |
| | | | | |

 $^{^\}star$ No. of Officials assumes community boards of five elected members.

This chart suggests some obvious issues about the total number of community governments that would be desirable in a metropolitan area, especially if a well defined and structured relationship between the lower and upper tiers is to be established, and if competent persons are to be found to serve at the local level.

With regard to relationships between the lower and upper tiers, span of control and communication issues arise. With how many lower tier units can the upper tier effectively and efficiently communicate? Is the ability of the lower tier units to influence areawide policies and decisions related to their total number? Would the areawide legislative body or executive attach any importance to a petition from one unit out of a hundred? Would local review of areawide plans and programs be too cumbersome a process with 100 units involved? The coherency and manageability of the total governmental system (areawide and local) has to be kept in mind throughout the design process.

The total number of lower tier elected officials which would result from the creation of 75 to 100 units may or may not be an important issue. Some intuitive speculations can be made. It would seem that the greater the total number of local officials, the less status and prestige would be ascribed to the position. This lowered status could affect, in turn, the willingness of individuals to compete for the posts and the interest of the electorate in voting for community positions. The opposite argument is that the greater the number of lower tier officials, the more opportunities there are for the average citizen to participate, and thus the more democratic and responsive the system.

The lower tier policy board

Three basic questions in the design of lower tier units are: 1) how many persons should be elected to serve on the policy board or legislative body of the lower tier government? 2) should they be elected at-large, from single member districts, or a combination thereof? and, 3) what system of voting should be used? While these questions are fundamental and of utmost interest to the designers and their fellow citizens, it should be noted at the outset that there are no conclusive arguments to support one method or another. It depends again on the circumstances of their application and the likes and dislikes of the population involved.

Two excellent research books cover these questions very well and should be consulted: Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Government in a Metropolitan Setting, and Joseph D. Zimmerman, The Federated City. Hallman discusses the various forms of organization which can be applied, ranging from the New England Town Meeting, the representative town meeting, to the small elected council. Zimmerman explains the range of electoral options, including at-large versus district representation, and potential voting systems such as limited voting, cumulative voting, and proportional representation.

Rather than debate the utility of these methods, it would seem more helpful to indicate the points to consider in choosing one or another arrangement. Whether the resident population of the community government is homogeneous or heterogeneous should influence the representation and electoral approach to be used. If a racial minority is included in the lower tier unit, or if part of the community has distinct preferences or problems, single member districts or proportional voting should be employed to insure those groups a voice in the community government. Single member districts would seem more appropriate the larger the population size of the community government. Atlarge elections might be adequate if the lower tier council represented only 10,000 residents. Of course, state election laws will determine ultimately the type of voting and representation system used.

There is no magic number for the size of a local legislative body.

Again the total number of lower tier governments and, thus, the total number of lower tier elected officials in the metropolitan area should be kept in mind while making this decision. A lower tier council of four to eight persons has been the most popular. The Rochester study group proposed this range in number of council members with the specific number to be decided by the individual community. The Salt Lake County two-tier proposal and the one in Sacramento provided for community councils of five members.

The system of representation does not have to be uniform throughout the lower tier; a number of options can be made available for decision by the voters in each community district.

Executive and administrative organization

Every local government charter commission has grappled with the issue of elected executive vs. appointed manager; it is another unsolved public administration question. The problem can be looked at in another way. There is a need at every level of government for leadership and professional expertise.

Those qualities can be sought in a number of ways. A community council as a whole, or together with its chairman, can provide the requisite leadership to build consensus and set priorities. The process may be helped with an elected executive at the lower tier level, but that position would not seem essential. The need for a checks and balances system, or an adversary relationship between the executive and council at the community level is questionable, especially if the community governments are viewed primarily as consensus building and demand articulating mechanisms. The appropriateness of the executive-legislative model at this level should also be questioned in the context of the role of the lower tier units within the metropolitan system of government. The two tier arrangement is premised on checks and balances between levels and between branches of the areawide government.

The need for professional management expertise at the lower tier level would appear to be more critical. That expertise would be more readily available to a community of 20,000 through employment rather than through election. The internal administrative organization of the community government depends entirely on the functions assigned to that level, and the methods of service provision which are adopted. If most functions are provided through contract with the areawide unit or private firms, then a chief administrative officer with a small staff reporting directly to him would probably be sufficient. With more services provided directly by the community government through its own employees, a conventional set of municipal-type departments would do. It may also be desirable for the community governments to mirror to some extent the administrative and functional organization of the areawide government. This could facilitate the day-to-day relationships between the two levels of government, but there is also the danger of developing vertical, functional bureaucracies.

Keeping the system flexible

Flexibility in the form, powers and boundaries of the community governments is needed to insure that the lower tier units continue to serve their original purpose. The ability to revise boundaries, structure and authority be built into the system in order to capitalize on the lessons learned through experience and to keep pace with the dynamics of the metropolitan area. Boundary revision is especially important in the faster growing areas which are still experiencing rapid suburbanization. Older communities also may experience substantial shifts in the character and/or number of their residents and may need some adjustments in their boundaries. A process for adapting the community government system should be developed at the outset. The initiation of a boundary change could be done by petition to the areawide legislative body, with perhaps review or decision by an independent boundary commission appointed jointly by the community councils and the areawide legislature.

Advisory council models

The preceding discussion on the design of lower tier units has been biased toward the establishment of full-scale community governments which would play a major role in service delivery. It is recognized that strong lower tier units of this fashion may not be desirable within the context of a large central city. Central city boundaries are more immutable than many of us would think and the option of abolishing the central city and replacing it with a number of small municipal type units may not be feasible.

It is possible to create decentralized, generalist-oriented structures within the central city which would enable local residents to participate in citywide policy decisions in an advisory and review role (and, perhaps, in some instances with veto power) and to have some influence over the delivery of services. Four models of this form of community "government"

are described next: 1) the District of Columbia Advisory Council system,

2) the Sacramento, California plan, 3) a proposed community council

system prepared by the City Charter Commission in 1972 for Rochester, New

York, and 4) the Salt Lake City Community Council plan. Only the Washington,

D.C., system has been adopted and it is just now being implemented; the others

have not progressed beyond the final approval stage.

District of Columbia

Voters of the District of Columbia approved a referendum in May, 1974, which provided for home rule and an elected mayor and council. On the same ballot was the question of whether a system of Neighborhood Advisory Councils should be established. That question was approved by 73 percent of the voters. When implemented in 1976, neighborhood council members will be elected on a nonpartisan basis to serve two year terms. The councils are advisory in nature, but they may employ staff and will have minimal public funds at their disposal.

According to the charter, the neighborhood councils "may advise the District government on matters of public policy including decisions regarding planning, streets, recreation, social services programs, health, safety, and sanitation in that neighborhood council area." The District Council is also required to give "timely notice . . . to each advisory neighborhood council of requested or proposed zoning changes, variances, public improvement, licenses or permits of significance to neighborhood planning and development within its neighborhood council area for its review, comment and recommendation." Other powers and duties can be given the neighborhood councils by the District Council.

1972 Rochester Plan

A new city charter was presented to the voters in Rochester, New York, in 1972 which would have provided for the establishment of community councils within the city. The charter lost by a narrow vote, but its defeat was attributed primarily to opposition against a strong mayor form of government (the city currently operates under the council-manager plan).

The proposed Rochester charter is a prototypical form of community councils. The boundaries of the community districts were to be coterminous with the eight councilmanic districts. This would result in districts of approximately 35,000 persons. The community councils would be activated by petition of five percent of the voters in the district. Community council members were to be chosen at-large in a non-partisan election to two year terms. They were not to have taxing powers, but could employ staff with funds appropriated by the city council. Their powers were strictly advisory. They could review and comment on physical development matters, including zoning changes, comprehensive plans, and capital projects. They could help plan and advise on the nature and methods of delivery of all public services rendered within the district. They also were empowered to recommend persons from the area for appointment to citywide boards and commissions.

Salt Lake City

The Salt Lake City and County Charter which lost at the polls in March, 1975, also made provision for community councils and contained some interesting variations of that form of decentralization. The boundaries of the fifteen council districts were laid out in the charter and no petition was required to activate them. Significantly, there was to be a commission established to make boundary changes in the community districts as population changes occured.

The community councils consisted of the typical five members, but with an interesting variation. The chairman of each council was to be elected separately and also would serve as one of the fifteen members of the City and County Council. While the powers of the community bodies were limited, this linkage with the areawide legislature would have strengthened their role considerably. They were not authorized to levy taxes or raise revenues. The councils were given a direct involvement in the planning and budgetary process of the City and County which authorized them to develop a detailed plan for the level and kinds of services to be furnished in their area.

Sacramento, California

The charter for a consolidated City and County of Sacramento which was submitted to referendum in November, 1974, called for the establishment of a community council system. It also failed to be approved by the voters. The charter contained criteria for the establishment of community boundaries which were to be followed by a community boundary commission. Again, five members of the council were to be elected, yet the voters in each community district could decide whether to elect them at-large or by single member districts.

The Sacramento community councils were to be given property taxation authority, subject to voter referendum, and were to be allowed to impose user fees for "the use of community facilities and community-provided services."

They were to have a direct service role in a limited number of areas:

- the operation and maintenance of neighborhood and comunity parks and neighborhood and community recreation facilities and programs and the establishment of policies relating to such operation and maintenance;
- 2) street lighting and initiation of and approval of proceedings to establish street lighting assessment districts;
- cultural activities which are community in scope;

- 4) the determination of the number and location of parking meters on streets within the community;
- 5) provision of a higher level of services than the basic level of services, to be paid for by the community council out of locally raised funds, and consistent with the powers delegated to community councils, provided that where primary responsibility for provision of a service lies with the city-county government, the community government may contract with the city-county government for a higher level of service;
- 6) such other programs and services as may be specified by the board of supervisors from time to time by ordinance.

The community councils were also to play a priority-setting role vis-a-vis the areawide government in regard to a number of other functions, for example, animal control services, street cleaning and maintenance, tree trimming, offstreet parking, and redevelopment projects. The board of supervisors was required to submit plans and proposals to the community councils for review and comment in a number of functional areas that were the responsibility of the areawide government. Specific procedures were also included to give the community councils a direct role in planning and zoning, but with final decision making left to the city and county government.

Comparison of advisory council models

The Rochester and District of Columbia models are most typical of those which have been proposed for the political decentralization of a central city. Similar proposals have been made for the cities of Detroit, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, and New York. They follow the general model of a small, elected council with mandatory review and comment powers, but with no taxing authority and a limited role in service delivery.

The Salt Lake City plan follows the same pattern, but with a dis-

tinctive linkage between the community council chairman and the areawide legislature. Another interesting variation to this concept of linking the upper and lower tiers through the system of representation can be found in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Winnipeg's Unicity has an extremely large legislative body of 50 members, but they serve in a dual capacity as members of the city council and as members of the community committees. The city has been divided into thirteen community committees. The committees are comprised of the councilors who represent the wards within each particular community (the number of committee members varies from three to six).

The power and authority given to the community councils in the Sacramento plan may be more extensive than would be desired for the decentralization of a central city. However, elements of that proposal, such as the priority setting role and the imposition of user fees could be included in a central city plan.

FOOTNOTES

1. Bert Swanson, The Concern for Community in Urban America, (New York: Odyssey Press, 1970), p. 130.

CHAPTER VI

DESIGNING THE UPPER TIER

The design of the upper tier unit of government may involve less troublesome questions than those confronted in establishing the community level of government. The task is simplified if the boundaries and structure of an existing county government are used to define and shape the areawide unit. More issues are raised if more than one existing county is included in the area under study.

The CED recommendations

The Committee for Economic Development made the following recommendations for the areawide level:

- 1) In those situations where the metropolitan area is contained within one county, a reconstituted county government should be used as the basic framework for a new areawide government.
- 2) In those cases where the metropolitan area spreads over several counties or towns, a new jurisdiction should be created which embraces all of its territory.

Implicit in the CED suggestions for multi-county situations was the abolition of the existing county governments and their replacement by a new and larger government. While the logic of this approach holds some appeal, the pragmatic possibility of altering or abolishing county boundaries may be remote. It may also not be an appropriate solution. While we have used the term "two-tier" as a convenient phrase to describe this centralized-decentralized model of metropolitan government, there are a number of multi-county areas where where at least three basic tiers of government are appropriate, that is, a regional government (the third tier), an areawide government (the county and second tier), and a community government (the first tier). The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in Minnesota which covers seven counties is perhaps the best example.

Designing the upper-tier in the single county metropolis

Reform and modernization of county government is where the action is in local government reorganization. Reform efforts in metropolitan counties have been undertaken at a furious pace during the last decade. The improvements being made in county government are transforming these traditional, and often anachronistic institutions into strong and progressive units of government. If this trend continues, counties may soon eclipse cities as the major providers of public services and become the prime actors on the local government scene.

The charges which have been levied against county governments need not be restated here—they are too familiar to bear repeating. Yet, the natural advantages of counties do need to be emphasized. First, and most important, is the geographic adequacy of most counties. Many have the territorial coverage to serve as areawide units and to capture economies of scale in the delivery of services, such as mass transportation, water and sewer, and solid waste disposal. In a large number of states, and the list is growing, counties can be endowed with the necessary fiscal, structural and organizational powers to operate effectively as an upper—tier unit. The National Association of Counties, which represents over 3,000 counties in the United States, claims five distinct advantages for counties:

- 1) a broad tax base which insures financial stability;
- 2) an areawide jurisdiction that enables it to administer and enforce important regulatory functions, such as housing codes and environmental programs;
- 3) an economy of scale that is beyond the capacity of smaller jurisdictions;
- 4) as a middle level of government, the county serves as a means of intergovernmental relations between the state and federal governments' programs and the nation's citizenry; and

5) political accountability; the people that reside within the county elect their representatives and pay the county taxes: they are served by the county governing board.

Metropolitan reform in the United States has been synonymous with county reform, with only one major exception—the creation of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in Minnesota. The most notable reform successes have all involved the transformation of a single county government into an areawide unit--Nashville/Davidson County, Jacksonville/Duval County, Miami/Dade County, Indianapolis/Marion County, etc. Since 1949, there have been 50 city-county consolidation efforts, 12 of which were successful. Significantly, 23 were attempted between 1970 and 1974, but only three were approved by the voters. In addition, two city-county consolidations occured by state legislative action--Indianapolis and Marion County in 1969, and Las Vegas and Clark County in 1975. But more important than these consolidations is the extensive number of county charter reforms which have transformed these "administrative arms of the State" into modern, urban governments. A number of counties in major metropolitan areas are functioning essentially as large municipalities; the more prominent examples are: Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties, Maryland, with populations of 660,000 and 580,000 respectively, Westchester and Nassau Counties in New York State with 900,000 and 1.5 million, St. Louis County in Missouri and Santa Clara County, California, both with a million residents.

County modernization efforts were undertaken in Pennsylvania and New Jersey during 1974 and 1975. In New Jersey, reform county charters were placed before the voters in eight counties with the result that four charters were adopted. Following the passage of state legislation in Pennsylvania authorizing home rule options for county government, a number of county charter commissions were organized. Broward County, Florida, recently adopted

a new county charter which gave the county preemptive powers vis-a-vis its municipalities in the areas of pollution abatement and land use. Charter commissions and government study groups have been organized throughout the United States to rejuvenate county government. The changes that are being made, while often unheralded and sometimes incremental, are, nonetheless, momentus in their long range impact on the character of county government.

politan areas, the county government must be reconstituted into an areawide government with broad responsibilities, so that it can deliver services to all its residents irrespective of whether they live in unincorporated areas or in municipalities. This transformation of the county may require new structure, organization, and revised executive and legislative forms, in most cases, but an essential first step is providing the county with a new image. This new image should be based on a conception of the county as a political unit common to all those who reside within its boundaries. For certain responsibilities (carefully designed and assigned), the county must become the dominant institution which acts for all the residents and shapes policy and programs for the entire community. This areawide role for the county will demand alterations in traditional practices and perceptions and create conflict in the process. Such conflict cannot be avoided, but must be mediated and resolved, if the county is to become a true upper-tier unit.

Designing the upper tier in a multi-county situation

The first and most basic issue in designing the upper-tier in a multi-county area is the determination of the outer boundaries of the metropolis. The Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) defined by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Office of Management and Budget may be a starting point. However, the SMSA should be used with caution, and it should be

recognized that SMSAs were developed for purposes of compiling statistics, not for purposes of governing. Counties are used as building blocks in setting SMSA boundaries—a practice which has led to exaggeration of metropolitan boundaries. For example, the Atlanta SMSA includes 15 counties, yet only seven counties belong to the Atlanta Regional Commission, and only four participate in MARTA, the regional transportation authority. The Rochester, New York SMSA is comprised of five counties, but 80 percent of the population and all of the "urbanized area" is contained within Monroe County.

Many of the 140 multi-county SMSAs are multi-county in governmental and political terms, as well as socially and economically, and some type of metropolitan arrangement is needed in those areas. The county modernization approach - by itself, is not an adequate response for these more complex metropolitan areas. The Academy sponsored study in the Tampa Bay area of Florida provides a good illustration of the need to look beyond the county in the design of upper-tier units for complex, multi-county metropolitan areas.

The Tampa/St. Petersburg SMSA includes three counties—Hillsborough, Pasco, and Pinnellas—yet a fourth county, Manatee, is closely interrelated with the region, and all four counties comprise the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Commission. The 1973-75 study by the Suncoast Study Panel focused only on the three SMSA counties, yet the exclusion of Manatee County was a continual concern to the committee. At no time was serious consideration given to the abolition of the existing counties. The three counties have not adopted charter forms of government, yet they possess considerable authority and provide a wide and substantial array of services. While there are significant interdependencies between the three counties, there are also marked differences in economic base, population characteristics (age and ethnic

backgrounds), political party affiliation, and life style. These variations between the residents of the three counties have translated into differing demands for types and levels of public services. As a result, the county governments and some of the municipalities are logical providers of most public services.

While the Suncoast Study Panel concluded that significant steps should be taken to modernize the counties and strengthen their role vis-a-vis the municipalities, they felt that the most critical public sector problems were beyond the capacity of county government and demanded a regional response. In their view, an effective regional governing body was needed particularly to deal with water supply distribution, sewage treatment, solid waste disposal and resource recovery, and transportation. Comprehensive land use planning and development, which involves all of the other functions, was also viewed as demanding regional attention. The panel's recommendations for reorganization focused on the need to centralize a limited number of public functions at a level above county government through the establishment of a comprehensive, authoritative and accountable regional organization.

The major point to be made here is that in the multi-county area of Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida, a local government study committee made clear distinctions between public services and responsibilities which were local (sub-county), areawide (county) and regional (multi-county) and, based on such a classification, determined the need for distinct but interrelated governmental units at each level.

The most appropriate governmental arrangement for a metropolitan area cannot be suggested in the abstract— it is true that each metropolis is unique and that what fits in one place may not be suitable to another,

Yet, there are some objective factors which should be considered in choosing from the options available. The following seem particularly relevant to upper-tier design and the definition of the real metropolis: 1) the size, in terms of land area, of the metropolitan area; 2) the density of the urban population, and its spatial distribution; 3) the character of the metropolitan population, county-by-county; 4) the number of counties involved; and, 5) the extent and magnitude of public sector externalities or spillovers in the metropolitan area.

The size of the metropolitan area in spatial terms should be a key consideration in deciding whether two or three tiers are appropriate. The land area over which public services must be provided will, in part, determine at what level economies of scale can be reached. Additionally, the number of miles between the citizen and government offices will influence accessibility of services. Generally, it would seem axiomatic that the larger the area covered by the metropolis, the more likely the need for three tiers of government. A compact and densely settled metropolis may be able to deliver services effectively and responsively with fewer levels of government, especially if its population is relatively homogeneous. On the other hand, those metropolitan areas with a concentrated urban core but with a semiurban and suburban population spread over a larger area would seem to need at least three tiers. The more diverse or heterogeneous the population, the greater the probable need for more governmental levels. The larger the land area, the lesser the population density, the more varied the citizenry, the larger the number of counties, and the fewer externalities involved are all characteristics indicating a three-tier arrangement. The opposites of these would suggest that two tiers are probably sufficient.

programs which impact on local communities through public hearings, advisory reviews, and, in some cases, veto powers. In addition, equitable representation should be accorded to members of minority groups on both citizen committees and elected bodies.

In its delivery of areawide services, the upper tier government should develop processes and mechanisms to insure the uniform availability of, and access to, public services throughout the community. It should be flexible in its mode of delivery so that services can be tailored to particular needs of individual communities, and should be able to adjust the level and intensity to the demand for specific services. And, finally, to enhance the equitable support and provision of services, it should provide for a fair distribution of taxes and charges for areawide services.

These general characteristics were stated well by the National Association of Counties in their 1974-1975 official policy statement:

- A. Flexibility of Form Counties should be free to devise their own internal organizational structure either under charter or under general law.
- B. Flexibility of Function Counties should be free to determine the scope and extent of the governmental service each will render, subject to the recognized need for some uniformity in the standard of delivery of services of national or statewide import.
- C. Flexibility of Finance Counties should have the ability to employ means of financing county government other than the traditional and inadequate property tax.

The system of representation and the form and organization of the executive and legislative branches of the upper tier government are likely to be the most debated issues that will be confronted. Unfortunately, there are no hard and fast rules and no conclusive evidence to rely upon in the consideration of these issues. They depend ultimately on the characteristics and traditions which prevail in the area. Some points can be pre-

sented for consideration in the process of reaching these value judgments.

The Committee for Economic Development concluded that the upper tier government should have a separately elected policy board:

The practice exists in some metropolitan areas of representing community units—towns and villages—on an area—wide governing council. However, this form of representation rarely produces an area—wide point of view but rather a bargaining process through which the various smaller units try to protect their parochial interests. Therefore, we suggest that delegates to the area—wide government represent legislative districts on a one—man, one—vote basis instead of representing the community districts as such.

The study panel in Florida reached the same conclusion in their proposal for a regional government:

The position of the panel is that regional policy must be responsive to a regional constituency. Local government officials must be judged by their own constituency for decisions pertinent to their own jurisdictions. The components of problems that are truly regional . . . cannot be solved by policies which are only a sum of the "parts" advocated by local jurisdictions.

A separately elected policy board or legislature does appear essential if the upper-tier is to exercise a significant set of responsibilities. The two-tier concept envisions a strong and independent areawide government that can set areawide policies, achieve directly or indirectly the carrying out of those policies, and mediate and moderate inter-municipal, inter-county, and other intergovernmental conflicts and disparities. An areawide policy board that is not directly elected and which lacks its own constituency base would have difficulty in fulfilling these roles.

It must also be decided whether the members of the upper tier policy board are to be elected at-large, from single member districts, or a combination thereof, and whether they should serve two year or four year terms. During the reform movements earlier in this century, numerous attacks were made against the single member district in an effort to get rid of ward

politics. At-large elections were praised on the virtue that they helped eliminate parochialism. Today, however, single member districts are viewed as the best way to insure equitable representation of minorities and other groups and to provide greater accountability to the electorate. Another argument made against at-large elections is the high expense of political campaigns. Two year terms are favored by many because more frequent elections tend to increase accountability, yet also lead to more frequent campaigning and allegedly less time devoted to legislative duties. Proponents of a two year term for legislators often point to the U.S. House of Representatives as an example of how well that system works. Those who favor a four year term argue that it provides a longer time to develop and implement programs and policy and enables legislators to be informed better on issues.

The other key issue with regard to the form of government is whether the upper-tier should have an elected executive or appointed manager. The Rochester panel looked at the pros and cons of this issue and cited the following strengths and weaknesses of the county manager and elected executive plans. "The manager tends to be a professional administrator; there can be a positive working relationship with the legislature; there is a balanced distribution of power between the executive and legislative branches; there is less political administration; and, the manager is more responsive to the legislature. The manager plan also has several recognized weaknesses: a diffusion of public responsibility and accountability; the absence of a single, elected leader for the upper tier; conflicting responsibilities and loyalties for administrative personnel between the executive and legislature.

The elected executive plan has the following strengths: direct accountability to the voters; a focal point for countywide issues and policy

leadership; potential of increased influence with state and federal governments with one voice speaking for the entire metropolis. Yet, there are potential weaknesses: erosion of the legislature's power; a concentration of
power in one person; an adversary climate could develop between the executive
and legislature; less likelihood of professional administration; and no
guarantee that legislative policy will be implemented."

The elected executive plan; seems to be growing in popularity, especially in those counties with more than 200,000 population. According to the National Association of Counties, 64 percent of the county executive positions have been created since 1960, and 35 percent since 1965. The New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission found that the elected executive plan "is suited particularly to urban counties where there are substantial differences of opinion over policy and where there is group and sectional diversity which creates the need for strong and decisive leadership to get things done." If the reform experience in Miami/Dade County is characteristic, a new areawide government will need strong executive leadership during the transtitional and formative period. The initial period of a reformed government is bound to be somewhat chaotic and in a time of extensive opposition to it, an elected executive may be essential to provide direction and to defend the system.

CHAPTER VII

LINKING THE UPPER AND LOWER TIERS

The 'two tier model calls for the development of a system of local government in metropolitan areas based on interrelated tiers or levels which are neither supreme nor subordinate to each other. The components of the system—upper tier and lower tier units—are separate governments formed for different purposes, yet responsible collectively for the governance of the metropolis. If they are to form a system of interrelated tiers, they must be linked to one another to fulfill their common purpose. The design of linkages between the two tiers is critical, since they are the glue which holds the system together and allows it to function as a system. Without such linkages, there is little distinction from the conventional fragmentation of most metropolitan areas.

Four fundamental reasons can be given for the establishment of linkages between the upper and lower tiers:

- 1) to provide for the general coordination of services, programs and policies of the areawide local units;
- 2) to increase responsiveness of the upper tier government to lower tier policies and citizen needs;
- 3) to enhance the accessibility of centralized services at the community level; and,
- 4) to establish and maintain a balanced power relationship between the areawide and local levels of government.

These basic objectives can be attained through the utilization of three main types of linkages: functional, power/process, and organizational. These types of linkages and the possible specific arrangements under each are discussed in the pages which follow.

The functional analysis process, explained in Chapter III, will result in determinations as to those functions, sub-functions, and activities which should be assigned to the lower tier units, those to be assigned to the upper tier, and those which are to be shared between the two tiers. It is likely that the majority of public services will, to a greater or lesser extent, be shared between the two tiers of government. It is in these shared functions that the two tiers are interrelated.

The activities—planning, funding, delivery, regulation—associated with the functions are the threads which knit the two tiers together, and decide the interactions which must occur between the governmental levels. If mass transportation planning is to be a shared responsibility with both tiers participating in the process, then linkages must be established between local planning committees and staff and the areawide planning committee and its staff. If the upper tier is assigned responsibility for the regulation of ambulance services, then methods must be developed for the setting and enforcing of standards vis—a—vis the local units which have responsibility for the actual conduct of emergency ambulance service.

The assignment of functions and activities determines the power/process linkages and the organizational linkages that are required to make the two tier system work. Power/process linkages are essentially a definition of the rules to be followed by the governmental actors—bureaucrats, elected officials, and citizens—in the execution of shared responsibilities. For example, can the upper tier policy board veto a land use decision made by a lower tier policy board? If so, what types of land use decisions and under what conditions. What discretion does the lower tier unit have regarding public health services delivered to the community by the areawide govern—

ment? Such roles and relationships have to be clarified in considerable detail for each function and activity. In most cases, state and federal law and regulation will decide a number of these issues. Many of the traditional practices and processes can be adapted to the new governmental system as well. If a substantial reallocation of service assignments occurs, however, new rules and procedures will have to be drafted without the benefit of past experience.

In the earlier chapter on functional analysis, eight types of power relationships were described. It is worthwhile to repeat those here. They include the power to veto absolutely, to veto subject to override, to delay for a specified period of time, to propose, to advise, to review and comment, and to appeal. These different forms of power, and variants of them, must be linked to each function and activity that is shared between the tiers. It is important to recognize that these powers can work in both directions, that is, certain decisions of the upper tier may be vetoed by the lower tier and vice-versa. In some functional areas, the role of the areawide government may be minimal and limited to such powers as review and comment, leaving the lower tier to operate with considerable autonomy.

Organizational linkages will also be needed to complement the power and process linkages that are developed. By this is meant such arrangements as joint committees of elected officials, citizen advisory committees, service facilities located in the community, and such other structures as may be devised to bring policymakers together and provide input from citizens into the policymaking process.

Decentralized Delivery of Centralized Services

Although a number of functions may be recommended for centralization at the areawide level, the actual conduct of those functions by the uppertier can be carried out in a decentralization fashion. This is particularly true of the human services functions—welfare, mental health, etc. Most human services are now the responsibility of county government with extensive involvement of state and federal agencies. The centralization of human services has taken place for reasons of economies of scale in their administration, the need for specialized skills, and because of the substantial funding levels required. Yet these services are directed at individual clients with differing needs, living in varied communities.

The welfare and social services field has been criticized often for its impersonality, its bureaucratic character, and its failure to deal with the "whole client." Numerous attempts have been made to resolve these problems by establishing neighborhood service centers and community based programs. The community mental health centers program, which began in the early sixties, set out to reverse the impersonal and remote character of state mental institutions by locating mental health staffs in the community. That program also attempted to integrate services by creating the "multi-agency center", a consortium of related agencies such as family services, vocational rehabilitation, psychiatric clinics, and mental hospitals. Not only were the community mental health centers to be integrative and community-based, they were also to be community operated with resident involvement on boards of directors and advisory committees.

The community mental health model is being adapted to other human services in an attempt to strike a balance between centralized responsibility and decentralized delivery. The need for such a balance is well-stated in

a report prepared by the Allegheny County Human Service Commission (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), a group of forty citizens formed to assess the County's role in the delivery of health and social services. The following quote from their November, 1974, report addresses this point:

Thus far this report has emphasized the centralization of administrative functions within a new office of County government. Equally important, we believe, is the need to <u>decentralize</u> the actual delivery of services into districts throughout the County. The citizen in need of human services faces a major problem: how to sort through the labyrinth of agencies to discover those services tailored to one's problem. Unfortunately this burden now rests with the consumer. It is the service consumer who bears the onus for poorly coordinated agencies, for inaccessible services, for an indecipherable system.

The citizens' commission recommended the creation of 12 service districts

"covering the whole County including the City of Pittsburgh, which each

County department must adopt and incorporate into its operation." The goals of
these districts were stated as:

- to assure clients of close geographic access to services;
- establish common entry points in districts for the entire range of County services;
- 3) provide comparable "data profiles" for each district, allowing for cross analysis;
- 4) allow flexibility in committing the appropriate resources into each district; and,
- 5) encourage strong citizen role in local design of programs.

 Each service district would have an advisory council consisting of local citizens, and perhaps service providers and local officials, yet the proposal would allow different governing relationships to evolve according to local needs and strengths.

The Greater Rochester Intergovernmental Panel developed a general model called the County Service District for the decentralized delivery of certain services which had been assigned to the upper tier. The County Service District Model was designed to serve three purposes: 1) improve communications with regard to the performance of areawide services within community areas, 2) allow citizens increased access to the planning, budgeting, programming and legislative processes of government, and, 3) improve the integrated delivery and quality of areawide services.

Under the Rochester proposal, County Service Districts would be established for each of the functional categories of human services, physical services and public safety. Service delivery programs would be designed for each functional category and would be tailored to the individual characteristics and needs of each district. Two way channels of communication would be created between advisory boards of the County Service District and the upper tier government.

A citizen board comprised of residents of the area served by the County Service District would be formed by the lower tier units located in the District. The citizen board would have the following major advisory responsibilities: 1) identifying community needs for services within each functional category; 2) participating in the setting of service priorities; 3) evaluating the services delivered; and, 4) participating in the design of service delivery programs.

The GRIP Plan for Police Services

After determining that the current system of police services in Monroe County suffered from a number of serious shortcomings, the GRIP panel worked to develop a plan which would be flexible enough to allow the retention of the

existing local police forces if desired by the municipalities, provide specialized services to the entire county, be equitably financed in relation to the benefits received, and allow for citizen participation at the local level.

The GRIP plan called for the establishment of a County Department of Police Services which would be divided into two divisions: a Central Services Division and a Central Police Patrol Division. The Central Services Division would be supported by a countywide tax and its services would be provided or available to all of the police forces in the County. Services recommended for the division included communications, records, identification, training, property, booking, special patrols (air and water), special investigations, technicians unit, planning and research, and detention.

The Central Police Patrol Division would be responsible for those services ordinarily performed by uniformed personnel in the field. Police patrol services would be provided to, and financed by, those municipalities without their own patrol forces through centralized districts. The City of Rochester would be divided into four patrol districts and three districts were to be formed in the County. These "town" districts would be comprised of contiguous towns which currently relied on the Sheriff for police protection.

Each of the patrol districts would have a local advisory council comprised of one representative appointed by the board of each participating town, or, in the case of the City, one representative appointed by the City Council from each of the three county legislature electoral districts. The local advisory councils would meet with the local police chief to determine the level of policies needed in the districts.

Police and Human services are only two examples of functional areas

which are amenable to decentralized delivery with some centralized responsibility. Other public functions, even those which may be viewed as purely local, can benefit from some type of linkage between the local and areawide levels of government. A careful analysis of functions, sub-functions, and activities will indicate the kinds of interactions which are appropriate.

This effort to interrelate the tiers of a governmental system should also include considerations which go beyond individual services and functions. The broader policymaking and planning activities of elected governing boards at the local and areawide level must also be considered.

Appendix 1

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